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COMPTROLLER FRED WHITE AND THE ARCTIC PRESENCE OF THE RNWMP 1903-1911

by

Terrance Frederick Kelly

A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH

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Date April 15, 1985

DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to the virtue of stubbornness, without which common sense would have intervened and prevented the completion of the project.

ABSTRACT

Officials in bureaucracies are entrusted with the responsibility of efficiently allocating resources to create a defined product. To accomplish this they expend resources in the form of money, time, person years and experience to develop the required procedures. When new goals become available to these officials, or when change is imposed externally, the decision-maker must measure the advantages to be gained in obtaining the new objectives with the resources available to him. Various officials will react differently. It may be more rational to protect the resources already invested in the development of procedures than to endure the costs of implementing the new goals. Certain decision-makers, termed 'conservers', will characteristically react to change by preserving past investments of resources.

During the years of the Klondike Gold Rush organizational stability within the Police was upended. Sometimes misinformed, often uninformed, Comptroller Fred White listened while the government became involved directly with events in the Yukon, and watched while field commanders initiated the erection of new detachments. Accountable to

the former and responsible for the latter, he rebounded rather than directed.

White remembered these experiences when the government ordered the Mounties into the Arctic in 1903. The N.W.M.P. had gained stature from the successes achieved in the Yukon. Fred White wished the benefits so derived, but desired none of the accompanying organizational instability. The western Arctic operation promised him just such a prospect. He closely directed the operation and soon offered the government the symbols of nationhood which they desired. The eastern Arctic operation was quite another matter. White was not prepared, knew little about the region and soon was responding powerlessly as he had been forced to do in the Yukon. Fortunately, the government lacked its earlier resolve. In 1905 White transferred much of the Mountie role to the Department of Marine and Fisheries. The scope of 'M' Division's responsibilities shrivelled as it fulfilled an ill-defined mandate.

In the western Arctic the relevancy of 'N' Division was equally nebulous. Detachment commanders' reports arrived at Fred White's office where recommendations were weighed in consideration of White's ability to function as a decision-maker. The health of the organization as perceived by White was all-important. Requests for new detachments, proposals for secure supply lines and suggestions for stores of emergency supplies for the natives were ignored or rejected.

In the East the influence of the whalers was moribund. In the West, a few foreign ships steamed past Herschel to whale some three

hundred miles to the east. Nonetheless White's reports to the government centered on the presence of these foreigners. Skillfully White linked the absence of criminal problems and sovereignty threats with the effectiveness of the Mounties. In the Yukon White had unwillingly responded to the synchronous demands of the detachment commanders and the government. In the Arctic White was less restricted by government policy and demands and could channel, alter and ultimately divert the requests of the detachment commanders to reflect the objectives for which he was willing to expend resources. The result was a product which seldom resembled the requests from those in the North, but which reinforced the authority of the office of the Comptroller.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I could never have anticipated the length of time that it would take to see this project from conception to fruition. My appreciation for those who have assisted me has grown over the years to an indebtedness which words on this page, no matter how sincerely felt, can not repay.

My thanks are extended to Professor John Foster who directed me with patience as I muddled my way through the first several chapters. Professor Gurston Dacks was instrumental in broadening my understanding of the multi-faceted nature of decision-making in bureaucracies. Dr. Robert Carney provided me with additional insight into several key areas in a timely manner. I am especially appreciative of the efforts of my thesis advisor, Professor C.S. MacKinnon, who persevered with indefatigable patience and resolve as the years ticked by. His gentle yet firm guidance kept me on the path which ultimately led to the finished product. I imposed on the relationship of a good friend, Maureen McRory, for the typing of this thesis and in so doing, discovered the unsuitability of the words 'thank you'.

Most importantly, I stand in awe at the patience displayed by my family. I tested Susan beyond all sense of fairness in the belaboured production of this and she responded with continued support. My children Meghan and Brendan did not even exist when this study was first undertaken and they have unknowingly given up the company of their father while it churned on and on. The word is too simple, too inadequate but it is offered with heartfelt respect: thanks.

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INTRODUCTION

By most accounts, the story of the Royal North-West Mounted Police[1] as a government agent in the Canadian Arctic is one in which the senior Dominion in the British Empire, led by a government which was confident that the twentieth century belonged to Canada, acted decisively to extend the rightful interests of Canadians in the face of the aggressive posturings of a land-hungry American nation. In the history which has emerged, the R.N.W.M.P. are seen as dutiful servants of 'nation' and Empire, the exemplary instrument of national policy.

This work will contest this popularly acceptable history. In focusing on the years 1903 to 1911, the crucial period in which the R.N.W.M.P. extended its jurisdiction to the Arctic Ocean, it will argue that the advance was far from an orderly assertion of national rights, the product of logical and well-executed policy. Rather, it shall illustrate that the northern activities of the national police force produced an unwieldy maze of disjointed results, that a concerted effort to establish a meaningful presence in these remote regions languished in the absence of a cohesive policy with clearly defined objectives.

decisions were made, and why they were made, the circumstances in which events took place fall more tidily into a comprehensible pattern.

Attention will centre directly on the role of the Comptroller of the Force, Fred White. The manner in which he fulfilled the responsibilities of his position had a singular role in forming the government's policy and shaping the R.N.W.M.P. presence in the Canadian North. After 1880, when White accepted the appointment to the newly-created office of the Comptroller, the authority of the position grew from that of a minor civil servant, accounting to the government for an agency which was headquartered in distant Regina, to the powers of a Deputy Minister. By 1900, White directed the Commissioner of the Force on all matters of broad policy, steering the Branch along the paths of government intention. Simultaneously he advised the government on issues which directly or indirectly involved the N.W.M.P. Through him, all information and much power flowed.

General histories of the Arctic, mostly travelogues and memoirs, scarcely address the police operations, and those few which centre on the expeditions take the tone of an 'Imperial' history. The exception is Morris Zaslow's The Opening of the Canadian North 1870-1914[4]. It is unique for its breadth of scope and its attention to factual detail. Despite some telling insights, however, the topic of his work precludes a systematic analysis of the smaller issue on which the present study focuses. In describing the police activities in the North, Zaslow to some extent, and many other writers to a larger

degree[5], rely upon assumptions which have been unquestioningly accepted.

Most published works on the R.N.W.M.P. are general histories, volumes designed to entertain the reader and to perpetuate the reputation of the Force as the upholders of justice. These works[6] focus on the perspective of the Mounties as agents of law and order. The authors do not recognize the political role of the Force. Consequently their works ignore the importance which politics, decision-making and administration have played in the accomplishment of the varied roles of the R.N.W.M.P.

Two doctoral dissertations contribute to an understanding of the events encompassed by this study. Ian McClymont[7] in his examination of the expansionist tendency of the Laurier government, contradicts many previous generalizations regarding the motivations of the government in asserting authority in the North. But his concern centres on the political environment: the development and growth of a national foreign policy under the leadership of Laurier. Consequently, he skims over the details of process in a department which was but one of the government's instruments of policy.

The Morrison thesis sets out to "discover how, why, where, and to what extent the Mounted Police contributed to the history and development of Canada's northern frontier"[8]. The chronology which he presents implicitly re-writes a story which since 1919 has been obscured by myth. However, he is primarily interested in describing

the events which transpired, and takes little account of the decision-making process which preceded and accompanied the extension of police authority into the northern frontier. Consequently, Morrison avoids addressing the dichotomy which existed between the stated objectives and the actual achievements of the northern police detachments during the first decade of the twentieth century.

As this thesis focuses on the pivotal role of Fred White, studies from other social sciences have been consulted to assist in the evaluation of his influence. The concept of an 'official mind' - stereo-typed methods of decision-making particular to government service - has won favourable attention from such writers with diverse historical interests as Schumpeter[9], Robinson and Gallagher[10] and Kanya-Forstner[11]. As an analytical tool, the concept has not been developed beyond a vague form of generalization and subsequently, it has remained susceptible to misuse and misunderstanding. The present century, shaped by ever-growing bureaucracies with unprecedented influence and power, has given rise to the topic of institutionalized authority in the disciplines of sociology, political science and public and business administration. Investigations into the process of decision-making have pushed aside many vague and unstated assumptions and replaced them with much needed substantiated reasoning.

Within a few years after Confederation, it was common knowledge that the operation of the civil service of the new nation was thwarted by graft, ineptitude, and stultifying precedence. The government appointed a Royal Commission in 1880 to study the disastrous condition

of the federal civil service. The Commission found that while the merit principle was supposedly the guideline for all promotions, not one qualifying examination had been written in the civil service in the four years preceding[12]. After public release of these conclusions, the government introduced procedures to rectify the deplorable state of affairs, but change was more apparent than substantive. Patronage continued to flourish in the decades which followed[13].

Consequently, the Liberals moved quickly after ousting the eighteen-year-old Conservative government in July of 1896. They ordered wholesale dismissals in almost all departments in Ottawa. In less than nine months, some 473 civil servants were removed from their positions in eight departments[14]. Even after the initial purge, dismissals continued for several years. Ironically, patronage had not been dealt a death blow, for the replacements were inevitably Liberal-favoured candidates who now sat where Conservatives had previously been appointed[15].

It was during the tenure of the Conservative government that Fred White enjoyed important career advances. Born in England in 1847, he emigrated to Canada in 1862 and after an assortment of jobs, became a clerk in the Justice Department in 1869. He soon gained favourable professional attention and in 1876 he was appointed to be the clerk in charge of the police, reporting to the Secretary of State. Four years later, the position of the Comptroller of the R.N.W.M.P. was formed. Prime Minister Macdonald had been forced to remove Commissioner Macleod because of massive over-spending and because of Macleod's inability or

unwillingness to appreciate the Prime Minister's desire to control the Mounties from Ottawa. The new position was to be "concerned with financial matters, government appropriations, and the like"[16]. Macdonald hoped that conflicts such as those which had surfaced during Macleod's tenure could thus be reduced[17].

From these humble terms of references, the authority which White exercised as the Comptroller during the next thirty-two years grew remarkably. He was financially responsible for the Force, but more importantly, he was expected to interpret and convey technical police matters to the Cabinet. Similarly, he was to channel accurately the government intentions to the Commissioner. As such, he was in a critical position to influence policy formation in both the N.W.M.P. and the government[18]. His influence peaked with the events in the Yukon at the turn of the century, was recognized when he was awarded the Companion of St. Michael and St. George in 1905[19], and eventually ebbed as technology and improved communications eroded the importance of his role. As early as 1883, he was given the powers, if not the title, of an assistant deputy minister, accounting to the new Deputy Minister of Interior, A.M. Burgess, for the implementation of, and the direction for, policies of the N.W.M.P.[20]. Even earlier, in 1880, his personal link with the Conservative Party had been symbolized when he was appointed private secretary to John A. Macdonald.

For this reason, White must well have sensed his vulnerability when the new Liberal government ousted large numbers of civil servants[21]. His uneasiness would also have been increased by the

awareness that the Liberals, while the official Opposition, had repeatedly attacked the Conservative government with the charge of financial irresponsibility[22]. One of the principal targets had been the N.W.M.P., the function and purposes of which had been denounced as wasteful, extravagant and irrelevant[23]. White's career, so successful under the umbrella of Conservative political domination, was threatened during the summer and fall of 1896.

The principle of a professional civil service, free to exercise the technical skills necessary for the objective implementation of government policy was degraded by the all-pervasive effect of patronage[24]. Ideally the civil service should have been removed from the daily machinations of party politics, governed by the "principle of efficiency and not by majority opinion"[25]. While such a distribution of power - detached, efficient, non-self-serving and legitimate - could never of course be obtained[26], it was the goal which rationality and accountability demanded.

But the incestuous relationship between the Conservative government and the civil service ensured that such an ideally-motivated mix of political and technical expertise did not exist[27]. Because of this, one of the principal advantages of a civil service - the assurance of individual security, enabling the continuity of the government's work despite the uncertainty of the political climate - was negated by the suspicious, albeit well-founded musings of a recently-elected Liberal government. This affected the candidness with which the remaining civil servants offered advice to the Cabinet. Fred

White was treading lightly in a politically-charged environment, frankly conscious of his professional vulnerability.

Despite the discrepancies between the actual and the ideal, the various government departments were structured to function in a rational manner, hierarchically organized to maximize productivity at minimal expense to the public. As Michels recognizes in his monumental study of bureaucratic structures[28], organization is a requirement of any group which desires the achievement of diverse aims through "the greatest possible economy of energy"[29]. The goal of rational decision-making and objective implementation is sought firstly by the division of labour which creates individual specialization, and secondly by the assurance of accountability. The latter is obtained by a strict adherence to procedures and an all-pervasive hierarchical chain-of-command. Such a process stresses technical efficiency, "precision, speed, expert control, continuity, discretion, and optimal returns"[30], attributes which lend themselves favourably to the non-partisan role of a civil service. Through an efficient organization, the spontaneous or accidental is rejected and replaced by the systematic. Verification and formalization become all-important processes[31].

A review of the analyses of bureaucracies indicates that in general terms several schools have evolved in the study of the methods by which organizations function[32]. One school, represented by such scholars as Weber, Merton and Blau deal with bureaucracies as a general category, attributing predictable and universal behaviour in large

organizations to common factors. But as Singhi notes, these studies have emphasized and perhaps distorted the dysfunctional aspects of bureaucratic behaviour[33]. Consequently, others contend that bureaucratic structure and bureaucratic personality cannot be portrayed as universal constants which react to given stimuli in grossly predictable ways. Such scholars have not necessarily denied the logic of predecessors' arguments as much as they have refined the utility of the earlier works. Anthony Downs seeks, as did Max Weber, the goal of predicting bureaucratic behaviour. In his studies, however, he identifies not one bureaucratic model of behaviour but five stereotyped personalities who function in a similar environment in distinct and identifiable methods[34]. The result is a more complex and sophisticated method of analysis, one which broadens the understanding of the bureaucratic function.

This work will rely heavily on the results of both schools of study. A general overview of the procedures within organizations can be summarized best by reviewing the work of the first school. Selected findings of the second school will be drawn upon to enhance the understanding of decision-making in a bureaucracy.

Many studies of bureaucratic structure have concluded that the very procedures designed to ensure rational decision-making often lead to the entrenchment of a process which creates the converse. The strong reliance upon procedures, designed to obtain a predetermined product can acquire a symbolic significance which places more emphasis upon the maintenance of routine than the achievement of the goal[35].

Verification of the correctness of any action is determined, not by whether the results were meaningful, but by proving that the procedures employed were correct. Since the emphasis on validity is placed on process, the power of an organization becomes both self-fulfilling and self-serving.

An evolution transpires. From the initial requirement for efficiency springs an organization, the creation of which centralizes power. To ensure that this power can be accounted for, procedures are formalized, which then become institutionalized. Sustaining these procedures becomes the goal of the organization. The importance of legitimacy transcends the importance of the flexibility required for maintaining relevancy in an ever-changing environment. Based on precedents, such power is conservative. Continued power means organizational survival.

The procedures must be entrenched as an integral part of providing the pre-defined service, and the staff must be trained in the importance of sustaining the procedures, the organization, and consequently, legitimate and institutionalized power. With power structured hierarchically, the attitudes and values which represent the organization will emanate from the top, representing the status quo[36]. The paramount value of the structure, then, will be organizational survival. The attention of the leaders will be focused squarely on the interests of the organization, and not necessarily on the service which the organization produces[37].

But the motivations of the individuals in the upper reaches of the hierarchy should not be misconstrued. In the eyes of the leaders, the abstract objectives of the organization are rational while the procedures have been legitimized through formalization. The commonality of perspective, shared by members of the organization[38] is natural, and the legitimacy of the power which is derived from the collective authority is assumed by those who wield it. As Michels states:

> The despotism of the leaders does not arise solely from a vulgar lust of power or from uncontrolled egotism, but is often the outcome of a profound and sincere conviction of their own value and of the services which they have rendered to the common cause.[39]

Consequently, members from all levels of a bureaucracy strive for stability. The human machine, which is the organization, is structured to create a product efficiently. At the lowest levels of the hierarchy, the procedures are most effective when circumstances parallel the conditions for which they were developed; at the upper levels, decision-making is routinized so that the expertise of the leaders, gained in the past, is maximized.

Change threatens the stability, the function and the effectiveness of the organization. Change which originates from outside of the organization due to circumstances beyond the control of those in the upper hierarchy jeopardizes the very existence of the organization by threatening the sanctity of procedures and eroding internal authority. For existing procedures are always based on producing a predetermined product. The new product or service not

predetermined by the decision-makers within the organization, invalidates the previous process and consequently places the strength of the organization, its processes, in jeopardy. To question the procedures or the solutions undermines the product of the past, the very substance of which represents the achievements of those in the upper strata of the hierarchy. Consequently, when change is imposed by circumstances or persons outside of the control of the decision-makers in an organization, it breeds uncertainty within.

Accordingly, the subject of a bureaucracy's ability to cope with change has become the focus of much academic attention. Studies have identified factors which lead to uncertainty in the decision-making environment. In any strategy, if decision-making is to be confident, key variables must be clear and measureable. Objectives must be defined; a known and realistic budget must be assured; and the additional support of other agencies must be available if the tasks will demand their specialized skills. Where these exist, leaders will function quite well: but if they are vague or ill-defined, or have been ignored either consciously or unconsciously, decision-making will be impaired. Furthermore, if decisions must be based on information which is limited or is known to be faulty, but comprises all that is available, decision-makers will find the exercise of their responsibility frustrated. They will recognize the weakness of uninformed action, and balk at its implications. However, they will be confronted by the conflict between their own 'aversion to risk' stemming from non-rationalized decision-making and the requirement to act despite this aversion. In summary, leaders will suffer from an

accumulated uneasiness when the objectives are unclear, the means are ill-defined, and the data is uncertain[40].

Quite simply, "the conflict arises from not knowing the principles of the new environment and finding the principles of the old are no longer sufficient"[41]. The sanctity of stability, the norm upon which the organization has risen to perform its expected function, is violated. And yet, the organization's very existence may well be determined by its ability to cope with this new situation. Analysts have found that decision-makers, plunged into these circumstances, usually respond in several like and predictable manners.

If the leaders feel that the situation does not constitute a serious threat to their organization's function, they will continue to rely upon established procedures. Their concern lies with the future damage which could be caused by the precedence of their actions, so they look principally to sustaining the system. They will often respond to change by merely rearranging the priorities, thereby not threatening the essential structure of the organization either in its form or in its long-term function[42]. For similar reasons, they may attempt to control the decision-making environment, and manage the forces of change into a form with which the organization can cope. As Benveniste states, the leaders will "attempt to use rational instruments to force the environment into more predictable patterns"[43].

When faced with the vagaries of uncertainty, leaders may look only to the short term in their strategies, and ignore all commitments or plans which could carry into the long-term. This will be true particularly if the source of uncertainty is a lack of reliable information. They will "solve pressing problems rather than develop long-run strategies"[44]. If the future looks too uncertain, they may abstain totally from the function of making decisions. Having chosen this course, in essence repudiating their prime professional responsibility, they may rationalize their actions by placing renewed emphasis on established rules and procedures[45]. By redefining the terms of their responsibility by the criteria of the established procedures, they ignore their responsibility to deal with the unexpected, and demand allegiance for the accomplishments of the past. That which has been done will be done: that which is unexpected, is, by definition, outside this purview, is consequently illegitimate, and is the responsibility of someone else. The very fact that circumstances are changed and demand a response will be the reason that no response is forthcoming.

It can be seen, therefore, that the reaction of the upper hierarchy to change or uncertainty is most often a more vigorous reliance on the symbols of authority. Established procedure, instead of serving as an efficient and objective tool, becomes the barrier to reasoned action. The logic of what Merton has described as 'trained incapacity' is borne out, and the product of a rationalized system of decision-making becomes decidedly irrational[46]. Certain characteristics of this process make it all the more dangerous in the

misuse of reason. Firstly, if an organization has a finite set of conditioned responses predetermined due to precedent, the response to a changed set of circumstances will be automatic, but probably incorrect. Secondly, the very confidence gained from past successes will encourage the wrong response to the changed circumstance. Thirdly, and finally, the attributes which in previous circumstances led to the leader's success now serve as 'blind spots' and prove to be a disability in recognizing and responding to change[47].

While these conclusions can be applied to decision-making in any large organization, they are commonplace in the unique environment of the senior civil service. The State, by the very nature of its diverse obligations and various responsibilities, demands a large and complex bureaucracy[48]. That the characteristics of a civil service and a bureaucracy should be closely parallel is therefore not surprising[49]. Indeed, it has become common to link the function of government departments with precedence and procedure, to note the self-fulfilling purpose of such departments, and to observe the distrust of change which permeates such organizations[50].

However, the difficulty of confident and rational decision-making in a bureaucracy is accentuated by the unique relationship between a government and its civil service. The former body, elected to be responsible for the nation's affairs, delegates much of that authority to the civil service for expert administration. In the non-political environment, the problems of management of authority between professional principles and bureaucratic principles

clouds the works of many organizations[51], but in these circumstances, the over-riding authority is politically dominated, and a third principle of authority conflicts with the bureaucratic and professional principles.

The mix of these three guiding and potentially conflicting principles breeds an environment which theorists would condemn for its effect on rational decision-making. The vagaries of political and public pressure can make policies non-substantive, the objectives muddled by the obscurities of rhetoric. A technically sound plan proposed by a department can be thoroughly altered by the political demands of the time, and its implementation can deviate yet further as the routine of precedence shapes the final product. Ultimately, each level of authority is found to act in an environment which is ever-changing, shaped by circumstances which are often removed from each respective decision-maker's area of jurisdiction. The professional environment becomes dominated by uncertainty and decision-making suffers accordingly. Authority becomes fluid, while the effectiveness of the organization created to serve the people suffers[52]. In these surroundings, the decision-maker in a bureaucracy finds that the cohesive role of stability is tenuous at best, that he is operating with the influence of change ever-threatening.

As we have observed earlier, it is under these circumstances that a systematic method of rational decision-making is most likely to produce irrational decisions, and for wholly understandable reasons. Consequently, to link automatically the rational process of a

government agency with a reasoned product may lead to a misinterpretation of the events which transpired[53].

The second school does not necessarily dispute much of the foregoing analysis. A divergence arises however from the effects of a fundamental hypothesis proposed by Anthony Downs, that "bureaucratic officials, like all other agents in society, are motivated by their own self interests at least part of the time"[54]. The traditional school contends that the influence of human behaviour is subjugated by the authority of bureaucratic process. Individual loyalties rest with the "system" and the organization takes on a personality which shapes individuals' reactions to given circumstances. The objective of this "personality" is survival, and stability on behalf of this survival becomes the all-important goal for which all members of the bureaucracy strive. Downs disputes this. He professes that officials remain loyal to themselves and their ambitions, that their personalities will not necessarily be suppressed by the power of an organization's hierarchial value structure. He has categorized five stereotyped personalities to differentiate the various generalized forms of behaviour, and claims that each "personality" will respond in a distinct manner[55]. Consequently, while he may agree with much of the foregoing discussion on decision-making during circumstances of uncertainty, he insists that this most aptly describes the behaviour of what he has called the "conserver" official. It is less accurate in dealing with officials who are "climbers" or "zealots". In short, the preeminence of organizational survival, hence stability, cannot be presumed, for in

fact there are officials who will function best in times of organizational instability.

A further important juncture lies as a result of Downs' definition of an official as a "utility maximizer"[56]. As such, and as Lindblom notes, the official recognizes that he is constrained in all his activities by the restraints of time, cost, availability of information, his own intellectual capacities, and political and legal restraints[57]. Generally, Downs suggests, the more the cost of

> . . . a goal rises in terms of time, effort or money they [the officials] seek to attain less of that goal . . . whereas whenever the cost of attaining a goal falls, they seek to attain more of it.[58]

These two concepts - the negation of the universal primacy of organizational stability and the recognition that officials weigh the desirability of personal and professional goals with the cost of attaining such goals - alter or add to the traditional discussion of bureaucratic behaviour and decision-making.

Now a case for the rationality of inertia may be made. The routine of precedent and the institutionalization of procedures represents a large investment of time, effort, money and experience by individuals within the organization. To deny the routine is to nullify this investment, which is all the more irrational if the implementation of the changes are to be costly and time-consuming[59]. As "utility maximizers" decision-makers must avoid the expenditure of scarce resources.

> Deviations from customary events cause repercussions of varying depth and cost, depending upon how large the deviations are and how

> permanent they are considered to be. It is easier to adjust actions than rules, easier to shift rules than change structures, and easier to alter structures than adopt new purposes.[60]

The explanation for the reliance upon routine broadens to include not only the sometimes irrational desire for stability but also the rational allocation and preservation of limited resources.

Similarly, these scholars have added to the earlier discussion on the effects of uncertainty on the decision-making process. Rather than emphasizing the dysfunctional nature of uncertainty, both Downs and Lindblom ask that this state of being be accepted as the norm by which most decision-making be analyzed. For, as Downs states,

> . . . although some uncertainty can be eliminated by acquiring information, an important degree of ineradicable uncertainty is usually involved in making decisions.[61]

Furthermore, uncertainty is primarily subjective, and may "vary in removability, intensity, and relevance"[62]. The individual's awareness of the uncertain decision-making environment, the priority which he has placed on the goal which this uncertainty affects, the resources which he has available to bridge the gap of uncertainty: all these factors will determine how he shall react to uncertainty in the decision-making environment. Ultimately this reasoning leads to the conclusion that there are limits to the rationality of all decision-making[63], that purely rational decision-making can never be, and should never be sought. From the perspective of a "utility maximizer" purely rational decision-making would be irrational for the costs incurred[64].

Lindblom has termed the alternative to the ideal-type of rational decision-making the "method of successive limited

comparisons"[65]. A small decision is made given the constraints of information, alternatives, and the time available. Later the results of the first decision are evaluated by reviewing the empirical evidence with newly disclosed information or alternatives. A new small decision is made and the process is repeated. This method recognizes the limits of rational decision-making, reflects what is common practice in bureaucratic decision-making, and is consonant with the fact that

> ... policy-making is a process of successive approximation to some desired objectives in which what is desired itself continues to change under reconsideration.[66]

Through this succession of incremental changes, the decision-maker reduces the risk of making serious mistakes which might have long-lasting consequences in an environment which is recognizably fraught with uncertainty. Importantly it is a method of decision-making which has been accused of being irrational but is decidely rational. It is systematic, cost effective and functional. However, as Lindblom notes, it is imperfect. It lacks safeguards which could ensure that "all relevant values" are considered, and the process may censure excellent options because alternatives were not introduced in the sequence of successive policy steps[67].

In summary a bureaucracy is designed to consistently and rationally produce a service. The rationality of the procedures may produce an irrational response to changed circumstances. Yet to alter the behavioural patterns of the organization to meet the needs of the changed circumstances might well be irrational in light of the constraints of experience, time and available resources. In this light, Fred White's role will be evaluated. Clearly repeating Anthony

Downs' warning - the classification of stereotyped bureaucratic behaviour into itemized categories is arbitrary and is but an ideal-type form of analysis to assist in understanding behaviour - it is suggested that Fred White's behaviour most often reflected the characteristics of the "conserver" official. Downs predicated the "Law of Increasing Concerverism", which stated that

> . . . in every bureau there is an inherent pressure upon the vast majority of officials to become conservers in the long run.[68]

These officials maximize their security and tend to oppose innovation and change. They predominate in slow-growing or stagnant organizations and they tend to view their positions with an attitude resembling proprietorship[69]. As decision-makers they tend to avoid risk firstly by firmly adhering to the rules and secondly by seeking approval or direction from above before initiating change[70]. In summary, many of the traditional characteristics of bureaucratic decision-making apply to officials who reflect the characteristics of Downs' "conserver".

These guidelines will serve as the basis of our analysis in studying the Comptroller's influence in the government's early northern policy. In Chapter One, by reviewing the nature of the N.W.M.P. presence in the Yukon, the stage will be set for understanding the Arctic operations which followed only a few years later. Throughout the Yukon experience, Fred White was most vulnerable. Earlier, it had been determined that the size and expense of the Force would be reduced. Consequently, he doggedly downplayed the requirement for a sizeable police force in the gold fields, even after his own emissary, Inspector Constantine, recommended that a large contingent be moved

there immediately. Ultimately, White's advice was ignored by the new Liberal Minister of the Interior, Clifford Sifton, and a large force was sent which was strengthened during the next several years. White was left reeling, attempting to reconcile the demands of the government with the concerns of the Force, while coping with events of which he was scarcely aware and could not control. It caused a complete cessation and reversal of his long-term plans. The government was imposing on the Force what White perceived to be new purpose, the ultimate change which Downs judges to be the most deleterious to rationality of organizational function. A change in purpose constituted a change in the Force's actions, its rules, and its structure. Such a massive shift from the norm meant the costly imposition of irrationalism.

For White, the Yukon years became a trial of crisis management. The precedent of routine was upended. New members were recruited at unfathomable rates; his projected annual expenditures fell remarkably below the mark as costs, many of them improperly or incompletely accounted for, skyrocketed; and new posts were erected at seemingly a moment's notice. The informal and fluid structure of authority led to gross procedural inconvenience and threatened "a permanent reduction in [his] status"[71]. His Yukon contingent bore the duties of various other departments, vexing him with the precedent that such successes might cost in the long-term. Most importantly, his credibility as an advisor to the government was undermined constantly by the tenuous lines of communication which kept him perilously ill-informed.

White learned professional lessons from the Yukon. A 'performance gap', as Downs has termed it had been recognized and White sought the information and alternate forms of behaviour required to bridge the gap[72]. If he was to survive future northern operations with his credibility intact, he must have access to the most current information, despite the thousands of miles of remote country which separated his office from the field of activity. He recognized that little could be done to shrink the distances, so plans and strategies controlled at Ottawa would, through necessity, be time-consuming. But they should not be hastened to satisfy anyone's quest for action. Furthermore, he learned the importance of supplies and of the difficulties of distributing them in the snowy and ice-clogged Arctic environment. Again, the need for time and careful planning had been highlighted, facts which reinforced the need for his offices.

White learned also to be hesitant about the enthusiasm which a government might show for an operation such as the Yukon. The decision to erect, man, supply and administer the numerous posts in the Yukon had originated with the politicians, but the administration of these decisions, the accountability for the successes and failures of the Force, rested with White and a handful of senior men. It was this breach between accountability and responsibility which made the Yukon years so painfully frustrating for White. In the future, he constantly suppressed, directed, or shaped the government's interest in the North, channelling enthusiasm to the police activities which he endorsed and could control. By assuming this role and by controlling the information, he sought assurance that the government decisions would

more closely approximate his own decisions, and allow him to exist in a relatively secure professional environment.

For White did not intend to stand still. He knew that the Mounted Police had accumulated gains in the Yukon, and that other northern successes might follow. Despite all the difficulties and frustrations, the N.W.M.P. had 'saved the day' in the Yukon, and the very politicians who short years earlier had threatened to dismantle the Force, now lauded its exemplary accomplishments. The role had been politically motivated; the results, in part, had been political successes. In the important years of 1903 to 1905, White would not hesitate to feed the perceptions of the politicians, successfully using the symbols his Force had acquired in the Yukon to direct the course of the government along the path of his intended actions.

The government's use of the N.W.M.P. in a two-pronged attack to make good Canada's claim to Arctic territory in 1903 and 1904 shall be the subject of Chapter Two. The contrast between the two operations vividly illustrates White's determination to control the northern ventures, and reject any politically-motivated initiative which had not met with his prior sanction. The western operation had been considered by Commissioner Perry and Comptroller White for several years. Some research regarding the activities of the American whalers on the Arctic coast had been undertaken; it was known that a regular supply system by Hudson's Bay Company steamers was established on the river system leading to the Arctic Ocean; and a contingent of men was conveniently located at Fort Saskatchewan for the expedition northward. The

operation would be colourfully symbolic, more dramatic in its appearance than its substance. Principally, it was to be a reconnaisance mission. The commitment to erect a post at Fort McPherson would represent nothing more than an amalgamation of duties already conducted on the Prairies and in the Yukon. It would fill a void on the map of jurisdiction, sliding the shaded area of control east and north from bases already firmly established[73]. This was stable and secure decision-making par excellence.

The eastern operation was quite another matter. Fred White was caught totally unprepared, and was only given several months to ready the expedition. His adamant protestations were fruitless. The decision had been made. Not unlike the events of 1896, he was asked only to implement the plan[74]. Control was once again wrestled from him. The expedition went ahead, but it did so without his support and shortly thereafter, with his steadfast determination to remove the Force from what he perceived as an ill-founded and poorly planned government initiative.

Chapter Three shall focus on White's efforts at extricating himself from the eastern operation. He came to a compromise solution which freed the Force's dependence on the Department of Marine and Fisheries but which isolated the newly-formed 'M' Division in a corner of Hudson Bay where none of the government objectives could be fulfilled. In the years which followed he insisted on retaining this directionless policy, for reasons which can only be understood by accounting for the professional environment in which he operated.

Again we are indebted to Downs for an understanding of the rationality of such a seemingly irrational maneuver. Many departments function with areas of jurisdiction which overlap. The competition for favour which ensues may create what appears to be a struggle for dominance. Yet this may be the most rational means by which a "utility maximizer" can stabilize his department's function[75]. The surrender by White of much of the Mountie role represents the actions of an official who was unwilling to allocate scarce resources for goals which could well bring little but organizational instability. Nonetheless he was committed to an eastern Arctic police presence by the directive of the Minister of the Interior. As a decision-maker, he turned to short-term problem-solving, attending to the problems of supply, communication and administration in tried and previously-proven methods. Even when his detachment commanders sent him recommendations for long-term policy and objectives, he repeatedly refused to address the issues. He had defined the limited means by which he could control the eastern operation and he would not risk this security to reap uncertain gains in an uncertain environment.

The western Arctic operation from 1904 to 1911 is the topic of Chapter Four. The success of the first expedition which saw the creation of a post at Fort McPherson won the Force wide popular acclaim: the media praised this great national achievement, its symbolic significance was noted in several speeches in the House, and a small space was reserved for an account of the expedition in the Annual Review of 1903. Unfortunately, White found himself committed to a 'red herring'. Whaling boats no longer wintered at Herschel, and the few

Americans who continued to eke out an existence in Canadian waters did so many hundreds of miles to the east, where no N.W.M.P. had ever been. In the years which followed, this information, with recommendations to make the western operation more relevant, was routinely received by Perry and White. There were repeated requests for the presence of a Revenue Cutter for ocean work, a police supply vessel for the Mackenzie River, and the replacement of the well-known posts at Herschel and Macpherson by those located more suitably for police operations.

But White would countenance little of this. To concede the requirements would be to admit that the initial motive for expansion down the Mackenzie was invalid. Furthermore, to retain a relevant role, large amounts of capital would have to be expended, and despite the lessons learned in the Yukon, he had a personal abhorrence of spending vast quantities of money. The plans were set, and to search now for a meaningful presence would be to jeopardize the fundamental principle of control. Rather than revise his plans and open the possibility of once again losing control of events, White chose to fly the Union Jack where he could control the nature of its presence. Year after year, detachment commanders submitted their reports, complaining of the meaningless role in the North.

The Force's presence in the Arctic by 1911 could not be measured as a product of a political initiative to exercise the sovereign rights of a nation[76], nor as a humanitarian gesture to protect the native people of the regions as they underwent the discordant consequences of a changing economic base. Rather, the

police detachments existed for reasons which can only be rationalized when the professional requirements of a far-removed senior civil servant in Ottawa are appreciated[77]. Police members sent to the North often left their individual mark on the communities surrounding the posts, but this was the fortuitous by-product of the Force's happenchance presence. The procedures of a secure plan were the prime objectives of the northern police detachments.

NOTES

[1]The term 'North-West Mounted Police' shall be used when referring to the Force prior to 1904, and Royal North-West Mounted Police shall be used for the period after.

[2]William Robert Morrison, "The Mounted Police on Canada's Northern Frontier, 1895-1940" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Western Ontario, 1973), and William Robert Morrison, "Showing the Flag: The Mounted Police and Canadian Sovereignty in the Western Arctic, 1903-1924," paper presented to the Canadian Historial Association, June 1983.

[3]Morrison in his dissertation sets out to show "to what extent the police . . . were the agents of conscious government policy, what determined this policy, and how the police interpreted it in the performance of their duties". Morrison, "The Mounted Police," p. 5. Yet in the body of his work he fails to identify the government policy and the means by which it was determined. Instead, he chronicles the accomplishments of the R.N.W.M.P. and implies that their actions parallel a "conscious government policy". The latter remains undefined.

[4]Morris Zaslow, The Opening of the Canadian North 1870-1914 (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1971). In a more recent article in which he emphasizes the chronological advance of control by the police into the Arctic, Zaslow blends the period 1922-1940 with the preceding two decades. In the later years, police objectives had been clearly annunciated, and posts located for a specific function. The results were more clearly measureable. By linking the two distinct periods as if they were one, and evaluating the first period as if it were the forerunner of the second, generalizations such as the following have resulted:

> "Entre 1897 et 1918, les initiatives en ce sens - voyages officiels aux fins d'exploration et d'administration - furent d'abord sporadiques, puis elles devinrent plus systematiques a partir de 1922". Morris Zaslow, "Administering the Arctic Islands 1880-1940: Policemen, Missionaries, Fur Traders," in A Century of Canada's Arctic Islands 1880-1980 (Ottawa: The Royal Society of Canada, 1981), p. 61.

[5]See for instance: Richard J. Diubaldo, Steffanson and The Canadian Arctic (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1978); J. L. Granatstein, "A Fit of Absence of Mind: Canada's National Interest in the North to 1968," in The Arctic in Question, ed. E. J. Dosman

(Toronto: Macmillan of Canada Limited, 1976); R. Finnie, Canada Moves North (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1942); R. A. J. Phillips, Canada's North (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada Limited, 1967); L. H. Thomas, The Struggle for Responsible Government in the North-West Territories 1870-97, 2nd edition (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1978).

[6]A. L. Haydon produced the first volume on the R.N.W.M.P., declaring that it was time "that an authoritative history of the Royal North-West Mounted Police should be added to the regimental records of the British Empire". See: A. L. Haydon, The Riders of the Plains (Toronto: The Copp Clark Company Limited, 1919), p. ix. This work, and others like it - notably those by R. C. Fetherstonhaugh, Nora and William Kelly, and S. W. Horrall - have made good use of primary resources, but have presented a one-sided history which has perpetuated the myth of police infallibility. Issues of controversy, or events which could reflect poorly on the Force have been ignored, or circumscribed adroitly. See: R. C. Fetherstonhaugh, The Royal Canadian Mounted Police (New York: Carrick and Evans Inc., 1938); Nora and William Kelly, The Royal Canadian Mounted Police (Edmonton: Hurtig Publisher, 1973); S. W. Horrall, The Pictorial History of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson Limited 1973). Other writers such as T. Morris Longstreth and Philip Godsell appear to have written for no other reason than the propagation of folklore history. See: T. Morris Longstreth, The Scarlet Force: The Making of the Mounted Police (Toronto: Macmillan 1964, 7th ed.); and Philip Godsell, They Got Their Man. 6th ed. (London: Northumberland Press Limited, sixth edition, 1940).

[7]Ian McClymont, "Canadian Expansionism 1903-1914" (Ph.D. dissertation, Michigan State, 1970).

[8]Morrison, "The Mounted Police,"p. 7.

[9]Joseph A. Schumpeter, Imperialism and Social Classes, trans. Heinz Norden, ed. and intro. Paul M. Sweezy (New York: Augustus M. Kelley Inc., 1951).

[10]Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher, Africa and the Victorians: The Official Mind of Imperialism, 2nd ed. (London: The Macmillan Press Limited, 1961).

[11]A. S. Kanya-Forstner, "French Expansion in Africa: The Mythical Theory," in Studies in the Theory of Imperialism, eds. Roger Owen and Bob Sutcliffe (London: Longman Group Limited, 1972), pp. 227-292.

[12]Charles H. Bland, "Public Personnel Administration in Canada," in Civil Service Abroad, ed. Fritz Morstein Marx (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company Inc., 1935), p. 63.

[13]Robert MacGregor Dawson, The Civil Service of Canada (London: Oxford University Press, 1929), p. 58.

[14]Bland, p. 67.

[15]Dawson, pp. 72-73.

[16]Morrison, "The Mounted Police," p. 13.

[17]"Macleod had to be replaced by a more pliable man who would accept the new arrangements without too many questions." Roderick Charles Macleod, The N.W.M.P. and Law Enforcement 1873-1905 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1976), p. 41.

[18]Ibid.

[19]Arnott J. Magurn, ed., The Canadian Parliamentary Guide 1905 (Ottawa: n.p., 1905), p. 11.

[20]Morrison, "The Mounted Police," pp. 13-14; Haydon, p. 341. Official recognition of his authority is reflected by Magurn when in 1903 he lists White's name under the column "Deputy Heads of Department". Arnott J. Magurn, ed., The Canadian Parliamentary Guide, 1903 (Ottawa: n.p., 1903), p. 8.

[21]A.M. Burgess, his immediate superior, would be dismissed by the new Liberal Minister, Clifford Sifton. See: David John Hall, Clifford Sifton: vol. 1 The Young Napoleon 1861-1900 (Vancouver: University of British Columbia, 1981), p. 126.

[22]Hall, p. 127.

[23]Morrison, "The Mounted Police," p. 33. These calls persisted despite the consistent reductions in the size of the Force. In 1892 the Force numbered 1000 men; by 1893 it had been cut to 850 men; and in June 1894 the President of the Privy Council ordered White to make further reductions to 750 men. Macleod, The N.W.M.P., p. 46.

[24]G. Kitson Clark, "'Statesmen in Disguise': Reflections on the History of the Neutrality of the Civil Service," in The Victorian Revolution: Government and Society in Victoria's Britain, ed. Peter Stansky (New York: Franklin Watts Inc., 1973), p. 73.

[25]Peter M. Blau, On the Nature of Organizations (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1974), p. 56.

[26]W. J. M. Mackenzie, Politics and Social Science (Harmonsworth, Middlesex: C. Nicholls and Company, Ltd., 1967), p. 248.

[27]For a graphic illustration of the very partisan nature of politics at this time, see Morrison, "The Mounted Police," pp. 33-36.

[28]For the purpose of this discussion, the term 'bureaucracy' has been defined in its most essential form. As Lipset has stated, "a bureaucratic structure . . . is [any] system of rational (predictable) organization, hierarchially organized". By adopting the simplicity of this definition, the various characteristics of bureaucratic structures can be examined with the understanding that bureaucracies can and will exhibit different degrees of 'absolute' bureaucratic behaviour in

accordance with variances in size, structure, and other factors. See: Seymour Martin Lipset, introduction to Political Parties, 2nd ed. by Robert Michels (New York: The Free Press, 1968), p. 16.

[29]Robert Michels, Political Parties, 2nd ed. with an introduction by Seymour Martin Lipset (New York: The Free Press, 1968), p. 61.

[30]Robert K. Merton, "Bureaucratic Structure and Bureaucratic Behaviour," in Politics and Society: Studies in Comparative Political Sociology, ed. Eric A. Nordlinger (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1970), p. 60.

[31]Guy Benveniste, Bureaucracy (San Francisco: Boyd and Fraser Publishing Company, 1970), p. xv. As the chief asset of a 'pure' bureaucracy is the 'routinization' of problem solving, the rules of the process must be institutionalized for the sake of consistency. Because accountability is hierarchial, they must in turn be formalized. See: Michael Inbar, Routine Decision-Making: The Future of Bureaucracy (Beverly Hills, London: Sage Publications, 1979), p. 13.

[32]For a concise yet comprehensive overview of the literature on bureaucracies, see Narendra Kumar Singhi, Bureaucracy: Positions and Persons (New Delhi: Abhinav Publications, 1974), pp. 1-12.

[33]Ibid., p. 141.

[34]Anthony Downs, "A Theory of Bureaucracy" (n.p.,n.d.), pp. 5-6.

[35]Merton, p. 63. Or as Michel stated: "Mechanism becomes an end in itself." p. 190.

[36]Lipset, p. 18.

[37]Blau, p. 20. Blau goes on to state that in the more 'mature' bureaucracies "there is a specialized administrative staff tasked to maintain the organization and, in particular, the lines of communication in it." Blau, p. 30.

[38]It is upon this precept that many who have studied history have focused when pondering the effect of bureaucratic process in political decision-making. Joseph Schumpeter mused about the effects which the 'official mind' played in the progress of modern imperial history; Hyam studied the British Colonial office and more importantly, the attitudes amongst those who occupied the chief positions; while Roger Owen found that in both the British and the French bureaucracies at the turn of the century, special bureaucratic interests had developed within the respective departments which left civil servants sharing common ideas regarding the role of the State. This, he concluded, did not necessarily reflect the attitude of the general public. See: Schumpeter, Imperialism and Social Classes; Ronald Hyam, "The Colonial Office Mind 1900-1914," The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 8 (October 1979): 31-40; Roger Owen: "Egypt and Europe: The French Expedition and British Occupation" in Studies in the Theory of Imperialism, pp. 195-209.

[39]Michels, p. 222.

[40]Howard Raiffa, Decision Analysis: Introductory Lectures On Choices Under Uncertainty (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1968), pp. 3-5.

[41]William E. Henry, "Personality Factors in Managerial Reaction to Uncertainty" in Expectation Uncertainty and Business Behaviour, ed. Mary Jean Bowman (New York: Social Sciences Research Council, 1958), p. 87.

[42]Inbar, p. 161.

[43]Benveniste, p. 4.

[44]Inbar, p. 146.

[45]Benveniste, p. 24.

[46]Lipset, p. 24; Paul Selznick, "The Iron Law of Bureaucracy," Modern Review 3 (January 1950):162.

[47]Merton, p. 61.

[48]Michels, p. 188.

[49]Several historians have commented on this. Roger Louis notes that the British Civil Service at the turn of the century was governed principally by the logic of continuity, while Kanya-Forstner in his study of French Imperial decision-making in Africa concluded that the collective attitude of policy-makers evolved primarily as a consequence of precedent in the administration's apparatus. See: Henry A. Turner, gen. ed. Modern Scholarship on European History: Imperialism: The Robinson and Gallagher Controversy (New York: Franklin Watts, 1976), p. 5 and Kanya-Forstner, p. 286. Hyam, more colourful in his analysis of official bureaucracy, concluded in his study of the British Colonial Office that "there is no reason why the Colonial Office should not be described as a panel of proud, patronizing and precedent-ridden pundits." Hyam, p. 51.

[50]R. C. Snelling and T. J. Barron, "The Colonial Office and its Permanent Officials 1801-1914," in Studies in the Growth of Nineteenth Century Government, ed. Gillian Sutherland (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1972), p. 161; Dawson, p. 112; and Mackenzie, pp. 139-60.

[51]Blau, p. 246.

[52]Howard Raiffa notes that abstractly, decision-making becomes 'cloudy' when one is responsible for the analysis and recommendations, but the decision-making is by a different person at a different organizational level. He adds that the environment is even more complicated when "uncertainties about political realities" are introduced. Raiffa, p. 263.

[53]Indeed, one analyst has been so swayed by the findings of his studies that he has concluded that deviations from rationality are the norm of government bureaucracies. Selznick, p. 162.

[54]Downs, "A Theory", p. 1.

[55]Downs concedes that the categorization of five personalities is arbitrary. Any number could have been chosen, but those which he chose suited the analysis he required for his study. He labelled the five models "climbers", "conservers", "zeolots", "advocats" and "statesman". Ibid., pp. 4-6.

[56]Ibid., p. 4. Anthony Downs, Inside Bureaucracy (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1967), p. 81.

[57]Charles E. Lindblom, "The Science of Muddling Through" in Perspectives on Public Bureaucracy, 2nd ed., Edited and with Introductions by Fred A. Kramer (Cambridge Mass.: Winthrop Publishers, Inc., 1977), pp. 134-136.

[58]Downs, "A Theory", p. 4.

[59]Downs, Inside, p. 174, 195.

[60]Ibid., p. 173, 174.

[61]Downs, "A Theory", p. 7.

[62]Downs, Inside, p. 76.

[63]Downs lists six reasons why decision-making can never be totally rational. Time is always limited; a decision-maker can only consider a limited amount of information at one time; a decision-maker can only focus on a limited number of concerns, and major concerns may be inadvertently ignored; information is always limited and incomplete; the future is always unknown, thereby reducing the value of the available information; and the collection of further information is costly. Downs, Inside, p. 75.

[64]For an excellent description of the costs of information, see Downs, Inside, p. 112.

[65]Lindblom, pp. 134-136.

[66]Ibid., p. 145.

[67]Ibid., p. 147.

[68]Downs, Inside, p. 99.

[69]Downs also claims that long tenure and advanced years in an official will tend to breed conserverism in individuals. Ibid., pp. 97-99.

[70]Ibid., p. 100.

[71]Ibid., p. 101.

[72]The analytical allegory is derived from Ibid., p. 169.

[73]A. M. Jarvis and W. Hetherington conducted the first patrol into the Mackenzie District when, from January 4 to April 15, 1897, they reached Great Slave Lake before returning to Fort Saskatchewan. Later that year, Inspector W. H. Rutledge became the first to patrol the Mackenzie River, his "furthest north" being Fort Simpson. Alan Cooke and Clive Holland, The Exploration of Northern Canada 500-1920 A Chronology (Toronto: The Arctic History Press, 1978), p. 275.

[74]Lindblom explains the process by which policy makers and decision-makers will approach problems armed with their previous personal experiences. Lindblom, p. 148. White could well perceive the eastern Arctic operation as another Yukon crisis.

[75]Downs, "A Theory", p. 11.

[76]There can be little doubt that the Canadian government's initiative in 1903 was highlighted by its concern of the sovereignty issue. Lord Minto's report to London in December 1903 suggests the lengths to which Canada was willing to go to protect her northern claim:

> "American whaling vessels frequent Hudson's Bay and the rivers of Canada emptying into the Arctic Ocean, and my Government has recently established a post at the mouth of the Mackenzie River, not only as a protection to the natives, but also as an evidence of British sovereignty over that remote section of the continent . . . . As American whaling and fishermen frequent the waters opposite the west coast of Greenland, it is not improbable that, stimulated by the profitable investment Alaska has proved, a proposal might be made to acquire Greenland from Denmark; in order to defeat the possibility of its acquisition by the United States, Canada would be willing to purchase that territory.

Minto to Lyttelton, 3 December 1903, Laurier Papers, C1171, P.A.C., volume 952, pp. 215686-687. Regarding a further Canadian concern expressed officially about sovereignty, see McClymont, pp. 32-33, 60-61. Regardless of some of the irrational results achieved in latera years as The RNWMP exercised its manner of asserting Canadian sovereinty, the government concerns and the policy so derived were assuredly rational.

[77]I am indebted to Dr. Robert Carney for his observations which indicate that the manner by which Fred White administered the police in the Arctic is not dissimilar from the procedures of northern administrators who followed.

CHAPTER I

WHITE'S CRISIS: THE YUKON YEARS

Introduction

When news of the Klondike gold rush reached Ottawa in the summer of 1897, it caught officialdom unprepared. The House had adjourned, Laurier was in England, and Sifton was preparing for a family vacation on Lake Champlain. Almost overnight, there was a requirement for the government to act immediately and attend to the needs of the rapidly increasing population[1].

Fortunately, a small detachment of twenty-three men under the command of Charles Constantine was in place[2]. The men in this contingent had arrived at Fort Cudahy in the Yukon in July 1895, a symbol of Canadian nationalism which had excited the public imagination. White and particularly Commissioner Herchmer were encouraged by the support that this small northern contingent engendered, for the prestige of the N.W.M.P. needed boosting[3]. Throughout 1896 and the winter and spring of 1897, Constantine petitioned his superiors for more men. These requests were

consistently denied[4]. It was not until the extent of the inrushing tide of humanity became known in Ottawa in 1897 that Constantine's long-desired reinforcements were authorized. The momentum of events which followed staggered both Comptroller White and Commissioner Herchmer.

The government passed an Order in Council on July 29, 1897 which authorized the size of the Force in the Yukon to be increased from 23 to 100 men. In scarcely more than a week, twenty-fully equipped men sailed from Victoria for the Yukon, while White planned the departure of two groups of twenty men for August 15 and August 22[5]. By September, White was content that one hundred men would be in place for the winter, and he was confident that there would be no further reinforcements in the forseeable future[6]. Yet, by mid-February 1898, not 100 men but 196 men occupied the territory and by July, the number reached 240. Conditions had so changed that the Comptroller, who one year earlier was content with a garrison of twenty-three men, now requested permission to increase the northern Force to as many as three hundred[7].

The newly expanded police role in the Yukon arrested plans to reduce the size of the Force; calls for budget restrictions ceased[8]. In just four short months, from October, 1897 to February, 1898, the strength of the total Force leaped from 574 to 760[9]. Similarly, the cost of maintaining the detachments in the Yukon skyrocketed from $27,593 in the fiscal year 1895-96 to $495,777 in 1897-98, and to a record $890,018 in 1898-99[10].

The Yukon operation created a professional environment for Fred White which he could not control. Yet he was responsible to the government for the actions of the Force. Often, he was an unwilling actor in a game for which he was ill-prepared. Difficulties of a long and vulnerable supply line, problems of costly and inefficient methods of communication, and confusion regarding the purpose of the police force all frustrated him from maintaining rational control of the operation.

The vital supply lines required to sustain the massive police force in the Yukon were tenuous. One of the principal reasons the government ordered the Force into the North was to safeguard Canadian territory from formal or informal foreign encroachments. Yet ironically, the members relied upon the continued success of American trading firms for their survival. No Canadian companies operated in this region during these early years, and so it was to Americans that the N.W.M.P. turned for life-sustaining supplies. These companies viewed the Police as just one of many customers in a market that was taxing all available resources. While few problems emerged from this modus operandus, the lack of established Canadian commercial interests and the virtual non-existence of Canadian government vessels made the N.W.M.P. always vulnerable to the private interests of the foreign companies.

The isolation and the tortuous climate imposed an even greater difficulty in the task of reprovisioning the N.W.M.P. In many places, the terrain was rugged while the navigable period of open water on the

rivers was very short. A detachment's stores often could arrive but once a year and the necessary supplies were cumbersome and expensive. Consequently, they had to be procured and positioned with careful planning. The very survival of the men posted to the Yukon relied upon it[11].

Ineffective communications plagued the police operation. In the crucial initial years, White did not possess sufficiently accurate information to properly inform the Ministers of the Crown, while the detachment commanders suffered from inadequate direction from their superiors. Constantine departed for the Yukon in July 1895, supported by a handful of men and armed with loosely-defined terms of reference. One year later, White had not received an official communication from his Yukon detachment and the first steamer which might carry the important reports would not dock in the United States until mid-August[12]. Even by 1897, no established means of regular contact existed and the normally understated Commissioner Herchmer voiced his concerns. He reminded White that mail arrived at Circle City in Alaska and then travelled by "chance travellers" the two hundred miles to Cudahy, where the police were located. This was unacceptable in such an unstable and ever-changing setting, and he urged that some more certain system be investigated and adopted[13].

If White was stymied by this predicament, and Herchmer frustrated, Constantine was often angered. He was cut off from authority, alone with many responsibilities. Any important mail and any bulk parcels could only be sent by boat, and what little Constantine did

receive was usually letters of no great significance[14]. In December 1896, he noted that after the arrival of the official mails in May and June, nothing more had reached him. In his report of January 1897, he reiterated his concern:

> . . . with the exception of 3 or 4 private letters from you, and a couple of official ones, we have not heard from the outside for nearly two years.[15]

As never before, the meaningfulness of the police force was closely linked to effective communications. A reciprocal exchange of information and guidance from the field of operation to the policy-makers in Ottawa, where administrative support could be forthcoming, was all important. Constantine knew this was a priority; Herchmer was sensitive to it; but White was slow to successfully implement a solution to the problem. Ironically, a senior civil servant from another department foresaw the need for a postal service even before Constantine set sail in 1895. In the spring of that year, the Deputy Postmaster General proposed a monthly delivery for the yet-to-be-established detachment. However he estimated that the cost might reach $1,000 per month and White, staggered, rejected the proposal[16]. White's decision was understandable: the cost would be borne by his Branch, while he could not yet appreciate the importance of such a service. He no doubt hoped that a future postal service would be funded by the police and by other departments soon to become involved in the Yukon. The issue become dormant. By September 1895, all mail addressed to Cudahy was held at Victoria, the direction for its disposal being awaited[17].

Subsequent efforts to establish a regular contact with the detachment were sporadic, and met with varying degrees of limited success. A contract was awarded to Mr. T.C. Healy of the Yukon Export and Transportation Company to deliver 65 pounds of mail on a round trip from Juneau to Fort Cudahy in January of 1896. However, Healy failed to get through in adverse weather and he did not try again because of unforeseen expenses[18]. A seventy-three-year-old man from Victoria, Captain William Moore, made three postal runs during the summer of 1896 at a cost to the government of $600 a trip[19], but as the winter of 1896-97 approached, no plans to institute all-season service had been formulated[20].

The problem was simply one of expense. In the summer of 1896, Constantine recommended that a regular service be organized, complete with waypoint buildings for protection from the harsh climes. The cost, he judged, would be approximately $1500 a month[21]. But with only a score of N.W.M.P. in the Yukon, the Comptroller would not authorize such an expenditure[22]. The inconvenience would have to be tolerated. As 1897 progressed, little originated from White's office to resolve the ongoing problems. Representatives of the postal services of the United States and Canada corresponded on the matter, but no agreement could be reached as to how a joint service could be instituted[23]. When the Yukon contingent was strengthened dramatically, the problem, which for White had been one of inconvenience, became an issue of greater consequence.

The Comptroller now faced the possibility that a large fraction of the N.W.M.P. would be located in the remote Yukon, cut off from his direction. White proposed a last minute effort to link his commanders in the Yukon with Ottawa in time for the forthcomining winter. But the idea of a telegraph line, or the decision to construct it, came too late. It was not until August 12 that White asked Mr. J.F. Richardson, a C.P.R. telegraph employee in Victoria, to supply an estimate for constructing a telegraph line from Lynn Canal to the N.W.M.P. post at Tagish. Richardson had but three days to make all the necessary preparations before departing Victoria for the arduous trip which would take almost two months to complete[24]. Before Richardson left, he wrote to White suggesting that arrangements for the construction of the line be started immediately, and insisting that a large number of supplies be prepositioned at Dyea. Meanwhile, with Richardson en route to Alaska, White had reservations about the project. Richardson rushed back to Vancouver on October 4 and immediately cabled Sifton the results of his study[25]. But the supplies had not been placed at Dyea; Sifton was not in Ottawa; and nobody would act on the requirements without the Minister's direction. The proposal for a telegraph link to be in place by the winter of 1897-98 died, the victim of uncertainty and indecision[26].

The Comptroller's Function in the Yukon

Ironically, White's inability to establish effective means of communication with the Force in the Yukon condemned him to function in Ottawa at a disadvantage. As both a decision-maker for the Force and as an advisor for the government, he, more than anyone else, required

accurate and credible information. The responsibilities of his office demanded no less. Without accurate information, White could only function in a conservative manner, defending the status quo as the norm from which rational process must evolve. The uncertainty bred of ignorance would be reflected in indecisiveness, particularly on issues which were clearly tangential. For this reason he tenaciously resisted the call to reinforce Constantine's meagre numbers, despite the fact that he was seldom armed with little more than opinion. He actively solicited more knowledge while resisting what he considered to be ill-informed or ill-considered demands for action.

In the spring of 1896, G.M. Dawson of the Geological Survey advised the Deputy Minister of the Interior that the police force, only recently arrived in the Yukon, should be reinforced in anticipation of future requirements[27]. Burgess forwarded the warning to White with a hand-written comment:

> My own impression was that the detachment already in the Yukon was fairly equal to the occasion.[28]

White, however, concurred with the advice of Dawson, but quickly admitted that his opinion was based only on information from newspaper reports. While White mentioned the possibility of sending a further twenty to thirty men to the Yukon[29], he made no preparations to even plan an increase in the Yukon detachments in the upcoming year[30]. Official concern subsided.

Throughout the next year, White sought to limit the police presence in the Yukon. His attitude was almost certainly influenced

by the election during the summer of 1896 of a new government, steered by Wilfrid Laurier. For many years, the Liberals had criticized the N.W.M.P. from the Opposition side of the House; upon achieving power, many felt that they would curtail, or perhaps eliminate, the activities of the Force[31]. White's actions in the ensuing year must be interpreted with this in mind.

Meanwhile, Constantine's report of July 1896 complained bitterly of the amount of work to be done by such a small contingent. Without more resources, less than satisfactory results would be achieved by the detachments. The Commissioner, in forwarding the report to White, simply commented:

> I do not consider that any more men are required . . . . There will be no further trouble.[32]

White concurred with Herchmer, but Constantine did not relent from pressing his concerns. In early September, he informed his superiors that one hundred men would be required and that new posts would have to be erected. Desperately he pleaded:

> Some more men must come in. I cannot undertake to be responsible for order and the carrying out of laws even mildly with my present strength.[33]

He repeated his insistent demands in reports written later in September and also in December.

Consequently, the Commissioner and the Comptroller were fully aware of the extensive workload and myriad of responsibilities which the men of the Yukon detachments faced daily. Still, they hesitated to act[34]. Indeed, the estimates for the fiscal year 1897-98, prepared by

White in the spring of 1897, indicated that he was planning on paring the total cost of the N.W.M.P. to an amount even less than that which had been allocated in the reduced budget of the year before. Nowhere in his projected expenditures was there an allowance for the force of 100 men which Constantine had requested[35].

In part, this hesitancy to act could be attributed to the decision-makers' inability to fully fathom the events transpiring in the Yukon. Both White and Herchmer were reticent to respond to circumstances which they hoped and felt would disappear in short order. Placer mining was an uncertain industry. Yet this alone could not explain White's actions. Only two months prior to the Order in Council which authorized the increase of the Yukon contingent to 100 men, White advised Sifton against strengthening the detachment[36]. After three reports by Constantine, one by Dawson, and several by C.H. Hamilton of the North American Transportation and Trading Company which called for an increased contingent, White doggedly demanded more time and information before committing further resources to this isolated field of operation. Even if the force was to be strengthened, White advised Sifton he would only recommend sending an additional ten men[37]. Remarkably, this came in response to an initiative by Laurier and Sifton in which they suggested increasing the number of men in the Yukon. This should have allayed any concerns White might have harboured about the political acceptability of such a proposal. Yet he stood by his earlier decision. White's intransigence, originally formed because of the uncertain nature of his information and because of his concerns for the contemporary political environment, was based

on different motives by May, 1897. Such an uncertain decision-making environment demanded the maintenance of the status quo, at least until White could be assured that the response was timely, appropriate, and most importantly, ordered and rational. Interestingly, his influence was sufficient to forestall Laurier and Sifton, the political policy-makers, from increasing the force until later.

White was playing for time, trying to become quickly informed. The extent to which he was vulnerable can be gleaned from the correspondence which passed between his office and that of C.H. Hamilton of the North American Transport and Trading Company. In March of 1897, almost two years after Constantine had departed to establish a detachment in the Yukon, White queried Hamilton about the supplies which could be procured in Juneau to outfit members of the Force travelling to the Yukon. Also, he needed advice about the timing of such a trip and about the nature of the supplies the deploying men would require[38]. In later correspondence, he asked for a schedule of vessels departing from Seattle for the Yukon, as it was upon these which he would transport the men. He asked whether the vessels would stop at the Canadian ports of Vancouver or Victoria[39]. Ingenuously, he stated to Hamilton:

> I would like to subscribe for a Seattle newspaper, and for one published somewhere in Alaska, by way of keeping myself posted on general information relating to the northern country.[40]

There could be no better example of the unenviable position in which the Comptroller found himself. Demands from the field for massive increases in expenditure were forthcoming; he was responsible

to plan the continued existence of the detachment in a remote and unknown land; he was accountable to the government for much of what transpired in the far reaches of the Yukon; and yet, without American newspapers to which he did not have regular access, he could not even know what was happening in the Yukon.

Consequently, when White was called upon to influence policy, the problem of inadequate information seriously restricted the decision-making process. Meanwhile, he was responsible for the continued stability of the entire N.W.M.P. Force. Therefore, his decision in 1896 to wait out the crisis of the Yukon can be interpreted as his effort to avoid changes in the status quo. By so doing, he hoped to elude the risk of a strategic disaster. Unpredictable and greatly increased expenditures to satisfy an uncertain cause would certainly exacerbate his already vulnerable position. It was not until the government ordered White to increase the force in the Yukon, that he made any attempt to implement Constantine's long-standing request.

Once the government acted, and the numbers of police in the Yukon skyrocketed despite the advice of White, the Comptroller reverted to the symbols of the authority which his office still possessed. In 1897, the structure of the police was reorganized so that the Officer Commanding in the Yukon, rather than reporting through Herchmer to White, now answered directly to the political Commissioner of the Yukon[41]. Thus stripped of a certain measure of control, White insisted on retaining the procedures which had been born of circumstances different from those being enccuntered in the Yukon. Only his office

could approve the many supplies which had to be procured and the administrative and support services which had to be planned.

Robbed of the responsibility for long-term planning, he emphasized administrative procedures designed for short-term problem solving. Examples of subsequent complications ranged from the petty to the serious. On July 5, 1900, the Assistant Commissioner of the N.W.M.P. asked White whether the Yukon Force would require pemmican for the upcoming year. "If so," he advised, "authority should be issued as soon as possible, as the season for making it is advancing."[42] Such a routine matter relied upon the sole authority of the Comptroller.

More seriously, White's concentration of authority could adversely affect matters about which he had little interest or knowledge, but which, if left unattended, could endanger the lives of those in the field. On December 3, 1898, Inspector Wood, the Commander of the Tagish District wrote to the Senior Officer of the Yukon Territory, requesting the immediate acquisition of several small fire pails, a handpump and three to four hundred feet of fire hose[43]. The community was entirely constructed of wood. If fire destroyed the shelter and supplies of those residing there during the winter months, the remoteness of the location would spell possible disaster. The Senior Officer was powerless to act upon the request, and he forwarded the letter to Comptroller White. Neither a reply nor the requested materials were forthcoming. Three months later, Wood, in a beseeching manner, reiterated his request. The letter again was transmitted to White who failed as before to respond. Fourteen months after the

initial request, Wood, in a less humble and more impatient tone, was still awaiting the arrival of the fire fighting equipment:

> With $500,000 . . . worth in stores here it seems strange we cannot get the hand engine and hose so often asked for. If a fire were to get anything like a fair start here nothing could save the Post now.[44]

As of May 4, 1900, nothing had been done to meet the Commander's demands[45].

The overall frustration bred by such an unwieldy decision-making process did nothing to make the Yukon operation more efficient. In the last example, where the request for supplies was not one which involved policy in any regard, the man who was responsible for the safe and efficient operation of a Police District was powerless to implement the necessary plans which would safeguard the lives of those under his command. Not even his immediate superior, the man responsible for the nearly three hundred men stationed in the Yukon, had the authority to purchase the necessary equipment. Both men had been given extraordinary responsibilities, but neither in this regard, had been given commensurate authority. Only one man in the complete Force could approve the making of pemmican or the purchase of "several small pails and a handpump."

Subsequent circumstances related to the increase of the Yukon force reflect on White's decision-making abilities as they applied both to the Yukon in the 1890's and to the Arctic during the 1900's. White had asserted a dominating influence on the N.W.M.P. for more than a decade and a half prior to the Yukon. His administration could be

characterized as one of routine and this orderly state of affairs reflected his personal influence. The Order in Council of July, 1897 heralded a temporary end to this ordered state of being, a change which ill-suited him[46].

The Yukon operation severely drained the resources of the N.W.M.P. During the period 1897 to 1900, approximately 100 men had to be recruited and trained each year[47]. The expansion was neither orderly nor preplanned, and this greatly distressed White. Usually, the demand for more men arrived after those who had been assigned a function were committed to unforeseen duties. White and Herchmer - later A. Bowen Perry - could do little but react[48]. Requirements varied from year to year and the unabated growth sent White's calculations for expenditures and utilization of manpower into constant revision.

What made this particularly vexing for White was that costs were totally unpredictable while control over expenditures became impossible from his far-removed office in Ottawa. In submitting a request for additional non-budgeted funds for the fiscal year 1897-98, White defensively reminded Laurier that the added costs had been incurred because of the political decision to increase the Force in the Yukon to 100 men, a figure which was later increased to 250 men[49]. A year later his frustration was still evident as he complained to the Prime Minister that "the expenditure in the Yukon . . . had been quite uncontrollable as to details."[50]

On March 5, 1900, Major A. B. Perry, serving as Commander of the N.W.M.P. in the Yukon, reported the establishment of two new posts on gold-bearing creeks in the Yukon which had been found to be teeming with miners[51]. White's reply to this was telling, and indicative of a leader who, after almost three years of similar circumstances, was still not comfortable with such unpredicted growth: "I suppose we cannot do otherwise than establish outposts where necessary, but it knocks all our financial calculations endwise."[52] Desperately, White longed for a return to a state of affairs which could be shaped by the accountant's pen addressing future foreseeable needs. In writing to Laurier, probably in late 1900, he hazarded this sentiment:

> From this [time] out it should be possible to conduct business in the Yukon on systematic lines . . . and to exercise control over the expenditure, which until recently has been impossible.[53]

White had been forced to live with this uncertainty, this inability to know in concrete terms just what the Force would be expected to do in the future. The government in Ottawa had defined the terms of reference for the activities of the N.W.M.P. in the Yukon. The actual implementation of the government's direction was being carried out in an uncontrolled and uncontrollable environment, in a reality that differed dramatically from that of the government offices. Between the policy-makers in Ottawa and the detachment commanders in the Yukon sat Comptroller White, accountable to the politicians while reacting to the needs of the men in the field. It was an unenviable position for a long-time civil servant and one which could find few precedents in a peacetime environment. The situation would be similar when the N.W.M.P. was ordered into the Arctic in 1903.

Significantly, and despite White's personal abhorrence of the expenses incurred in the Yukon, there is nothing in the correspondence of either Laurier or White which indicates that the Cabinet shared White's concern to such an extreme. Every request for additional funds was met with the immediate approval of Laurier. Indeed, it was only at the insistence of the Prime Minister and the Minister of the Interior that the police force in the Yukon was dramatically reinforced in 1897. The hesitancy, the indecisiveness to act, this was the result of the Comptroller's influence.

Sifton's Function in the Yukon

As noted earlier, the division of authority to different tiers of responsibility hinders the decision-making ability of the senior civil servant. The means by which the key figures interrelate - whether they are sensitive and tolerant to the others' professional environment and subsequent vulnerabilities - will determine the assuredness with which each can function as a decision-maker. White's conservative nature which emphasized precedence was bound to conflict with the more voracious attitude of the Minister of the Interior.

A great deal of what emerged in the Yukon as government policy was the product of the young and energetic Clifford Sifton. It was he, who in the absence of Laurier during the summer of 1897, "had to reverse the government's expressed intention to curtail the size of the force."[54] And it was he who in the following years developed the policies which called for an increased presence of the N.W.M.P. in the Yukon.

His most recent biographer described him as "vigorous, forthright, expansive, energetic, [and] devoted to growth and development."[55] Combined with these characteristics, he harboured a keenly felt sense of nationalism which was coloured by a suspicious anti-Americanism[56]. The Yukon was a forum in which his beliefs in a progressive and developing Canadian nation combined with his cynicism regarding the attitudes of the powerful nation to the south. It was these dynamic attitudes which directed the government's actions. For events along the Yukon River represented first and foremost an administrative crisis to the Liberal Government, and one which demanded immediate attention.

To meet these requirements, Sifton initially turned to the N.W.M.P. Morrison has noted that by so doing, Sifton relied upon the police in the political role that they had first filled in the 1870's and 1880's when the presence of the N.W.M.P. in the Prairies had served both as a symbol, and as a force against American encroachment[57]. Indeed, it was the Yukon which exposed Sifton to the full potential for conflict in Canadian-American relations, a potential which was immeasurably great as hordes of Americans rushed into the remote regions of the Yukon.

Much of the intensity of the anti-Canadian and anti-American feelings which arose as a result of the Yukon was due to the emotion of public sentiment. Repeatedly, the press of both nations distorted the issues, exacerbating the conflict. Misunderstandings about mining laws[58], suspicions about the machinations of Canadian authority,

rumours of British flags being cut down and desecrated[59], stories of pitched battles between Canadian and American miners[60], inflamed sensitivities over the sight of Canadian police uniforms on American territory, accusations of Canadian government ineptitude[61], all did much to heighten the ill feelings among the Canadian and American public[62].

Furthermore, Sifton's strong faith in the nation's capabilities, combined with his scarcely disguised anti-American sentiments was primarily a reflection of the political beliefs and sentiments shared by most English-speaking Canadians of the time[63].

These events and others in the Yukon thrust White and Sifton - a long-time civil servant and a newly-appointed energetic and ambitious young Minister - into a closer working relationship[64]. The antithesis of personalities met to resolve a common national problem. There can be little doubt that particularly during the initial years of the Yukon, disparate perspectives antagonized the decision-making process. Sifton was aggressive, an actor who was disdainful of bureaucrats and the inertia they represented[65]. White was cautious and unimaginative, a product of a centralized environment created by long-term Conservative rule. Both Macleod and Morrison have noted that circumstances in the Yukon were fortuitous for the N.W.M.P. The operation led to a renewed and vigorous life for the N.W.M.P. It also created a closer understanding between the government and the national police force[66]. But this perspective only became apparent years later; the relationship between Cabinet Minister and civil servant during the early Yukon

period was one which had still to develop. Initially, White reeled to the demands of his political master. Correspondence from Governor-General Minto to Laurier confirms that Sifton bullied White, and that White was not above complaining:

> Fred White has assured me . . . that the manipulation of the N.W.M.P. is absolutely in Sifton's hands - that Sifton takes no advice what-ever - and that he himself has almost despaired of being able to carry on the control of the Force. In fact Fred White has to me expressed his utter despondence at the consequences of Sifton's unjustifiable interference.[67]

Even after the turn of the century, by which time White more fully understood Sifton's temperament and expectations and appreciated that the gold rush was important for the Force's continued existence[68], there are indications that White attempted to harness the energy of government decisions to produce results more akin to his conservative nature. To illustrate, a brief review of the 'Whitehorse Conspiracy' contrasts the continued cautiousness of White's personality with the energy of Sifton's character[69].

In the fall of 1901, the Commissioner of the N.W.M.P. received a cyphered message from the Officer Commanding the N.W.M.P. in the Yukon:

> Reported politics from Seattle to seize Territory. More Constables required. Please send at once. Writing.[70]

He immediately relayed the distressing news to Comptroller White and over the next several days, more details became available. Superintendent Primrose reported that there was a secret organization which planned on taking the Yukon, first by rushing Whitehorse, then by capturing the smaller detachments along the river, and finally, by

securing the last remaining police post at Dawson. The plan was purported to have the support of many Americans along the coast from Seattle to Skagway[71]. Despite the obvious concerns of the Yukon Commander, neither the Commissioner nor the Comptroller wished to act as the certainty of a threat could not be proven. After waiting two months, however, they could delay no longer.

On November 15, White wrote to Laurier for the first time on the matter[72]. On the very next day, White wired to Perry:

> Minister anxious about White Horse. Please increase imperceptibly by few men at a time.[73]

For over two months, the most senior members of the N.W.M.P. had delayed from even informing the government of the possible danger in the Yukon. However, once the politicians had been notified, inaction was no longer tolerated. Fifty additional constables were sent north, the first departing within weeks; the Prime Minister briefed the Governor-General, Lord Minto, who in turn conveyed Laurier's concerns to Britain[74]; and information was forwarded to the United States through diplomatic channels which resulted in the Governor of Alaska and the Commander of United States troops in Alaska being directed to monitor any suspicious circumstances carefully[75].

Over the next several months, uncertainty became the principal characteristic of the crisis. In an effort to secure more information, investigators were hired by White both at Skagway and in the northwest coastal States. However, the information so derived was both conflicting and suspect, and White's files became heavily laden with

detective reports. For every one which denied the existence of a conspiracy, another assured the officials that the threatened takeover was imminent[76]. By late spring, when nothing had materialized, the crisis faded from official concern. By May, White had released the last of the agents in his employ. The winter reinforcements, however, remained.

When White received first word of the conspiracy, it came with the demand for more men. It was the Comptroller's responsibility to make recommendations and forward them to the Minister. Instead, he chose to withhold the information until more light could be shed on the matter. In the subsequent two months, the credibility of the reports could not be verified. Word of the conspiracy was passed to the politicians only because further delay might well have proven disastrous. White's position was unenviable. In maintaining his silence, he must have been aware that with only the strength of Primrose's demand, the government would have little choice but to act as requested. This would incur further costs and demand further administrative services. Furthermore, it would represent yet another occasion in which White would have little or no control over the long term direction of the Force.

The government's reaction to the conspiracy concern was equally reflective of Sifton's character. Since an action was required, then that requirement should be met. The fact that Laurier's administration took the possibility of armed insurrection by the American public very seriously, illustrates the mood of the day[77]. The government's

domestic and foreign policy during the next decade reflected this underlying concern, in part due to experiences gained during the administration of the gold rush.

The dichotomy of perspectives offered by Superintendent Primrose, Comptroller White and Minister Sifton reflects the awkward balance of authorities which can adversely affect the decision-making environment. Primrose was the technical expert, responsible for continued good order in the Yukon region; White, accountable for the individual operations of the N.W.M.P., was also responsible for ensuring that the systemic health of the Force was safeguarded; and Sifton, answerable to the voting public, responded to the crisis on behalf of the nation. In this instance, the perspectives of Primrose and Sifton coincided, while White could do little but provide a rearguard action that would satisfy his own neglected requirements. Once again, the stability of White's professional environment had been sacrificed to satisfy the unprecedented demands for police service in a far-flung region of the Minister's domain.

Conclusion

The government was forced to recognize its national northern interests with the demands for law, order and administrative support in the Yukon. It turned first to the N.W.M.P., a group of disciplined men who could be delegated the responsibilities of most government departments and entrusted with the establishment of essential government services. That the N.W.M.P. accomplished this, and exceeded the

expectations of all in the ensuing years has become the mainstay of most accounts of Mounted Police activity in the Klondike[78].

But the individual accomplishments belie the professional dilemma which surrounded White. As long as the responsibilities of the Force remained all-encompassing, the specific objectives of the Yukon operation remained ill-defined. They could be expanded without a moment's notice: seldom were the duties of the Force diminished. The resources, both financial and human, were not available at the onslaught of the Yukon expansion, and it fell to White to make good the shortfalls as they became apparent. Constantly he worked in the past, measuring that which had already taken place while stymied from planning for the future. The result was professional uncertainty. Armed with out-dated and inaccurate information, frozen by a concern that his response to issues would be incorrect, he watched helplessly as proven procedures were discarded irreverently.

All four functional levels identified by Downs at which change can affect an organization - the purpose, the rules, the structure and the actions[79] - were threatened in the Yukon. National objectives had been indentified by the government, and the utilization of the Mounties to fulfill the needs was the rational selection. The imposition of this expanded role on the administrative structure of the N.W.M.P., however, sacrificed years of experience and expended resources developing established procedures. White was responsible for the rational allocation of scarce resources, and such a hastily implemented operation warned of an irrational committment.

White was well aware of what transpired in the Yukon. He recognized that the unique circumstances in the North and the political environment in Ottawa had robbed his offices of their long-respected sanctity. This time, he could only ride out the turbulent period, a frustrated decision-maker. In the future he would endeavour to protect more successfully the stability of the organization. The rational process for which he was responsible demanded this committment.

NOTES

[1]Hall, pp. 157-161.

[2]Constantine's credentials were impressive. Born in Yorkshire he came to Canada while still a child. He was an officer in the Red River Expedition of 1870 and later became the Commander of the Manitoba Provincial Police. In 1885 he joined the N.W.M.P., assuming his duties with the rank of Inspector. Horrall, p. 129.

[3]For an interesting and entertaining account of the establishment of the first detachment in the Yukon, see the first-hand account by M. H. E. Hayne, The Pioneers of the Klondyke, as recorded by H. West Taylor (London: Sampson, Low, Marston and Company Limited, 1897). With regards to the senior hierarchy's initial interest in the Yukon, See: W.R. Morrison "The North-West Mounted Police and the Klondike Gold Rush", Contemporary History :95.

[4]Ogilvie too had difficulty in interesting officials in Ottawa with the needs of the Yukon at this time. He was there when claim number one was struck on August 17, 1896 and he sent a warning letter in the fall. He wrote a follow-up report detailing his concerns which arrived in Ottawa during the spring. Little concern was evinced. Don W. Thomson, Men and Meridians: The History of Surveying and Mapping in Canada, Vol. 2 (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1967), pp. 154-155.

[5]Comptroller F. White to J. E. Stanton, 9 August, 1897 Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 140:469-97.

[6]Comptroller F. White to H. Spurier, 24 September, 1897 Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 140:529-97.

[7]Commissioner Herchmer to Comptroller White, 17 February, 1898, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 168:274-99. Report, Comptroller F. White to Governor General in Council, 4 July, 1898, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 153:385-98.

[8]Hall, p. 163.

[9]Memorandum, F. White to Wilfred Laurier, undated, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 168:274-99.

[10]The complete cost of the N.W.M.P. in fiscal year 1895-96, including the cost of the twenty-three men in the Yukon, had not exceeded $533,014. The costs of the Force in total are extracted from 'Comparison of Expenditures 1894-95: 95-96: 96-97' Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 141:642-97. The costs of the Yukon expenditures are extracted from 'Statement of Expenditure: Yukon', Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 268:171-04.

[11]Edwin Adney, a journalist and artist who travelled to the Klondike to write for Harper's Weekly, and the London Chronicle, offered a personal perspective on the supply routes to the Yukon:

> "People outside talk as if the steamers on this river run on a schedule; whereas they are liable to be stuck on a bar and not get off at all and be destroyed by the ice in the Spring. This country is not and never has been well supplied. Mr. Harper says that in the twenty-five years that he has been in the Yukon there has not been a year when there has not been a shortage of something."

Edwin Tappen Adney, The Klondike Stampede of 1897-98 (New York and London: Harper and Brothers, Publishers, 1900; reprint ed., Fairfield Washington: Ye Galleon Press, 1968), p. 163.

[12]Comptroller F. White to Secretary, Department of the Interior, 29 July, 1896, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 119:160-96.

[13]Commissioner Herchmer to Comptroller F. White, 16 March, 1897, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 133:140-97.

[14]Report, Constantine to Herchmer, 12 January, 1897, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 140:525-97.

[15]Ibid.

[16]Comptroller F. White to Lt. Col. W. White, 10 May, 1895, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 133:140-97.

[17]Post Office Inspector E.H. Fletcher to Postmaster General, 6 September, 1895, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 133:140-97.

[18]He was awarded $600 for the trip. Despite Healy's enthusiasm to do a good job and thereby secure a lucrative contract with the Canadian government, his efforts were frustrated. Ironically, the same company succeeded in winning the contract for American postal service within Alaska. Memorandum F. White to Wilfred Laurier, undated, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 133:140-97.

[19]Captain Moore had accompanied Ogilvie on his 1887 expedition to the Yukon, one which "represented the most important and extensive exploratory survey ever undertaken by the Department of the Interior." Thomson, p. 150.

[20]Meanwhile individual entrepreneurs - usually men who were "going out" - would take a letter out of Dawson for the accepted rate

of $1 each. Such service of course came with no assurance of delivery, nor with the concern of expedient routing. Adney, p. 182.

[21]Report, Constantine to Herchmer, 22 June, 1896, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 133:140-97.

[22]The North American Transportation and Trading Company, operating largely in Canadian territory, had attempted to arrange a joint Canadian and American postal service, but to no avail. By 1896, an American postal service had been established in Alaska, and a Mr. C. H. Hamilton, the Assistant Manager of the North American Transportation and Trading Company pressured U.S. authorities to provide separate mail bag service to Forty Mile in Canadian territory. After this plan failed, he approached Comptroller White with the hope that Canadian authorities could influence American decision-makers. White was sceptical that the Americans would subsidize such a project, solely to aid the Canadian postal system where it had failed, but he urged Hamilton to petition Washington for an American postal system "at or a little west of the International Boundary, which is within site of the Canadian Post called Cudahy." See: G. F. Stone, U.S. Acting Second Assistant Post Master General to C. H. Hamilton, 21 October 1896; C. H. Hamilton to F. White, 9 November, 1896; and F. White to Post Master General, 13 November, 1896, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 133:140-97.

[23]Mail service in Alaska started in the summer of 1894 but it only serviced camps on the Yukon river and was limited to the summer months. In 1896, Jack McQuesten, who had helped Al Harper found Forty Mile seven years earlier became the first official postmaster at Circle City and in 1897, an official post office was built at St. Michaels. It was not however until 1900 that the U.S. Post Office Department established a winter service that could consistently serve the miners in the interior of Alaska. L. D. Ketchner, Flag Over the North (Seattle: Superior Publishing Company, 1954), pp. 152-153.

[24]F. White to J. F. Richardson, 5 August 1897, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 140:140-97.

[25]While neither route over the Chilkoot or White Pass was ideal, Richardson felt that a telegraph line through either of the two was feasible. He estimated that the cost would range from $250 to $350 a mile for the 100 mile route. Richardson to Clifford Sifton, 4 October, 1897, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 140:470-97.

[26]Work on the telegraph line got into full swing in 1899 and 1900. At that time the Department of Public Works expended $380,254 towards its completion. K. J. Rea, The Political Economy of the Canadian North (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1968), p. 205.

[27]George Dawson, the Director of the Geological Survey, was spurred to act both by Ogilvie's correspondence and by an article in the Victoria Colonist. He forwarded the latter to Sifton, penning a terse comment under it:

"The attached clipping has reference to the trouble likely to occur in [the] Yukon District should the anticipated 'rush' occur." H. George Classen, Thrust and Counterthrust: The Genesis of the

Canada-United States Boundary (Chicago, New York, San Francisco: Rand McNally and Company, 1965), p. 318.

[28]A. M. Burgess to F. White, 13 April 1896, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 119:160-96.

[29]F. White to A. M. Burgess, 14 April 1896, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C, volume 119:160-96.

[30]Memorandum, Assistant Commissioner N.W.M.P. to all Division Commanders, 22 May 1896, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 119:160-96.

[31]Hall, p. 163.

[32]Hand-written note, Commissioner Herchmer to Comptroller F. White, on Report, Constantine to Herchmer, 13 July 1896, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 123:468-96.

[33]Report, Constantine to Herchmer, 2 September 1896, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 140:525-97.

[34]In March, 1897, correspondence was exchanged between Comptroller White and the offices of C. H. Hamilton of the North American Transportation and Trading Company. After hearing from White that the N.W.M.P. would be rotating the personnel detached in the Yukon, but not increasing the size of the contingent, he replied by forcibly suggesting that "the present force in the Yukon will hardly be able to cover all the territory in a satisfactory manner." He stated that no less than sixty men would be required. In a rather aggressive manner, he continued:

> "It would seem to me that from the amount of money your government is collecting in Alaska, both as to customs and in the Land Department for the registering of claims, that you could well afford to keep a good sized police force in there, as I know positively that your government is taking more out of the country up to the present than they have ever put in and even with an increase of the police force, as I suggested, would still continue to be more than self-supporting."

C. H. Hamilton to F. White, 6 March, 1897, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 137:360-97. It does not appear that White replied to this. However, after a month, Hamilton addressed the matter to a compatriot, P. B. Weare, who spoke to the Lieutenant-Governor. This time Hamilton's concerns reached White's desk only after they had crossed those of Laurier and Sifton. Even now, White urged that nothing be done until yet further was heard from Constantine; if necessary, he would recommend an increase in the force by ten men. This was an ironic twist. A citizen of another nation was ardently requesting increased services from Canada's paramilitary organization while a senior civil servant accountable to the government for the force was most steadfast, resisting the call to strengthen the nation's ability to protect her sovereign claim. F. White to C. Sifton, 18 May, 1897, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 137:360-97.

[35]Memorandum, F. White to Wilfrid Laurier, undated, entitled 'Estimates', Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 123:473-96.

[36]F. White to C. Sifton, 18 May, 1897, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 137:360-97.

[37]Ibid.

[38]F. White to C. H. Hamilton, 4 March, 1897, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 135:211-97.

[39]F. White to P. B. Weare, 23 March, 1897, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 119:160-97.

[40]F. White to C. H. Hamilton, 19 March, 1897, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 148:153-98.

[41]The re-organization of the police hierarchy for the Yukon operation severely usurped the Police Commissioner's role. The new chain of command recognized both the requirement for expediency and the multitude of responsibilities which the Force undertook in the Yukon. Commanders of Tagish and Dawson Districts reported to one senior officer in charge of the Yukon operation, who in turn reported directly to the political Commissioner of the Yukon. These reports then went to the Comptroller in Ottawa, from whose office they were sometimes sent to Regina. The Commissioner of the N.W.M.P., responsible for the staffing, training and operations of the N.W.M.P., was the last man on an information link which was comprised of many men located over many thousands of miles. Report, Comptroller to Governor General in Council, 4 July, 1898, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 153:385-98. See also: Thomas, p. 268 and Morrison, "The Mounted Police", p. 66.

[42]Assistant Commissioner N.W.M.P. to Comptroller, 5 July, 1900, Commissioner's Correspondence to Comptroller, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 2220.

[43]This request came less than two months after a fire had ravaged Dawson City. The fire on October 14, 1898 destroyed over 40 buildings and damage was estimated to be in the excess of $500,000. On April 26, 1899 a second more devastating fire consumed 111 buildings, irrevocably damaged fifteen more and accounted for over $1,000,000 damage. See Russell A. Bankson, The Klondike Nugget (Caldwell, Idaho: The Caxton Printer Ltd, 1935), p. 241.

[44]Report, Wood to Commissioner, 3 December, 1898; Wood to Commissioner, 2 March, 1899; and Wood to Commissioner, 17 February, 1900, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 190:387-400.

[45]By 1905, Z. T. Wood was a Major and had been appointed the Acting Commissioner of the Yukon while occupying the position of Assistant Commissioner of the R.N.W.M.P. Arnot J. Magurn, ed. The Canadian Parliamentary Guide, 1905 (Ottawa: N.P., 1905), p. 459.

[46]Downs points out that while "conservers" do not favour negative change, they are equally distrustful of positive change which might increase the size or enhance the opportunities of the organization entrusted to them. Downs, Inside, pp. 96-97.

[47]Memorandum, Comptroller F. White to Laurier, undated, entitled 'Supplementary Estimates 1900-1901', Laurier Papers, C1177, P.A.C., volume 785, p. 222547.

[48]L. W. Herchmer served as Commissioner of the N.W.M.P. from 1885-1900. The son of an Anglican Minister who was a friend of John A. Macdonald, he had served as an Officer of the British army. He was the Inspector of Indian Agencies at the time of his appointment to Commissioner of the N.W.M.P. In 1900, at the age of sixty, he asked to be relieved of his position to volunteer to serve in the South African War. A. Bowen-Perry, who was to serve as Commissioner from 1900 until 1922, was but 39 years old when he assumed the position. In 1896 he was promoted to superintendent while in command of the Regina Post; in 1897 he commanded the N.W.M.P. contingent which went to London to honour Queen Victoria at the Jubilee Celebrations; and in 1899 he replaced Col. S. Steele in command of the Force in the Yukon. Macleod, The N.W.M.P., p. 43, 55, 63-64; Morrison, "The Mounted Police", p. 15; Fetherstonhaugh, p. 100.

[49]Memorandum, Comptroller F. White to Laurier, undated, entitled 'Supplementary Estimates of $200,000 for budget 1897-98', Laurier Papers, C1177, P.A.C., volume 785, p. 222461.

[50]Memorandum, Comptroller F. White to Laurier, undated, entitled 'N.W.M.P. Estimates 1898-99', Laurier Papers, C1177, P.A.C., volume 785, p. 222484.

[51]Report, Perry to White, 5 March, 1900, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 190:385-400.

[52]White to Perry, 2 April, 1900, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 190-385-400.

[53]Memorandum, Comptroller F. White to Laurier, undated, entitled 'Yukon Expenditure 1898-99, Statement', Laurier Papers C1177, P.A.C. volume 785, p. 222529.

[54]Hall, p. 163.

[55]Ibid., p. 242.

[56]Ibid., p. 121, 201, 204, 248.

[57]Morrison, "The Mounted Police", pp. 9-12.

[58]William Ogilvie to E. Deville, 8 January, 1896, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 119:160-96.

[59]The British Flag over the Canadian Customs Office at Skagway was reportedly cut down on 22 June, 1901 by an American citizen of local standing. So great was the hard feelings between the American and

Canadian citizens in Skagway that neither American military or civilian authorities would act on the matter for fear of a mob reaction. They refused any assistance to the Canadian customs officer and referred the matter to Washington. Secret Cypher, Lord Minto to Chamberlain, 1 July, 1901, Laurier Papers, C1171, P.A.C., volume 952, p. 215391.

[60]On March 17, 1899, White telegraphed to Perry: "Press in New York publishing sensationalist story alleged to come from Vancouver that a collision between Canadian and American miners in Porcupine District, Dalton Trail, has occured resulting in killing of four men. What truth is there in this report. Reply Immediately." This, like other reports, was founded only in rumour, but the anxiety it caused was characteristic of the charged environment in which both the politicians and the senior civil servants found themselves extremely vulnerable.

[61]The most severe criticisms came from supporters of the Canadian Conservative Party, and from a small vocal group of U.S. citizens. See: Luella Day, The Tragedy of the Klondike (New York: n.p., 1906).

[62]This anti-Americanism was felt by many Canadians throughout the nation, and was not restricted to those in the Yukon. Hall, p. 163, 167.

[63]The newspapers of both countries carried out a jingoistic battle, enlightening their respective readers with the injustices and evils of the other country. In 1899, this culminated in Canada by "an abusive press campaign against the United States", encouraged by the Conservative, Charles Tupper. Norman Penlington, The Alaska Boundary Dispute: A Critical Reappraisal (Toronto, Montreal: McGraw-Hill Ryerson Limited, 1972), p. 87, 108.

[64]White was responsible directly to Laurier, but due to a number of circumstances, answered most often to Sifton. When word of the goldrush first reached Ottawa, Sifton responded almost singlehandedly on behalf of the government. Later, with federal authority secure on Yukon soil, the Yukon administration reported to Sifton, whose terms of reference as Minister of the Interior were truly impressive: "He controlled a vast fiefdom . . . over which he held more power than any other person . . . ." Hall, p. 123. Inter-office correspondence between White and Sifton reflected this relationship. Often inquiries or reports, written by White and addressed to Laurier were returned to the Comptroller's desk with answers or comments by Sifton. At other times, memoranda were addressed directly to the Minister of Interior. Seldom did Laurier input to any further extent than making the marginal comments: "I concur.".

[65]Morrison, "The Mounted Police", pp. 64-65.

[66]Ibid., pp. 16-17, 31-33.

[67]Governor General Minto to Prime Minister Laurier, 24 October 1903, Minto Papers, P.A.C., Volume 2, quoted in Macleod, The N.W.M.P., p. 59. Around 1902, Sifton allowed White and Perry more room in the decision-making process, and sought advice more often. Ibid., p. 68.

[68]Morrison, "The Mounted Police", pp. 59-60.

[69]Many writers have since dismissed the conspiracy as an example of 'much-to-do' about nothing. Hindsight allows this perspective as, after all, no attempt to overthrow the Yukon government took place. However, the considerable amount of concern at key levels of management the voluminous correspondence related to precautions undertaken, and the sheer manhours expended by members of the N.W.M.P. illustrate that the anxiety which was generated was very real.

[70]Cypher Telegram, Superintendent Primrose to Commissioner Perry, 18 September, 1901, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 229:149-202.

[71]Report, Superintendent Starnes, Commander 'B' Division, to Superintendent Primrose, Officer Commanding N.W.M.P. Yukon, 20 September, 1901, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 229:149-202.

[72]F. White to Laurier, 15 November, 1901, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 229:149-202.

[73]Telegram, White to Perry, 16 November, 1901, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 229:149-202.

[74]'Most Secret' Cypher Telegram, Lord Minto to Chamberlain, 20 November, 1901, Laurier Papers, C1171, P.A.C., volume 952, p. 215410.

[75]'Secret' Telegram, Pauncefote to Chamberlain, as relayed by Chamberlain to Lord Minto, 26 November, 1901, Laurier Papers, C1171, P.A.C., volume 952, p. 215410.

[76]Once directed by the Liberal government, both White and Perry became heavily involved in activities at Whitehorse. Besides reinforcing the detachment and hiring detectives, White directed that information be gathered on residents of the Yukon, placing particular emphasis on their past military background. Furthermore, he directed that the population of Whitehorse be listed in categories of ethnic and national origin. He obviously was planning for the formation of a volunteer force of loyal subjects, should the need arise. Memorandum, F. White to Wilfrid Laurier, 2 January, 1902, entitled 'Re: Yukon', Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 232:195-202. On January 28, 1902, White instructed Constantine to proceed to the Yukon, and oversee the Command with a special mind to conspiracy matters. Coded Telegram, White to Constantine, 28 January, 1902, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 232:195-202.

[77]While Sifton was occasionally frustrated, and even sometimes angered by his official dealings with Washington over matters related to the Yukon, he was most concerned with the threat of anarchy amongst the United States' citizenry. The remoteness of rational influence from Ottawa and Washington, the media 'hype', the public emotions bred of ignorance, the aggressive, irresponsible and self-serving ways of American business interests, these were the factors which Sifton expected might lead to a chain of events which, once precipitated, might draw the Canadian and American government on a dangerous road of

face-saving conflict. Indeed, Sifton found that on several occasions, the response of the American administration to Canadian concerns was reasonable and just, often siding with the perceptions of the Canadian government over the demands of the vocal American population. For an example, see the account of the American Relief Expedition, in Hall, p. 174.

[78]Two recent articles query the means by which the Mounties succeeded in maintaining law and order in the Yukon. Both conclude that they were successful only because they stepped outside the bounds of the law. See Thomas Stone, "The Mounties as Vigilantes: Perceptions of Community and the Transformation of Law in the Yukon, 1885-1897", Law & Society Review, 14 (Fall, 1979):102 and Morrison's "Klondike Gold Rush", p. 99.

[79]Downs, Inside, pp. 167-168.

CHAPTER II

THE DECISION TO ACT: 1903-1904

Introduction

In late 1903, Clifford Sifton rose in the House of Commons to announce that police posts were established on the Arctic coast of Canada. They stood there, he assured the Commons, as symbols of the great lengths to which the government would go to safeguard her territories and to protect her people. The government was interested in meeting two objectives. It would control and monitor the activities of the foreign whalers, while bringing the authority of Canadian law to the indigenous people. Importantly, it acted not so much to satisfy new developments in the North, but rather to erect the images of nationhood which government members and the general population equally demanded[1].

As the years progressed, Sifton's objectives remained unfulfilled. The government presence, particularly as it involved the R.N.W.M.P., became symbolic rather than substantial. Police detachments were established in locations where it was impossible to

effectively enforce Canadian law. Seldom were there any foreign nationals in the region and those few who eked out an existence in the remote land operated hundreds of miles from the government officials who were there to oversee their activities.

A gradual evolution of the means by which authority was to be asserted eroded the purposes of Sifton's northern strategy. Perhaps in 1903 he fully envisaged a future government presence which would satisfy the political perceptions of those in the population centers while serving the northern occupants of this little-known land[2]. But he was to be thwarted, firstly by a lack of systematic planning that was hampered by uncertain information and secondly, by the process of bureaucratic delegation upon which he was reliant.

Fred White played a large part in the evolution which transpired. Sifton's focus lay in the development of a viable national presence on the northernmost boundary of the country, while White concerned himself with influencing the decision-making process, administering the northern Force and with guarding for precedents which would link the R.N.W.M.P. to the fulfillment of the duties of other departments. His concerns, while hampering his ability to function as an advisor to the government, ultimately limited the success which the government could achieve. The Comptroller's priorities dominated all policy-oriented decision-making, causing future recommendations of northern detachment commanders to be largely ignored. Eventually, the government's enthusiasm paled.

The expeditions of 1903 resulted in the establishment of two new northern posts. But White's opinion of the relative merit of the two contingents shaped the successes which each detachment would gain, even before the Mounties first set foot upon the northern land. One of the detachments, that situated on the Mackenzie Delta, was the product of eight years of planning by the Comptroller; the other, its flag raised in the icy northwest corner of Hudson Bay at Cape Fullerton, was established over his most adamant protests. He opposed the plan to insert the N.W.M.P. in the eastern Arctic, had even argued against police involvement in the expedition with the Deputy Minister of the Interior. Failing to gain a sympathetic hearing, he petitioned the Minister directly. But his most energetic remonstrations failed to sway the self-assured Sifton. The Minister of the Interior dictated that the government would be represented by the N.W.M.P. in both corners of the Canadian Arctic.

White's enthusiasm for the one project and his opposition to the other illustrates the conflict from which he suffered while wrestling with the demands made by the Laurier government. He was sensitive to the successes the Force attained in the Yukon and he relished the challenge of a new venture down the Mackenzie River with a scarcely-contained glee. The police presence along the valley to the Arctic coast would be but a natural extension of the domain of authority already consolidated in earlier years. North from the prairies and east-north-east from the Yukon, it would link the established posts through natural transportation links, while squaring off a sizeable portion of the Canadian map under the shadow of police

authority. It was logical, orderly and tidy; it was a controlled and preplanned extension of the duties of the Force; and importantly, it was a role envisaged and controlled by himself and senior police commanders.

The information amassed by White on whaling in the western Arctic dated back to September 1895. Throughout the next eight years, he passively observed developments from his distant office in Ottawa. As time progressed, he compiled a wealth of information on the subject which almost certainly surpassed all else known by any other senior civil servant. As early as 1895, Inspector Constantine had reported to White on the whaling activities at the mouth of the Mackenzie. Writing from Fort Cudahy he noted that the Alaska Commercial Company had forwarded 25 barrels of liquor to Herschel Island for trade with the natives. Constantine reported further that he had met a ship's engineer who had served onboard a whaling vessel in the Canadian Arctic and that this man had recounted tales of the natives being debauched by the rough-living American seamen[3].

The report which was several years old by the time it arrived in Regina was forwarded by the Commissioner to Ottawa. White transmitted it to the Minister of the Interior. The response several weeks later by Deputy Minister A.M. Burgess was telling:

> The information contained in these reports is satisfactory. I presume that for the present we are not in a position to consider what may be done in regard to the Mackenzie River country. We must be content with what we have already been able to accomplish.[4]

This came at a time when the Force was being expanded weekly to meet

the insatiable demand of the Yukon, so the comments by Burgess doubtless met with White's approval. The matter remained dormant on White's file.

But much can be gleaned from Constantine's report, both in its substance and in the response it evoked from Burgess and White. First, it highlighted the difficulty of communicating with the remote outposts. Constantine prepared his report in early September 1895, but it did not arrive at the desk of the Commissioner in Regina until two years later. Second, the means of gathering information was circumstantial at best. A chance meeting by Constantine of a man who claimed to have served several years previously in the Arctic, provided what was considered by senior civil servants in Ottawa to be important information. The information could neither be corroborated nor was there substantiating evidence. And third, the response by the Deputy Minister illustrated that the government was hard-pressed by events in the Yukon to do anything other than assume the role of observer, while hoping that circumstances at Herschel remained quiet[5].

During the last years of the century, information continued to trickle through to the Comptroller's office, where he meticulously read reports, paraphrased information, cut newspaper articles and filed notes pertinent to the situation. Constantine's report of January 1897 spoke of continued lawlessness but indicated that only four ships wintered at Herschel during the winter of 1896-97. Newspaper stories carried by the Edmonton Bulletin on September 13, 1897 and again on July 7, 1898, described tales of anarchy on the remote island. The

latter article noted that during the winter of 1897-98, two ships were present at Herschel, four were wintering at Point Bathurst to the east and five had been caught in ice to the west[6].

Thus, the information available to White at the turn of the century was sparse, incomplete and of uncertain accuracy. But he possessed a record from which a crude composite picture could be sketched: the number of American whaling ships active in the western Arctic had declined over the five-year period; the wintering-over location, hence the point of social and economic contact with the trade in this remote part of Canada was conducted solely by Americans without the restrictions of licence or tariff; and the impact of recent developments threatened the continued existence of the Inuit in the region.

Earlier, in 1896, White had recommended to Laurier against the establishment of a police detachment at the mouth of the Mackenzie River, citing cost and uncertain effect as substantiating reasons[7]. But when Liberal back-bencher Frank Oliver publicly asserted at the turn of the century that the government should assert its control in this far-removed area, White responded by actively seeking more information related to the whaling and trading activities. On May 8, 1900, White requested any "printed matter" which Oliver might possess:

> I am getting together all the particulars I can with a view to giving effect to your recommendation that Canada should at least assume jurisdiction over the District and incidentally get the benefit of any trade there may be.[8]

At the same time, he wrote to Superintendent A.H. Griesbach the detachment commander at Fort Saskatchewan, soliciting information pertaining to the mouth of the Mackenzie River. White's interest was one of jurisdiction, for, as he said to Griesbach, "the time has arrived when the Canadian Government should take steps to protect Canadian Traders in that vicinity".[9] Already White's perspective on the significance of Herschel Island was changing. In the years before the Klondike, circumstances at the Island could be viewed as unfortunate but not worthy of the Force's attention. But now with virtually one-third of the N.W.M.P. in the Yukon, White realized that the successes they had achieved were as linked to international concerns of jurisdiction as they were to the maintenance of law and order. Herschel could assume a similar significance in the eyes of the government. This time, White would be well-prepared.

Besides corresponding with Oliver and Griesbach, White directed one of the most senior officers of the N.W.M.P., A. Bowen Perry, to visit San Francisco and obtain intelligence pertaining to western Arctic whaling. The report which Perry wrote upon his return contained information which summarized the contemporary state of the Arctic whaling industry. He told of whaling captains who no longer favoured wintering near the mouth of the Mackenzie and of whaling companies which relied on steam tenders to re-supply the whaling vessels during their extended Arctic voyages. From the records of the Custom House he tabulated data pertaining to trading and whaling vessels, finding that the ledgers had not been itemized to reflect the locations from which the goods had been obtained. As a consequence, his list of twenty-four

whaling vessels included not only ships which plied Canadian and American Arctic waters, but also vessels which sailed in regions of the Pacific Ocean, far removed from the colder climes[10]. There is no record of how White interpreted this information.

Information from Oliver and Griesbach was less valuable. Oliver wrote to White stating that he really had nothing which would assist the Comptroller. Griesbach's reply, dated May 28, 1900, was more substantial but it reflected the opinions, not of Griesbach or members of the N.W.M.P., for they spent little time in this region[11], but of an Edmonton trader, a Mr. W.H. Connors. Being an "interested" and therefore non-objective party, Connors placed heavy emphasis upon what he felt were the improper practices of the American traders.

Armed with so little information, White did not pursue the matter. The study had been his own initiative and he chose to quietly withhold the data he had collected. It was not until eight months later and only after the very same W.H. Connors complained to the Minister of the Interior about the unfair trading advantages of American vessels at the Mackenzie River, that White reopened the file on the western Arctic. In a memorandum to Sifton dated January 23, 1901, the Comptroller outlined the situation at the mouth of the Mackenzie River. This was his first brief to the government on the matter. The information in the report relied heavily upon that which had been provided by Griesbach, which in turn reflected the opinions of Connors. White concluded by proposing a limited course of action which recognized the fundamental requirement to acquire reliable first-hand

information before developing and implementing a government policy. Accordingly, he recommended that an officer of the N.W.M.P. be sent down the Mackenzie River on Hudson's Bay Company steamers near the end of May:

> . . . with instructions to gather all the information he can respecting the trade being done and the various channels between Fort McPherson and the mouth of the Mackenzie; and either return in the autumn or remain during the winter . . .[12]

He reasoned that then and only then could a plan be plotted.

Such a fact-finding journey, however, was not realized in the immediate future. The requirement to act had been identified, the difficulty of poor information had been conceded, but the initiative to implement the plan would be delayed fully two more years. White, however, would not forget his goal of establishing a police detachment in the western Arctic[13].

In February 1902, Sifton ordered Constantine to proceed to the Yukon to oversee police activity related to the Whitehorse Conspiracy[14]. White capitalized on this opportunity by directing Constantine to travel by way of Seattle and San Francisco to "endeavour to obtain further information regarding the operations of the Whaling Fleet at the mouth of the Mackenzie River"[15]. In April, White received and kept on file a report by a Collector A.R. Milne, in which it was stated that the number of natives inhabiting Herschel Island had diminished from a fluctuating population of three to five hundred to one of "exactly twenty". And in September, he clipped an article from the Edmonton Bulletin which was highly critical of the government for

its negligence in protecting the interests of the Canadian traders at the mouth of the Mackenzie[16]. Still, White did nothing to direct the government to further action.

Constantine's report from his short excursion to Seattle and San Francisco was full of precise and useful information. The once dominant Pacific Steam Whaling Company no longer wintered in the Canadian Arctic, as the costs incurred were not matched by the returns. He named the two small independent schooners the 'Penelope' and the 'Altair', which would be wintering-over during the next year, and he located Baillie Island as the site at which they would be moored. He forwarded the judgement of Captain M.A. Healy of the famous United States Revenue Cutter 'Bear', that the whaling industry in the western Arctic was moribund and that the whisky traffic amongst the whalers had been all but stamped out[17]. In one single report, Constantine encapsuled what White needed to know. Yet White did not appear to fully appreciate the merit of the information. It was stockpiled with the other reports, combining the accurate and the up-to-date with the contradictory and unreliable information obtained in the past[18]. All the necessary data required for the formulation of a relevant police presence was contained in the short report: whaling activity had all but ceased; the wintering of American vessels was greatly reduced and that which did take place occurred many miles from the mouth of the Mackenzie River; and trading activity was conducted on an extremely small scale, with the illicit barter of alcohol an extinct practice.

Although White had amassed this information, he did not volunteer the results of his investigations to his political superiors. The initiative for northern police expansion would have to await the direction of the Minister of the Interior. That step finally came in late 1902. On December 4, Sifton's Deputy Minister, James A. Smart, wrote to White:

> I would be glad if you could make it convenient to come to my office on Saturday morning at eleven o'clock to consider the question of American whalers who are trading with the Indians and Esquimaux on Hudson's Bay and the Beaufort Sea.[19]

The meeting which transpired was to have historic consequences while producing reactions which were both dramatic and immediate. On December 19, White directed Perry to investigate the possibility of procuring a vessel in either British Columbia or San Francisco for police use in the western Arctic. He indicated that the Ministry of Marine was similarly studying the options for an expedition into Hudson Bay.

But if action was finally to be taken, the Canadian government did not want its intention to be known at this early stage. Clifford Sifton emphasized the need for Major Gourdeau of the Department of Marine and Fisheries to act in secrecy, while White wrote later to Perry that

> . . . we have all been particularly impressed with the importance of not making known the intention of the Government with regard to the policing etc. of these far northern waters.[20]

Urgency was the other keyword of the operation. After years of passive observation, the Departments had been forced into quickly responding to a perceived need. Within a month, no less a person than the

Commissioner of the N.W.M.P. was reporting to Ottawa from San Francisco on the results of his personal search to acquire a vessel for service in the Canadian western Arctic.

Ironically, White's past hesitancy to keep the government abreast of developments in the western Arctic ensured that he would not play an instrumental role in the government's final decision to expand northward. The decision was made in the key political offices of the Cabinet. Earlier, when White had addressed the government on northern matters, he had emphasized the need for more information before a meaningful government policy could be developed and implemented. Yet by having withheld information, he introduced the possibility that if the government undertook an initiative, it might be without the benefit of his consultation. It might as a consequence take a shape that was less than relevant. After all, White had assumed that the government's northern presence would be a response to developments in the North. Hence, his meticulous note-taking of information about that region. However, when the motivation to act encompassed issues of jurisdiction, then the nature of government activity naturally placed emphasis upon symbols which might be politically important but inconsistent with the requirements of the North. Canada's new northern policy, premised on the demands of sovereignty assertion, would soon reflect the considerations of the Ottawa political environment. Demands orginating from the North would remain neglected, often unheeded[21].

It is clear that Comptroller White was not concerned with the government's plan to assert authority in the Canadian eastern Arctic.

As the year 1903 opened, his northern file dealt exclusively with the Force's commitment to the Yukon and with the possibility of a police expansion into the Mackenzie valley region[22].

The Eastern Arctic 1903

For this reason, correspondence from the Deputy Minister of the Interior on July 15, 1903, came as a complete surprise to the Comptroller. Smart announced that not only would there be members of the Force on the expedition destined for Hudson Bay in a month's time, but also that the N.W.M.P. was expected to establish and man a post on the Bay during the upcoming winter[23]. White replied to Smart immediately. In a reasoned and determined manner, he laid bare his many concerns regarding the venture. He must have felt that the plan did not have the approval of higher authority for in an uncharacteristically candid manner, he exposed the weaknesses which he foresaw by posing questions which pertained directly to the police operation. Then, grievances aired, he qualified his stand:

> If the 'expedition', in all its bearing, has been fully considered and decided, I have nothing to say and shall go ahead on such lines as have been laid down; otherwise I would suggest to whoever has the matter in hand whether it is desirable, on this expedition of discovery, to establish permanent posts anywhere on Hudson's Bay.[24]

Smart's reply of the next day illustrated the degree to which the Deputy Minister had not considered the requirements for such a police operation. White had shown concern about pay for his detachment, where and when the expedition would be starting, who would finance the involvement of the N.W.M.P. and the nature of a relief

force in 1904. He had commented on the lateness of the departure and the concerns of legal jurisdiction. Furthermore, he had queried the ability of the expedition to supply itself with the large quantities of fuel required for such an undertaking[25]. Smart's reply to these concerns was at best vague. Defensively, he made it quite clear that he was merely acting out the desires of the Minister, Clifford Sifton. His answers ranged from the cavalier to the arrogantly misinformed and must have done little to ease White's state of apprehension[26]. Obviously unaware of the location of the tree line, Smart dismissed White's preoccupation with life-sustaining fuel by suggesting that the detachment members obtain wood from the trees which would be found in the vicinity of the post. In a rather patronizing manner, he snubbed White's suggestion that coal be brought by boat from Halifax.

However, White was determined to be heard on the matter. In the abstract he was concerned about the precedent of a "plan so foreign to anything the Police have in the past been called upon to perform"[27], but principally, he was concerned about leaving a detachment of police in a remote and unknown spot with the problems of supply and resupply not yet addressed, let alone resolved. A week later, he wrote Sifton and attempted to persuade him to alter the project. For the immediate future he felt:

> . . . it hardly likely that there will be any magisterial or police work, as the vessels which are trading in the northern waters have been doing so for a century and would expect reasonable notice before being called upon to pay customs duties on their outfits; . . .[28]

White argued that police services could be provided by employing a magistrate from the East and swearing in four crewmen of the ship as

special constables for the duration of the voyage[29]. But Sifton was not to be swayed. On July 25, he informed White that he expected a contingent of seven men to be at Halifax by August 15 and that they were to be prepared to sail on a two-year voyage. It was not until July 28 that White, accepting the situation, directed the Deputy Minister of the Marine and Fisheries to stock the supplies for the police. Inspector Strickland had been hand picked by Sifton to lead the detachment, but Strickland declined the offer. In his place, Superintendent John Douglas Moodie was appointed by White. Within two days he had been appointed an Inspector of Customs[30] and by August 5, Comptroller White had petitioned the Acting Deputy Minister of Justice for the powers of Commissioner of Police to be extended to Moodie[31].

White found himself extremely disadvantaged, responsible for an operation in a region about which he knew almost nothing. To reduce his vulnerability, he turned to any available source, even after the original sailing date had passed. From C. Chipman, the Fur Trade Commissioner for the Hudson's Bay Company, he received disheartening advice, advice which had it been available earlier, might have strengthened the case he had presented to Smart and Sifton.

White wrote Chipman, inquiring as to the nature of the Hudson's Bay Company activity in the northwest portion of the Bay. The information which Chipman provided was foreboding. Should the N.W.M.P. wish to situate a detachment in the vicinity of the American whaling activity, Chipman advised, they should establish a detachment at Cape Fullerton, which guarded the entrance to Roe's Welcome. However, to do

so would virtually isolate the detachment from all links with the outside world for periods of half a year or more. If alternatively they wished to establish a police post at Churchill Post where the Hudson's Bay Company was located, they would resolve some of the problems of supply and communication, but they would not be in a position to monitor the American activities at the time when the whalers were the most sedentary, during winter. Chipman pointed out that previous Company plans to locate a station at Fullerton had been abandoned due to the recognized difficulty of supplying the post[32]. None of this encouraged White, and his reply reflected his frustration at being involved in this apparently ill-prepared, planless venture. He openly stated tht he had no desire to see the Force involved with the expedition, but his "orders were imperative"[33].

Between September 16 and November 25, a constant exchange of correspondence flowed between Perry and White as the two decision-makers attempted to wrestle with some of the more central difficulties of maintaining a police presence in the eastern Arctic. Ironically, while these deliberations continued, the contingent for that detachment was already en route. The problems had barely been identified; their resolution was nowhere near completion.

The frustration felt by White stemmed from the requirement to act without the benefit of a plan. The government had decided on a course of action but had done so without investigating the complexities of its implementation. It had decided on the result that it wished to achieve from its northern policy: a visible presence. The initial

strategy was immediate and was based on information which was faulty, suspect or incomplete at best. The tactics - the structure for such a strategy - were ill-defined in the short term and undefined in the long term. Sifton was confident that this would be quickly overcome:

> It will be understood that our knowledge of the Northern portions of the territories in question being so un-exact no very definite instructions can be given as to the location of the post . . . . They (the Captain of the ship, the N.W.M.P. Officer, and Low) will further be asked to make a full report as to what should be the policy of the Government in dealing with the administration of these territories, apart from the technical report each of them will be required to furnish to his own branch of service.[34]

Sifton did not forsee a problem with collecting information, pursuing a limited course of action and formulating a plan later. Difficulties however could be predicted.

Further information was required before a strategy could be developed, yet several years might pass before sufficient information would be forthcoming. In the meantime, the presence of the police detachment in the eastern Arctic would require an administrative infrastructure which would safeguard the lives of the men in the North. Operations and expeditions would become a reality and with time, a systematic set of procedures would be in place. The presence of the police would perpetuate an obligation to remain. A fait accompli would be the sustaining rationale behind government activity, preshaping the future goals regardless of the demands which new information might suggest. Indeed, when reliable information did become available, it threatened the system which had been devised in part to gather that information.

Almost immediately, symptoms of these problems surfaced. Correspondence between White and Perry nearly a year later illustrated that neither a fully reasoned government plan was in place nor the resultant frustration reduced. White, in replying to Perry about the departure date of the 'Arctic' which would sail into Hudson Bay to resupply the expedition, stated:

> We had an informal consultation a few days ago - the Minister of Marine, the Deputy Minister of Marine, Capt. Spain and myself, but it did not amount to much beyond a promise of the Minister of Marine to make further enquiries of his colleagues. He asked me to prepare a memorandum - to which I replied that I had already written several and could not make any further progress until I knew the policy of the Government with regard to patrolling our northern waters . . . . I will keep you advised, but from experience up to date, I would like the Police to be relieved of this duty in north-eastern waters, because I feel sure that whilst a lot of responsibility will be thrown on the Police officers, we shall have very little to say about the movements of the vessel and general jurisdiction. However we must bide our time and adapt ourselves to circumstances.[35]

Indeed, in the ensuing years White would bide his time and in adapting to the circumstances, would oversee a police jurisdiction in the eastern Arctic which could find few logical reasons for existing. The future circumstances, created by compromise, would aggravate the senior hierarchy of the R.N.W.M.P. and frustrate the Force members sent to the remote regions.

The Western Arctic 1903-1904

White had been surprised and disillusioned by the use of the N.W.M.P. on the Hudson Bay expedition of 1903. He had, however, both anticipated and desired the extension of police jurisdiction to the mouth of the Mackenzie. A western Arctic police detachment, tied as it

was to both law enforcement and sovereignty assertion, would add to the successes already gained in the Yukon. White was well aware that the N.W.M.P. presence in the Yukon, in addition to being required for normal policing duties, was viewed by the Minister of the Interior as a force with political significance. Canada could not afford to be vulnerable should any altercation involving American citizens take place on Canadian territory[36].

Therefore, the decision in December 1902 to extend the Force's jurisdiction to the mouth of the Mackenzie River met with White's complete approval. Some nine months previously, White and Perry had, on their own initiative, considered sending a patrol down the Mackenzie to Fort McPherson, where it could strike off to the west and link up with the police detachments located in the Yukon. The advantage of opening communication ties with the isolated Yukon would be increased by the knowledge that could be gleaned of trading activities at the mouth of the Mackenzie[37].

No exact means of asserting authority was agreed upon at the meeting of December 1902. But as the month progressed, White wrote to Perry that a vessel would be required:

> I think it is about decided that the Government will send a vessel to Mackenzie Bay for the protection of Canadian Fisheries and Canadian interests generally.[38]

It was because of this that White directed Perry to "run down" to San Francisco to look into the acquisition of a ship that would be suited to the government's needs in the northern environment[39].

Interestingly, Perry's confidential report written the next month from Del Monte, California, repeated much of what Constantine had stated the year before, confirming the demise of the whaling economy in northern Canadian waters. As he reported:

> The entries of furs . . . are much less than I expected. I think it is accounted for by the fact that the Whaling Fleet as a whole does not winter in the Arctic as it formerly did. I was informed that the owners found it unprofitable to keep the fleet in the Arctic.[40]

By early 1903, even after the government was committed to expanding its jurisdiction northward, the Commissioner and the Comptroller of the N.W.M.P. knew that the reasons given by the government for such a plan were not as relevant as they had been years before. This same information had been reported earlier by Constantine, acting under the direct instructions of the Minister of the Interior.

White did not forward this latest intelligence to Sifton, and in May 1903, guidelines for the expedition were discussed and compiled. For Commissioner Perry, the first priority of any undertaking to the mouth of the Mackenzie River was to gather all available information related to whaling operations, both "past and present". Other concerns, he felt, should include the nature and extent of crime, the possible requirement of more police, the recommended locations for the establishment of police posts and the best methods of travel in the Athabasca and Mackenzie Districts[41]. Most of these concerns were reflected in the final directions which White prepared for Superintendent Constantine, the leader of the expedition.

Specifically, he was to erect a police post "at or near" Fort McPherson, whence he could obtain information not only about the whaling fleet but also about trading activities. He was to gather as much detail as possible about the local people and constantly consider the best means of securing lines of communication between the new police post on the Mackenzie and the other police detachments both to the south and to the west in the Yukon[42].

Constantine satisfied this directive in short order. He departed from Fort Saskatchewan on May 30 and returned in less than three months, on August 25, 1903. His report combined lessons in history and geography with a travelogue, logically drawing out recommendations for government policy. In general, he held little hope for the future prosperous development of the north country.

> Taken on the whole it may be safely said that the country is fit for nothing but Indians, furs and pulp wood, and Missionaries. There is no Agricultural land north of the Athabasca River.[43]

He was no less scornful about the site of the new detachment at Fort McPherson: "The place is the picture of desolation, cold and inhospitable"[44]. With regards to the whalers, he could only confirm that which he had already reported in 1902 and which Perry had independently asserted in 1900 and 1903. He wrote that while in the past there had been a flourishing trade between the whalers, the missionaries and the Indians, there now only existed tales of days gone by[45].

> The Whaling Fleet have practically abandoned Herschel Island. Last winter there were only two small schooners there. For three winters there were none . . . . The policy is now not to winter in the Arctic. I was told I was six years too late.[46]

His report on the conditions of the local inhabitants described a sorrowful story. An epidemic of measles had decimated complete bands of natives in Fort McPherson, Herschel Island and the Richards Island regions only months before he arrived.

Constantine's recommendations were clear, concise and well-reasoned. First, disband the post at Fort McPherson within the year, even though it had just been established:

> McPherson is not a suitable place for the Police Detachment, as the whalers have left Herschell [sic] Island and gone to Baillie Island, N.W. of Cape Bathurst which is 300 miles east of Herschell [sic], where the natives are more numerous.[47]

Second, for the effective administration of police jurisdiction where it was most needed, it was imperative that a series of police posts be established along the Mackenzie Valley. He felt that a minimum contingent should include one Non-Commissioned Officer and two Constables at Fort Simpson, two Constables at Fort Resolution and a supplementary force of one Constable and Officer attached to the newly-formed police post at Fort Chipewyan. To link these posts he strongly suggested that the N.W.M.P. procure a number of steamboats to ply the river system of the Mackenzie. Third, as there was not to be a police detachment any further north than Fort Simpson and since the region of the Arctic coast could not be adequately protected by any land-based post, he recommended that a Revenue Cutter be sailed permanently into the Arctic waters.

> . . . [This Cutter] with a strong crew, would have to winter on the Arctic, sending out sled parties to different points along the coast. The cost of this would considerably exceed any Revenue gained (at present). From a Revenue view it would not be a gain,

but from a National one it would, as we should protect all parts of our National Dominion from poachers and smugglers.[48]

Many of Constantine's recommendations were supported by the next report which arrived from the North. Scarcely two weeks after he had reached Fort McPherson, Sgt. Fitzgerald, the detachment commander, set out to patrol down the river and along the coast to Herschel Island. A report of this patrol arrived at Fort Saskatchewan in early November[49]. Because reliable information about this oft-discussed pinpoint of land was so scarce, Fitzgerald dedicated the initial pages to general information regarding the island. He then elaborated on circumstances relating to the whaling activities of the previous winter, the developments during the summer and fall, and the projected plans for the upcoming winter months. Of the two whaling boats which had wintered at the island, one was but a schooner with four Americans onboard. The other, the SS 'Narwhal', owned by the Pacific Steamship and Whaling Company was larger, employing seven officers and thirty-nine men. Between August 16 and 19, six more American ships arrived at Herschel, but of them, only one planned on wintering during the upcoming winter season. Fitzgerald concluded by unknowingly supporting Constantine's recommendation that a Revenue Cutter be deployed to the region to represent Canadian authority amongst the far-ranging American vessels[50].

Of interest was the manner in which these reports and the new wealth of information they embodied was received at higher levels. Originally, there had been no plan to establish a detachment on the western Arctic coast until at least 1904[51]. Sifton had made it quite

clear in the summer of 1903 that Constantine was to go to Herschel, but that the purpose of that year's activities was only to gather information. Possibly by 1904 an expedition would be sent in through the Bering Strait to establish a permanent post in a suitable location somewhere in the expanse of the western Arctic[52]. Certainly, neither Perry nor White had directed Constantine or Fitzgerald to establish a post at Herschel.

Sifton, White and Constantine falsely assumed that Fitzgerald had erected a post on Herschel for the winter of 1903-04[53]. Constantine added to the confusion when, in forwarding Fitzgerald's report to the Commissioner with a covering letter, he explained that he directed Fitzgerald

> . . . verbally, at the last moment before I left that if on making his patrol he should find that it would be in the interest of the Government to establish a post at Herschell [sic], he might do so . . . .[54]

But Fitzgerald had merely postmarked his report from Herschel while patrolling the region. His base for the winter was at Fort McPherson.

The import and substance of Fitzgerald's report changed as it travelled from Fort Saskatchewan to Regina and then to Ottawa, where it circulated amongst several offices. Attachments altered its context. It left Fort Saskatchewan with Constantine's covering letter on November 9, 1903 and having passed the Commissioner's Regina desk, was on its way to White in Ottawa by the 13th. On November 17 White addressed a letter to Laurier steeped with information acquired from

Fitzgerald's report, and on November 18, the report was forwarded by White to Sifton.

The summary which White prepared for the Prime Minister reflects the political realities of the time. It is significant because of what White chose not to relay to the Prime Minister. He started by reporting the estabishment of a police post at Herschel Island. The exultant tone of White's letter proudly endorsed the Police and Government involvement in the western Arctic regions. Nowhere was it mentioned that neither Constantine or Fitzgerald had been instructed to establish a post at Herschel; nor was there any reflection on the wisdom of such a venture[55]. Everything which White reported supported a continued and concerted government presence in this relatively unknown land. He spoke of the "seven whaling vessels in the locality", neglecting to mention that many of these vessels were but itinerant tending vessels, extremely small in size, which plied Canadian waters for periods of barely a month a year. He did not mention that only one ship planned on wintering in the upcoming season and that in the three previous years, none had wintered at Herschel. Instead he stated:

> The Police report that they are at a great disadvantage in not having a Revenue Cutter, and that it will be impossible to take active measures in the enforcement of customs laws and the suppression of liquor traffic until a suitable boat is supplied. The information I have received refers only to about 80 miles of coastline, although it is known that American Whalers are fishing fully 300 miles east of that point.[56]

In fairness, White can scarcely be blamed if he chose to reap political rewards owed to the Force. But in so doing, he altered the

substance of the information contained within the original report. This compromised the government's ability to develop a meaningful northern policy. Much had been held in abeyance awaiting reliable information. Now, before it could be compiled and used, it was being censured. In White's report, there was no mention of rampant disease amongst the natives, of the death of the whaling industry or of the recommendations to withdraw the detachment from McPherson. And certainly, there was no mention of Constantine's remark: "I was told I was six years too late".

White's actions cannot be condemned as personal idiosyncracies. Downs has formulated a hypothesis, based upon his studies, which explains this action:

> Officials inevitably distort information which they relay upwards to their superiors or downwards to their subordinates . . . .[57]

Importantly, downs states the official's

> . . . perception apparatus will partially screen out data adverse to his interests, and magnify those favouring his interests.[58]

It is the responsibility of the official to screen out and distill information as it is relayed to higher levels of decision-making. In the fulfillment of this task, the influence of the individual's interests come to the fore.

But if White was capitalizing on unexpected gains to put forward the case for a visible presence of the N.W.M.P. at the mouth of MacKenzie, there were others who had yet to formulate a concrete plan for asserting authority in the North. Clifford Sifton had advocated information-gathering journeys into the Arctic so that government

agents could return with newly-obtained information, educate the decision-makers and sow the seeds which would lead to a long-term government policy. Adequate information had not been forthcoming, and while he knew of the need for policy, he was not willing to totally commit the government. Such was the attitude expressed in his reply to White, acknowledging receipt of Fitzgerald's report:

> . . . I am pleased to know that Sergeant Fitzgerald has successfully made the trip and performed the duties assigned to him. When his full report comes forward, be good enough to consider the whole subject of what ought to be done in that neighbourhood fully and bring the matter before me for discussion and settlement . . .[59]

Ironically, the Minister who had insisted on the involvement of the N.W.M.P. in the eastern Arctic expedition - an involvement which White would not endorse because of insufficient information and planning - was now hesitant to commit the government to police involvement in the western Arctic until further information was available.

Conclusion

The year 1903 should have marked the proud commencement of a bold new chapter in the story of N.W.M.P. jurisdiction. Instead, it left a confused and uncertain legacy.

In the eastern Arctic, a small handful of men had been hastily dispatched to an unknown destination. They left without the benefit of an overall plan, without the support of their leaders, without the guidance of strictly implementable terms of reference and without the assurance of secured lines of provisions or communication. They voyaged to satisfy an uncertain requirement, scarcely perceived before

it was to become irrelevant. Their continued existence - both literally, as men forced to eke out an existence in a harsh and unforgiving environment, and figuratively, as a body of men with a series of ill-defined tasks to accomplish - would rely heavily on close communications between themselves, senior civil servants and politicians.

In the western Arctic, there had been sufficient indication before the departure of the expedition that White's original plan was largely irrelevant. Initial reports had confirmed this. The purpose of the expedition was to gather information, yet it was in a state of metamorphasis even before the first man left Fort Saskatchewan. The plan for a northern post at Herschel had taken root over many years and it was now an important goal, a symbol of accomplishment for Fred White. The information which had arrived, which would continue to be forthcoming, would soon become less important than the significance which White attributed to perpetuating this symbol.

Ironically, the differences between the two fields of operations cast White in opposing roles. With regards to the eastern Arctic, he was the pragmatist, opposing the politically motivated plan of the government. He was reason, armed against the dangers of uncomplicated naivete. His concerns were legitimate and responsible and were derived from years of experience with police operations. But his attitude to the western expedition in no way resembled this systematic approach to decision-making. His reasoning was fixed and less rational as he bent the process of decision-making to meet

pre-determined objectives. As Sifton had determined that there would be an eastern Arctic detachment, so had White asserted that there would be one in the West. Advice to the contrary would be shuffled as effectively as Sifton had done to White's advice. White was blinded to anything that would divert him from the implementation of his long-awaited and much delayed northwest expansion of jurisdiction.

White's reaction to the two expeditions was not as inconsistent as it appears. In the West, he planned the initial expedition and controlled the destiny of the police presence as he had never been able to do in the Yukon. He possessed the security of decision-making on his own terms. Sifton relied on the N.W.M.P. and on White's capacity as an advisor to prepare the government's policy in the western Arctic. If White wished to retain this power, this influence, he had to be able to filter the right information to the government while ensuring that the scope and nature of the future police presence fell within the limits of the Force's jurisdiction. Anything less would usurp White's influence to advise the government and would threaten the destiny of the expanded Force.

Meanwhile in the East, White would most vigorously oppose the government's initiative until such time as the R.N.W.M.P. presence could be diminished to a size and scope that White could mould. Ultimately, his success ensured that the police in the eastern Arctic would fulfill no more than a token role. It is noteworthy that in the decade after the first expedition of 1903-04, all advances in jurisdiction and sovereignty in the eastern Arctic were accomplished by

the Department of Marine and Fisheries. White fought to remove the Force from such notions of adventure. Through his efforts, he succeeded in reducing the eastern Force to two minute detachments. They would be located where they could be administered with the least amount of inconvenience.

For the next seven years, White orchestrated the committment of the R.N.W.M.P. in the Arctic, directing the Force's involvement towards this self-defined but never openly-conceded objective. With every success the chances of a relevant and logical police presence, one which met the real needs of the North, were diminished.

NOTES

[1]The press greeted the expedition to the eastern Arctic with great enthusiasm. In their eyes, Canada would be avenged by forcing the Americans to withdraw from the Bay or to submit to Canada's punishing authority. Of course this in no way resembled the official purpose of the expedition. Neither Low nor Moodie had many direct instructions, but Moodie in particular was notified to be lenient with foreigners in every regard. Morrison, "The Mounted Police," p.177.

[2]If this was the case in 1903, by 1905 the government's attitude precluded any such concern for the indigenous people of the North. Diamond Jenness, in describing the appointment of White to the position of the first commissioner of the newly reshaped Northwest Territories noted that:

> "His instructions called on him to uphold Canada's sovereignty in the northland, to maintain order, and to enforce the laws of Canada - a negative task which made his administration as static and unprogressive as police-run states generally are."

Diamond Jenness, Eskimo Administration: II. CANADA, Technical Paper No. 14 (Montreal: Arctic Institute of North America, 1964), p. 21.

[3]Report, Constantine to Herchmer, 4 September 1895, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 135:222-97.

[4]A.M. Burgess to F. White, 20 November 1897, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, volume 135:222-97.

[5]Just the year before Bishop W.S. Bompas, stationed at Buxton Mission on the Upper Yukon River, had appealed to national pride in attempting to cajole the government into asserting authority at Herschel Island:

> "You are probably already aware that Herschel Island in British waters off the Arctic Coast of the Canadian Dominion has now become a regular American whaling station where probably about 12 large American steamers lie for about 9 months of the year with crew[s] of about 600 Americans. . . . Deeds of furious violence are becoming common place among the Natives from drunkenness."

He concluded with a plea for the assertion of Canadian law and order. R.W. Scott, the Acting Minister at the time that the letter arrived in Ottawa addressed the Bishop's concerns. He sympathized with the plight of the natives and agreed that their exploitation by the immoral use of alcohol was abhorrent. He nonetheless concluded that the Minister's Office was tied by financial restraints: "There would be great

difficulty . . . in getting the requisite appropriation." See: W.S. Bompas, D.D. Bishop of Selkirk to Minister of the Interior, 18 June 1896, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C, volume 314:177-206 and R.W. Scott to Right Reverend W.S. Bompas, 2 October 1896, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C. volume 314:177-206. The Bishop's letter received the attention of the highest circles before Scott replied. Of interest is White's response to an inquiry by Laurier on the matter, in which the Comptroller stated that he felt that the expense of expanding the N.W.M.P. to the Arctic coast would not be merited given the "existing state of affairs". Memorandum, White to Laurier, 19 October 1896, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C, volume 314:177-206.

[6]These articles were cut out and placed on file. See: Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 140:445-97.

[7]Memorandum, F. White to W. Laurier, 19 October 1896, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 314:177-206.

[8]F. White to Frank Oliver, 8 May 1900, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 314:177-206.

[9]F. White to Superintendant A.H. Griesbach, 9 May 1900, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 314:177-206.

[10]A. Bowen-Perry to F. White, Victoria, 29 May 1900, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 314:177-206.

[11]Before 1897, the N.W.M.P. had never been further north in the interior reaches of Canada than Lac La Biche. Early that year, two policemen patrolled to Great Slave Lake and in December 1897, Inspectors A.E. Snyder and W.H. Routledge reached further north on separate patrols. Routledge became the first to patrol down the Mackenzie River, advancing as far as Fort Simpson before returning. Meanwhile, Inspector J.D. Moodie travelled with great effort from Edmonton to Fort Selkirk in the Yukon between September 4, 1897 and October 24, 1898. Cook, pp. 275-76.

[12]F. White to C. Sifton, 23 January 1901, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 314:177-206.

[13]White directly quoted Constantine in the submission of the N.W.M.P. Annual Report for 1901, thus reinforcing his favoured project:

> ". . . the time is rapidly approaching when the North should be more closely looked after, the number of men and police stations increased and facilities for better communications improved."

N.W.M.P. Report 1901, p. 56, cited by Zaslow, The Opening, p. 243.

[14]See: pages 55-58, above.

[15]Confidential Letter, White to Constantine, 11 February 1902, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 232:195-202.

[16]Edmonton Bulletin, 22 September 1902, found in the Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 314:177-206.

White retained the article, underlining in red those portions that were the most severe.

[17]Report, Constantine to White, 17 April 1902, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 232:195-202.

[18]Interestingly, Constantine's report was filed with other reports which primarily dealt with events in the Yukon. Buried as it therefore was, it may not have received the consideration that it deserved.

[19]J.A. Smart to F. White, 4 December 1902, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 314:177-206. This correspondence is of interest for two reasons. It illustrates how poorly informed some decision-makers in Ottawa still were, for there were no Indians involved in trade with American whalers, either in Hudson Bay or on the Beaufort Sea. Also, Smart's concerns were focussed as much on the Hudson Bay as they were on the western Arctic. Certainly, White did not share this interest as all his correspondence and files related to the North were directed at the Western Arctic.

[20]Personal Letter, White to Perry, 30 December 1902, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 314:177-206. Writers have rationalized this desire for secrecy as the government's attempt to keep the cost of acquiring a vessel to a minimum. A government committment made public would inflate the purchase value of the vessel. While concerns of cost may have indeed been a factor, direction from White to Perry indicate that the mask of secrecy reflected government concerns which were graver than mere cost. Perry was directed to "report by mail information obtained but take no definitive action. Everything quiet in the Territories." Quite evidently the government had expected trouble in its northern territories and Perry's search for a government vessel was directly linked to this expectation. White to Perry, 29 January 1903, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 314:177-206.

[21]Morrison, "The Mounted Police," pp. 365-66.

[22]In the correspondence which followed the meeting, it becomes evident that interest in the eastern Arctic and the Hudson Bay region originated from the offices of the Minister of the Interior. It was White's understanding that the Department of Marine and Fisheries would implement the plan to assert Canadian sovereignty in the eastern portion of the northern waters. Consequently, he made no preparations for an expedition into the eastern Arctic.

[23]J. Smart to F. White, 15 July 1903, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 293:236-305, II.

[24]F. White to J. Smart, 16 July 1903, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 293:236-305, II.

[25]Ibid.

[26]J. Smart to F. White, 17 July 1903, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 293:236-305, II.

[27]F. White to J. Smart, 16 July 1903, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 293:236-305, II. White's argument is surprising and must have been unconvincing. R. C. Macleod notes:

> "One of the most interesting things revealed by the N.W.M.P. records was that the Force spent much, indeed most, of its time on activities not directly connected with law enforcement."

Macleod, The N.W.M.P., pp. x-xi. Since the 1870's and certainly in the 1880's, the N.W.M.P. had functioned "as an arm of the executive branch of the Canadian government" in the Prairies and fulfilled the political role of resisting American encroachment in the barely-populated regions of the West. Macleod, The N.W.M.P., p. 22; Morrison, "The Mounted Police," pp. 9-12.

[28]Memorandum, F. White to C. Sifton, 23 July 1903, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 293:236-305, II.

[29]White to Perry, 23 July 1903, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 293:236-305, II.

[30]Note contained in Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 321:637-706.

[31]White to Acting Deputy Minister of Justice Power, 5 August 1903, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 259:665-703.

[32]C. Chipman to F. White, 21 August 1903, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 314:188-206.

[33]F. White to C. Chipman, 2 September 1903, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 314:188-206.

[34]Memorandum, C. Sifton to F. White, 30 July 1903, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 293:236-305, II.

[35]White to Perry, 18 June 1904, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 293:236-305, II.

[36]As White expressed it to Perry:

> ". . . as Mr. Sifton has so frequently expressed his desire to be prepared for any emergency in the Yukon, I shall be glad if you will arrange to send in ten more recruits to White Horse."

White to Perry, 25 November 1902, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 223:53-102.

[37]White to Perry, 26 March 1902, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C, volume 235:296-302.

[38]Private Letter, White to Perry, 23 December 1902, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 314:177-206.

[39]Ibid.

[40]Confidential Report, Perry to White, 30 January 1903, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 314:177-206.

[41]Perry to White, 11 May 1903, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 235:296-302.

[42]Memorandum entitled "Instructions for Superintendent Constantine" date 19 May 1903, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 235:296-302, II.

[43]Report, Constantine to White, 6 September 1903, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 236:296-302.

[44]Ibid.

[45]Constantine stated that in the past, whalers had sold flour at a price of $6/100 pounds, whereas the Hudson's Bay Company at Fort McPherson was selling flour at a price of $22/100 pounds. See Ibid.

[46]Ibid.

[47]Ibid.

[48]Ibid.

[49]The nature of the transportation routes, hence the communication links of the day, is illustrated by the circuitous route which Fitzgerald's report travelled to reach officials. Written at Herschel Island, the document must have been hand-delivered to the Captain of one of the American tender vessels, which was destined to depart Canadian Arctic waters that fall. As a result, a report on the trading and whaling practices of Americans in Canadian waters - a report that was intended to counsel the administration on the best manner by which these economic interests could be controlled, curtailed or regulated - was delivered by an American trading vessel in the hire of an American whaling company. It was taken from Canadian waters, west along the Arctic coast to the Bering Strait, thence south along the coast of Alaska, then Canada, to the American port of Seattle, where it entered the normal international postal system to be delivered to Fort Saskatchewan. A link between Herschel Island and Fort McPherson, a distance of only a few hundred miles, would have allowed the report to be carried directly south onboard a Hudson's Bay Company steamer which plied the Mackenzie River.

[50]Report, Sgt. Fitzgerald to Officer Commanding 'G' Division, 21 August 1903, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 235:296-302, II.

[51]White to Perry, 17 April 1903, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 235:296-302.

[52]Sifton to White, 30 July 1903, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 293:236-305, II.

[53]It appears that White and Constantine believed that Fitzgerald was based at Herschel Island. Commissioner Perry however, was not only aware that there was no police force established at Herschel Island during the winter of 1903-04, he was dismayed that such was not the case:

"I think that it is a matter of regret that an Officer was not sent in charge of the Detachment to remain there for the winter, as difficulties may arise on Herschel Island with the whalers . . . ."
See: Perry to White, 25 November 1903, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 235:296-302. It is possible that White was using a bit of licence to embellish the accomplishment of the Force. Only a week after White announced to Laurier that a post had been established at Herschel, he wrote an informal and 'newsy' letter to Moodie. In it, he announced that the police force was at the mouth of the Mackenzie River and that a "connection [had been] made with Herschell [sic] Island where a small detachment will be permanently stationed". (Italics mine.) White to Moodie, 25 November 1903, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 314:188-206.

[54]Constantine to Commissioner, 9 November 1903, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 235:296-302, II.

[55]There is evidence to indicate that neither White nor Perry had previously supported a detachment at or near Herschel. Perry wrote to White:

"Referring to the Mackenzie River Detachment, I think Sergt. Fitzgerald's report, which I forwarded to you some time ago, ought to change our views with regard to the necessity of a Detachment at the mouth of the Mackenzie River."

The context of the rest of the letter is clear: they should change from not supporting a detachment to actively endorsing the requirements for one. See: Perry to White, 25 November 1903, Comptroller's Papers, P.A.C., volume 235:296-302.

[56]White to Laurier, 17 November 1903, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 235:296-302.

[57]Downs, "A Theory", p. 9.

[58]Downs, Inside, p. 180.

[59]Sifton to White, 19 November 1903, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 235:296-302.

CHAPTER III

THE EASTERN ARCTIC: 1903-1911

Introduction

Events which led to the first expedition of the N.W.M.P. into the eastern Arctic shattered Fred White's security. Shaken and unprepared, he reeled to the demands made by the government. But he recovered quickly. During the next year, he prepared plans that far outshone the suggestions of Clifford Sifton and in so doing, he wrestled initiative back into his hands. But these plans, formed without the benefit of information from the expedition, took little account of the problems of supply, or of the difficulties of transportation in this barren land.

It mattered little, for within the year his objectives were obsolete, victims of a compromise which enabled him to withdraw from the dubious task of pioneering in this unknown region. He struck an agreement with the Department of Marine and Fisheries which handed most of the new-found responsibility to the latter department. White's initiative and accompanying resolve diminished. Armed with but one report from Moodie, he committed the Force to a role which was severely

restricted and which would limit it in the ability to respond to unforeseen and future demands. His vision was dimmed. Accordingly, White ignored the suggestions of later years which called for a dynamic or progressive police role. Instead, he centred his attentions on the more facile concerns of rational decision-making. In so doing, the usefulness of the eastern Arctic Force was tempered to satisfy the principles of good administration.

Without a clearly defined government policy, he was left to determine the priorities for 'M' Division. His response was to refuse to trap himself into long-term commitments or unwieldy or difficult projects. His policy became one of abeyance, in which he busied himself with overseeing the administrative chores of the Division. The role of the Police in the eastern Arctic became one first of existence, then of maintenance. Proposals to expand this role were consistently denied. What nobody could be expected to know was the extent to which the whaling industry in the eastern Arctic had diminished[1]. Once this fact became indisputable, the Department of Marine and Fisheries and the R.N.W.M.P. had each to search out the meaning of their respective and well-publicized presence.

Whaling activities in the eastern Arctic waters dated back to 1619, when it is recorded that a Dutch vessel first caught whales in the Davis Strait. From the mid-eighteenth to the early nineteenth centuries, Dutch and American ships shared in the bountiful take until they were displaced by vessels from England and Scotland. But the success which the British enjoyed in the next fifty years lured

American enterprise back[2]. In 1845, American vessels once again touched on the shores of Davis Strait; in 1855 they penetrated the Spitzbergen Ocean, followed in 1857 by entrance to the Okhotsk Sea; and in 1862, they inched through the ice-clogged Hudson Strait to fish the Bay for the first time[3]. The successes achieved here and throughout the waters of the world assured the New England whaling industry of world dominance.

The English and Scottish industries crumbled in the last decades of the nineteenth century[4], but the American fleet, assisted by greater resources and access to the many whale fisheries throughout the world, continued to turn a profit. To do so, they sought ever-changing techniques. In the Canadian eastern Arctic, the Americans concentrated on the waters of Hudson Bay. As a result, the slaughter, which until then took place in many tens of thousands of square miles[6], now became highly intensive and regionally localized. At four different sites ranging from Marble Island in the south to Repulse Bay in the north, American whaling vessels wintered from mid-September until May[7]. Natives became an integral element of the American enterprise, congregating in large numbers at the location of the ice-bound ships[8]. From these bases they hunted, ran chores and assisted in the whaling. But the heyday years of 1855 to 1875 were replaced by increasingly less prosperous seasons[9]. By the turn of the century, a few non-profitable sedentary stations had almost totally replaced the whaling vessels and only through the benefit of limited trade were the continuing expenses defrayed[10]. By 1903, Low reported the complete disintegration of American whaling activity in these waters and the entrenchment of an

extremely small Scottish industry, which even then was in its final death throes[11].

Eastern Arctic Expansion

The 'Neptune', commanded by Low and with newly-appointed Police Commissioner Moodie onboard, left the dock at Halifax on August 22, 1903[12]. After touching at Port Burwell on September 1, where the Job Brothers of Newfoundland ran a fishing and trading station, the 'Neptune' steamed north, docking at a Scottish whaling station on Blacklead Island in Cumberland Sound. During the next several days the Canadians visited three more stations similar to Blacklead. Kekerton, like Blacklead, was run by the Noble Brothers of Aberdeen, while Frenchmen's Cove and Cape Haven were both owned by Potter Wrightington of Boston. At each of these stations, Moodie found that whaling and trading had been on the decline for the past several years. He also found that without exception, the men at these isolated outposts were enthusiastic about the government's intentions to assert Canadian sovereignty[13]. The first contact between the representatives of Canadian government authority and the foreign entrepreneurs of the far North was a friendly one.

After only four days of contact with the whaling stations in and around Cumberland Sound, the 'Neptune' steamed south to locate a safe haven in Hudson Bay for the upcoming winter. The next ten months were spent at Fullerton Bay, on the north central coast of Hudson Bay, frozen-in in the company of an American whaling vessel, the 'Era'[14]. It was at this isolated point that the N.W.M.P. established the post

which would stand as the sole representative of official authority in the Hudson Bay region for the next several years.

When the summer months of 1904 finally arrived the activity of policing and exploring - cut short in the previous year - continued. Staff Sergeant C.H. Dee patrolled to Repulse Bay where he rested for five days before returning to Fullerton on August 19. The 'Neptune' finally shed the icy bonds which had held her captive for so many months and sailed to Port Burwell where it rendezvoused with the S.S. 'Erik'. Moodie boarded the 'Erik' to return to Ottawa and report to White personally[15]. He would return to Fullerton aboard the 'Arctic', commanded by Joseph Bernier, before the next winter. Meanwhile, the 'Neptune' turned north with Acting-Corporal Donaldson aboard. This portion of the expedition was dedicated almost solely to exploration and the claim of territory. In the next six weeks, the 'Neptune' anchored first at Etah in Greenland and then at Cape Sabine and Cape Isabella on Ellesmere Island, while touching on the shores of Beechey, North Devon, North Somerset and Bylot Islands. It met with only five vessels, all of which were associated with Scottish whaling or trading firms and none of which wintered in Canadian waters[16].

Meanwhile, Moodie arrived in Ottawa in August 1904, armed with information which was awaited by both the government and Comptroller White. His report, dated September 3, stretched to forty-four pages and encouraged an expanded government presence in this region. Moodie stressed the importance which great distances and the remoteness of the country would play in the implementation of any future plan. Even the

most limited objectives would "require a considerable force and an expenditure in proportion"[17]. He recommended that police detachments be established at those locations where there was regular interface between foreign entrepreneurs and the native inhabitants. There would also have to be a network of smaller posts, always within patrolling distance of each other, to protect policemen from the dangers of operating in such a desolate environment[18].

He proposed that a principal port of entry be established at Wolstenholme to control the collection of taxes and that this location be the Headquarters for the R.N.W.M.P. operations in the north-east district. He recommended the purchase of a fast steamer which could guarantee the regular supply of the various posts. It would also assist in the enforcement of the law on the waters of Hudson Bay. He felt that the government was compelled to take a more active future role in this land. He favoured the Danish system of administration, in place already in Greenland:

> All stores and trading stations are in the hands of the Government, and no person is allowed to trade with the natives unless in some special case.

He foresaw that

> . . . unless stringent laws are made and foreigners kept out of the country, there is very considerable risk of trouble, as with only small detachments here and there, they would be tempted to ignore the laws.[19]

As in Greenland, the country could be run by a Lieutenant-Governor who, with all-power, would exercise authority for the betterment of the native population and for the Canadian nation as a whole.

Moodie was well aware of the all-embracing ramifications of such a policy. The government would have to step in after the expulsion of the traders, for the natives were dependent upon foreign goods for their subsistence. But he ardently felt that this would be to the advantage of Canada as a nation. The native would get a fair deal when trading for goods instead of enduring the exploitive rates of exchange from which he currently suffered. The hunting of whale and musk-ox would be denied to all save the natives, thus ending the danger of extinction to these species. To assist the natives as a group, he recommended that a hospital post be erected at every police detachment, thereby safeguarding the health of both the indigenous population and the Arctic-based members of the R.N.W.M.P.

In summary, Moodie's report detailed an elaborate plan designed to protect the natives of the region. It would involve the R.N.W.M.P. in great measure and its implementation would result in a costly network of police posts along the bleak coast of Hudson Bay. His report completed, Moodie boarded the 'Arctic' and once again sailed north, meeting with the southbound 'Neptune' at Port Burwell on October 1. Almost none of Moodie's recommendations would ever be implemented.

In part, the role of the R.N.W.M.P. remained limited as a consequence of an agreement signed by White and officials from the Department of Marine and Fisheries. On January 20, 1905, Commander Spain, the Deputy Minister of Marine and Fisheries, Comptroller White, representing the R.N.W.M.P., and Commander Low agreed that:

> For the purposes of enforcing the laws of Canada and for exploration, the waters of Hudson Bay, Hudson Straits, and the islands and waters north thereof, be under the control of the Honourable Minister of Marine and Fisheries[20].

Further, they agreed that the Department of Marine and Fisheries would enforce the laws of Canada on all whaling vessels and amongst the whaling stations in Cumberland Sound. The R.N.W.M.P. would retain responsibility for maintaining law and order only on the land around the Bay. By the end of the month, both the Minister of Marine and Fisheries and the Prime Minister of Canada had sanctioned this all-important distribution of authority.

Consequently, the R.N.W.M.P. could attend to those locations around the Bay where natives were in contact with non-natives. One American whaler continued to frequent Fullerton Bay. There it wintered and in the spring, it sailed north to whale with the assistance of the natives. Every summer, Scottish vessels continued to sail through the Straits and up to Repulse Bay, where they traded with the natives for goods procurred during the winter months when the ships were docked in Scotland. With these transactions completed, the vessels whaled for a month before disembarking their native help and steaming back to Scotland. It had been a few short months since Moodie had recommended a large police force to oversee an elaborate government jurisdiction. Already, the terms of reference for the eastern Arctic division were altered, impairing the plan before the first additional post could be erected.

Conducting patrols throughout the period 1904-1911 proved to be cumbersome and ineffective. The best time for winter patrols was during the months of February, March and April and these were usually conducted to any or all of Chesterfield Inlet, Baker Lake and Repulse Bay. As there were no traders wintering regularly in these regions, the patrols served merely to reinforce an awareness amongst the natives of the R.N.W.M.P. presence. No interpreter accompanied the patrols and even those who performed the patrols questioned the effect that they had in communicating the laws or the intended goodwill of the government.

Without a patrol boat, the effectiveness of the summer patrols was equally doubtful. Initially, members of the Fullerton Detachment improvised. Sometimes they borrowed native whaleboats; at other times, they 'hitched' a ride on the American whaler 'Era'. Such were the means by which Canadian sovereignty was asserted in the early years[21]. Not surprisingly, such a sporadic means of enforcing Canadian law was often unfruitful. If the police arrived too early in the season, they found that the Scottish ships had not yet arrived. When they arrived too late, the ships had already departed with their native crew to hunt for whales. The arrival of the R.N.W.M.P. accomplished little unless by chance they arrived on the few short days during which the Scots were present and trading with the natives. Seldom did this happen.

In later years, the Detachment at Fullerton became even less effective. The police who manned the winter post were often forced to

spend the summer months travelling south to Churchill to obtain much needed supplies. This meant that any foreign vessels which wished to clear at the only official port of entry arrived at Fullerton only to find it abandoned[22].

Moodie's recommendation for a string of posts and detachments around the Bay never received serious consideration. By early 1905, White and Perry were solely concerned with jurisdiction on the western coast of Hudson Bay. Even so, they were hesitant to commit further expenditures on 'M' Division. Finally, in the fall of 1906, some three years after the 'Neptune' sailed from Halifax with the delegation of government representatives, Moodie was instructed to establish a post at the mouth of the Churchill River which would serve as Divisional Headquarters. To safeguard supply and communication lines, Perry ordered the construction of detachments at Norway House and Split Lake, thereby segmenting the 610 miles which separated the end of the railway line at Winnipeg Beach and Fort Churchill[23].

This marked the extent of police expansion in the Canadian eastern Arctic for the foreseeable future. In effect, these measures served only to logistically consolidate that single probe of authority to Fullerton undertaken in 1903. Ironically, the infrastructure designed to supply the outpost now consumed more resources and manpower than did the Fullerton detachment, and in almost no time, a disproportionate amount of attention was diverted to ensuring the continuity of the Churchill to Winnipeg Beach line. Nonetheless, by December 13, 1907, the total strength of 'M' Division numbered only 13

officers, Non-Commissioned Officers, Constables and special native constables, a reduction of two in the fifteen months previous[24].

While Moodie recognized that his first recommendation for a series of detachments would never be fulfilled, he continued to believe that posts were required where the non-native population and the native population interacted. Consequently, he lobbied relentlessly for a detachment at Baker Lake, even though five years had elapsed since he first argued the requirement. Even the Commissioner, who was more responsive to requests from the field than White, failed to support Moodie's constant efforts to establish a police post at Baker Lake[25]. In 1909, Moodie requested a new detachment of two Constables and an interpreter at York Factory, where he felt that there was much work to be done. This time Perry supported Moodie, but White chose not to act on the request[26]. For the immediate future, White would not consider an increased police presence in the northeast of Canada.

Moodie was frustrated by these constraints and by his inability to improve his minute command. In the late winter of 1906-07, he requested that a windmill and additional material be sent to Churchill so that electric light could be provided for his new Headquarters' buildings. The long dark winter months were causing a great deal of inconvenience and the requirement for efficient artificial light was a necessity to perform the daily responsibilities. At the same time, he requested four miles of telephone line to link his Division's Headquarters with the center of habitation, the Hudson's Bay Company

post[27]. White's response regarding the provision of electricity was short, but instructive:

> Our appropriation would not permit, and the conditions at Fort Churchill would not justify the expenditure involved by your recommendation at the present time.[28]

In an equally telling manner, White replied to the request for telephone wire:

> This must be deferred for the present, and I would suggest that you renew your recommendation if the permanency and conditions of development at Churchill in the future justify the construction of the lines.[29]

Moodie could have asked for no clearer indication that the command with which he was entrusted was by no means a permanent part of R.N.W.M.P. policy. For the next several years Moodie plodded steadily onwards, writing his reports, analyzing the circumstances and forwarding his recommendations and requests to Regina and Ottawa. For years, his correspondence was read and filed.

As a result, business went on as usual in 'M' Division, with only occasional changes in procedure. During the winter of 1908-09, life-sustaining supplies became low at Fullerton. When ice breakup occurred in July, the Detachment members scrambled south to the safety of Churchill with its more plentiful goods. The post was re-manned in September, but for the next several years it became the custom to get the Detachment out of Fullerton once the decaying winter's ice made it possible. Consequently, the prime objective of the Detachment became that of "standing guard" over the one American whaling vessel which irregularly wintered at Fullerton, and monitoring the status of the

natives of the region. Winter patrols were still made to Baker Lake and Repulse Bay when supplies and travelling conditions permitted.

Conditions of commerce in the Bay continued to decline. Whales were scarce, too scarce even to support the small numbers of vessels actively engaged in hunting them. Other wildlife, killed before as items of trade, continued to be depleted. The cost of maintaining a sedentary station and a transatlantic vessel did not offset the diminished returns.

The government presence in the Hudson Bay evolved during the years 1903 to 1911. In 1903, the first official delegation steamed - almost defensively - into the Bay, armed with little information and almost no terms of reference. The first year's activity had been symbolic; the second quite ineffective. Police activity became ritualistic in a very small corner of the region, with occasional excursions of short duration to native settlements. In Churchill, they oversaw the influence of a Hudson's Bay Company agent and a Church of England Missionary. In Fullerton, they shared winter company with a kindly American whaler, who sometimes helped supply the detachment, sometimes informed the Comptroller of the needs of his men, sometimes collected artifacts for the Canadian National Museum and often assisted the natives around Fullerton Harbour[30].

With time, the government's interest in this corner of its domain was rekindled, but not because of the recommendations from its representatives within the region. Official attention focused upon

commerce and trade, Canadian trade and the potential for a deep-water port that would provide easy access to the developing Canadian interior[31]. As they had done before, the R.N.W.M.P. now served as emissaries for the goverment infrastructure which was to follow.

When Moodie established the post at Churchill, some saw it as the headquarters of a vast network of yet-to-be established police posts, positioned as listening posts for the far-removed decision-makers of Canadian government policy. By 1910, it sat immobile, its effective jurisdiction extending barely beyond the boundaries of the mouth of the Churchill River. It remained to be seen whether the government's new initiative for this area of Canada would give 'M' Division its first hint of relevancy.

Characteristics of Eastern Arctic Expansion

White's plan for the Yukon prior to 1897 was one of procrastination, a short term 'wait-and-see' policy that was changed only after the politicians whom he advised countered his recommendations and acted, despite his protests. White approached the expedition into Hudson Bay in 1903 with similar trepidation, but for different reasons. He felt the plan was not a well-reasoned one and that necessary details of supply, planning and logistics had not been considered. However, while he continued to disagree with policemen being aboard the 'Neptune' expedition, he recognized the priority that the politicians placed on the establishment of a Canadian government presence in the eastern reaches of the Canadian Arctic. With memories of the Yukon expansion still alive, when he had failed to successfully

read the mood and intent of the government, he now set aside his personal misgivings and actively prepared for a new police operation. Fully three weeks before the 'Neptune' sailed, White sketched out a plan to send policemen overland to Churchill or York Factory, where they could patrol the region and link up with the Moodie party wherever the latter chose to winter. Furthermore, he predicted a complete system of police jurisdiction established in the near future on the west coast of Hudson Bay. This plan gained Sifton's immediate approval[32]. The patrol to Churchill and points north did not materialize, yet White's enthusiasm did not diminish[33].

In January 1904, he proposed to Prime Minister Laurier that new police districts be formed which would include yet undefined areas of jurisdiction in the North. To supply these remote districts, he requested that ships be procured for the Police Force. When he received no reply, he once again wrote to Laurier. This time, the Prime Minister approved White's request the next day[34]. White immediately started to formulate a plan for the Hudson Bay region. Although he had not yet heard from Moodie, he anticipated the information that would be forthcoming and decided on the establishment of a permanent post at Port Burwell. This would be the Headquarters of the northeast district. Later, after Moodie submitted his report, White changed the location of the new detachment from Port Burwell to Wolstenholme and he expanded the scope of the plan to include a future police station in Cumberland Sound[35]. He agreed with Moodie that, with Fullerton in place, the next priority was the establishment of a port of entry. After that, a post should be located where there appeared to

be the greatest interaction between foreign entrepreneurs and the natives. White delegated the organizational details of the new 'M' Division to the Commissioner of the R.N.W.M.P. and with the preliminary information reviewed, Perry reported to White with an enthusiasm which mirrored that of the Comptroller:

> I am satisfied that the work in Hudson Bay will extend to such an extent that "M" Division will be of considerable strength before many years.[36]

But throughout the remainder of 1904 no action was taken, no tangible results achieved. White's plans were formulated, Perry's theoretical construction of 'M' Division was completed, even Laurier's consent to purchase vessels had been obtained. This widespread enthusiasm but small actual commitment facilitated the reversal of policy which took place in the next year.

After the meeting of January 20, 1905 in which each Department agreed to a very strict definition of responsibility, White's ardour towards further police involvement in Hudson Bay cooled. The meeting resulted in part from a clash of personalities between Low and Moodie on the expedition of 1903-04. But it went further, for each agency perceived a fundamentally different future role in the Arctic. Those at the meeting were candid in acknowledging these differences, both actual and perceived, and had met "for the purpose of discussing and framing suggestions for the avoidance of friction and misunderstanding caused by divided responsibility."[37] The results of the meeting arrested the implementation of White's program for future police operations. He agreed that the Force would uphold the law only on the

land surrounding the Bay. In so doing he allowed the Department of Marine and Fisheries to assume responsibility for enforcing Canadian law upon the inland sea and also for policing activities at the whaling stations in Cumberland Sound. In so doing, he all but ensured that the Force would not be in future contact with foreign nationals in the northern reaches of the Canadian eastern Arctic. From this moment, White's enthusiasm was replaced by a general desire to minimize police involvement.

In the next years, White directed the withdrawal of the R.N.W.M.P. to a very small corner of the region, there to await the uncertain future. In late 1906, White wrote to Perry about the new patrol boat soon to be delivered to the R.N.W.M.P. for use in the Bay. In so doing, he reflected on the involvement of the Police in future exploration:

> If we succeed in getting her off next Spring, and then arrange for a patrol from Chesterfield Inlet to Great Slave Lake, I think we shall have completed our exploration operations and be able to wait patiently for final results so far as the Police are concerned.[38]

Clearly, White would administer the eastern Arctic with a minimum of expenditure and flourish.

But the exasperation which the R.N.W.M.P. and the Department of Marine and Fisheries experienced did not end in January 1905. The Department of Marine and Fisheries had agreed to build a "light draught steamer" for the Police Force, one which could carry sufficient coal to cruise for twelve days while re-manning and re-stocking the posts in the Bay. The plan called for the steamer to be ready for service by

early summer of 1906[39]. But this joint venture - the building of the 'Rouville' - was to be yet another fiasco.

The deadline for delivery - early June 1906 - was not met. One delay followed another. During the winter of 1905-06, construction was halted for two months, while the ship's plans were reconsidered[40]. Incredibly, there was no provision to carry cargo within the ship, despite the fact that this was its primary function[41]. When construction resumed, the oversight had not been rectified, but progress was imperative if it was to be ready for the 1906 season. It was the wrong vessel being rushed to a late completion so that it would be unable to accomplish the primary role for which it had been ordered, but not designed. The next delay stretched from May through to July 1906, while the Departments argued over the responsibility for outfitting the ship[42]. These delays ensured that the 'Rouville' would never touch on Arctic waters in 1906[43]. It was into drydock in April 1907, the departure date delayed consequently until June 25, 1907. And then, the problem which was to be final surfaced. The 'Rouville' burned twenty tons of coal a day, but could carry no more than 170 tons in total. They would have to preposition fuel for the voyage to the Bay, for the patrol around the Bay and for the return to warmer waters[44]. The cost would be astronomical; the ship's practicality was totally suspect.

It can only be surprising then that it was fully two more months before White acted on the obvious. On August 16, 1907, fourteen months after the originally scheduled sailing date for the 'Rouville's'

debut northern voyage, White cancelled the program. A vital ingredient of Moodie's plan for the development of the eastern Arctic died. With its death went also the ability of the R.N.W.M.P. to control its own very important supply lines.

Trends which characterized expansion in 1903 and which had been evident in the Yukon in the previous decade, evolved into precedents as the years progressed. Both Sifton and White had earlier declared that no policy could be formulated until further information was available. Yet in the Yukon, when government representatives supplied the much needed information, it was greeted by an almost inexplicable lack of action[45]. The realities in which the two groups travelled - the one influenced by the immediate requirements of a small group of people who quite literally survived in isolation; the other, life-long civil servants who wrestled with the mysteries of political whim and bureaucratic precedent - differed immensely. The lines of communication between them were often strained or non-existent.

Detachments

In 1904 Moodie recommended that there be a series of detachments strung around the Bay. However, within months White was phasing out all plans for such a large-scale police involvement. He would support only the minimum number of detachments required to accomplish a figurehead role.

But Moodie continued to report to his superiors with information which, had it been acted upon, would have created a dynamic

and expanding role for the R.N.W.M.P. In 1903, he was still philosophic:

> Re Detachments. I have very little expectation that my suggestions will be carried out, but if the govt [sic] is desirous of taking over these Territories and enforcing the claim of the Dominion to them I see no other means of doing it. Believing this, I consider I would be to blame did I fail to state my opinions. It there rests with the govt to act on them or not as appears desirable.[46]

Such a detached attitude persisted only as long as he talked of a vague notion of territorial sovereignty. His concern for the natives, his demands for supplies and reinforcements, these were issues which bespoke the need for action. In September 1904 and again in January 1905 he petitioned White for detachments at Repulse Bay, Chesterfield Inlet, Port Harrison and a point halfway between Churchill and Baker Lake[47]. Furthermore, he recommended the establishment of several detachments along the east coast of the Bay.

> Without more detachments along the coast on both sides of the Hudson bay [sic], but little real patrol work can be done.[48]

Moodie was grappling with the realization that his detachment was stranded far away from where it should be, powerless to patrol and powerless to act. But in Ottawa, White was primarily concerned with the eastern Arctic quarrel between himself and the Department of Marine and Fisheries. It was White's hope that the R.N.W.M.P. could bow out of the costly and troublesome project of maintaining permanent posts around the shores of Hudson Bay. Significantly, all of the posts which Moodie recommended fell within the guidelines of the agreement made in January 1905[49].

The difference in perspective involved other issues. Moodie disagreed with White's plan to use a patrol boat - what was to have been the 'Rouville' - as the principal method of surveillance. He argued that it was both expensive and ineffective, as the vessel would be tied up in a northern port for nine months of each year with no effective role to play. Worse, it would keep members of the police detachment close to Fullerton instead of actively patrolling. He recommended that the steamer be used only as a supply vessel, enabling it to complete a round trip in three months. With the money that would be saved, the R.N.W.M.P. could afford

> . . . 4 or 5 detachments of one NCO and three men each. With these detachments around Hudson Bay the whole of that district could be effectively patrolled, and some return obtained for the expenditure incurred.[50]

Had the 'Rouville' not been such a dismal failure, Moodie's advice would once again have been over-ruled. White tenaciously held to the original plan. Even the increased expenditure of the additional vessels required to assist in re-supplying 'M' Division was not enough to sway him from this decision.

Moodie's frustration grew. In several reports of 1907 and in one of 1908, he demanded more men and resources[51]. By 1909 he was bitter and frustrated.

> As far as I am concerned I would not mind staying here for 4 or 5 years if I had the men and means to do effective work, but it is disheartening trying to make bricks without straw.[52]

All this only aggravated Perry and White. They viewed Moodie's demands as misguided requests for nonessential requirements[53]. The issue came to a head over the proposed Baker Lake post.

In early 1907 Moodie announced that he planned to establish a police detachment at Baker Lake and that it would be erected during the summer[54]. He was unable to accomplish this in 1907 or again in 1908, but it was an item of priority for 1909. Finally Perry lost his patience and in writing to White, vowed that he would put a halt to Moodie's preparations:

> Superintendent Moodie is constantly referring to the establishment of this detachment. I myself cannot see the purpose which it is to serve. . . . With your concurrence I propose to instruct him that the intention to establish a detachment there has been abandoned.[55]

Perry was unequivocal: the Baker Lake Detachment would never be. White's reply, though, was less assured and his reticence symbolized the essential problem of the eastern Arctic operation. On the margin of Perry's Letter, White simply stated: "The establishment of a Police Post at Baker Lake must remain in abeyance for the present."[56]

At this late date no long term plan for the R.N.W.M.P. was in place. Moodie gathered information and offered advice, but once submitted, it was but raw data from which no structure emerged. Consequently each man - Moodie, Perry and White - maintained his own concept of why the Police remained on the Bay. To Moodie the Arctic Force existed to assert territorial sovereignty. It could protect the native population from unjust exploitation by a more worldly and powerful white entrepreneur, while upholding Canadian law no matter where the service was required. It could supply medical assistance to the natives and through its actions, symbolize the intentions of an assertive and humanitarian government. To Perry and White, however, the Mountie role was not so grandiose. The N.W.M.P. had been ordered

in by the government to wave the flag of sovereignty. Time had passed and in the absence of further direction, their commitment had become one of abstention from future responsibilities. If the Department of Marine and Fisheries was to be the chief representative of the Canadian government, so be it. The R.N.W.M.P. would be policemen, nothing more and nothing less. There were other departments to provide succor to the natives, and other departments to collect taxes.

It was for this reason that Perry could "not see the purpose which . . . [the Baker Lake Detachment was] . . . to serve".[57] But White, ever sensitive to the political nature of expansion, could not be so self-assured. Almost a month passed before White responded to Perry and when he did, he responded with a characteristic lack of definiteness. There was no long term policy with which he could structure such short-term decision-making[58]. Uncertainty was an essential element of his environment. The consequences of this permeated the operation throughout the first decade of the century.

Communications

As in the Yukon, effective lines of communication were very important. Even in 1903, White had been well informed of the problems which he could expect in communicating with his Hudson Bay Detachment. Briefed by the Fur Trade Commissioner of the Hudson's Bay Company, he knew that to send mail during the winter, he would have to have correspondence in Winnipeg by December 10, so that a mail packet could be prepared and sent overland to Churchill. It would usually reach Churchill by early February, but in the past it had been delayed as

late as mid-April[59]. Chipman informed White that the Hudson's Bay Company would not take mail past Fort Churchill, and that White might be forced to rely upon local natives to take it the last several hundred miles to Fullerton. Consequently, White could expect that mail which left Ottawa in late November would not reach his men at Fullerton until May or June of the next year[60].

White's first use of the Hudson's Bay Company's mail service did not even meet with this limited objective. White sent his dispatches from Ottawa in November 1903 and having passed through Winnipeg, they arrived at Churchill in January 1904. From there they went no further. Ten months later, in November 1904, his correspondence of the year before had not budged from Churchill[61]. Similarly, the first mail which White received from Moodie arrived in Ottawa in April 1905, having travelled the length of Hudson Bay by dogsled before being routed through Churchill to Norway House and Winnipeg to Ottawa[62].

After several years of intermittent and uncertain mail service, White set about establishing an all-police system of mail delivery to link Regina with Churchill. The latter was to become the center of the Division. Accordingly, White placed the highest of priorities on establishing a reliable communication link. His directions to A.B. Perry were explicit:

> Please give your personal attention to the establishment of this route, so that we may be certain of communications with Churchill during the winter of 1906-07.[63]

Perry acted immediately. He expanded the Norway House detachment by several people and he planned the creation of a new Detachment at a point approximately halfway between Norway House and Churchill[64]. On August 11, 1906, Perry issued a directive in which he spelt out, with the exact details of dates and locations of crews and dog team changes, the means by which the new service would be instituted[65].

Interestingly, Perry's new mail service almost exactly paralleled the route and schedule which had been run for years by the Hudson's Bay Company. The main difference was that policemen would be handling the mail. He must have hoped that this would produce a more reliable service. Importantly, the new system did not address the problem which was central to effective communications with 'M' Division: the virtual isolation of Fullerton. The Headquarters was moved to Churchill, where one level of decision-making could be kept in contact with another. But the post at which the most important duties were performed remained unconnected. It was from Fullerton that members sporadically contacted whalers and from Fullerton that winter patrols were launched. Detachment members located there continued to rely upon the good graces of the native population to carry correspondence or relay messages. For many more years Moodie remained at Churchill, ignorant of events at Fullerton but informed of decisions made in Ottawa. The 'solution' attacked the problem from the perspective of Headquarters but did nothing to address this prime internal concern of 'M' Division, the solution to which lay beyond the jurisdiction of the Divisional Commander.

To expend such energy and expense implementing a postal service which ignored the harsh realities of what was required illustrates the dilemma which the decision-makers faced. They had identified a problem and were responsible to resolve it. But to do so completely would involve the expense and commitment of establishing a reliable link from Churchill to Fullerton. Before undertaking a project, they had to be assured that the future police role would guarantee the continued relevancy of such an effort and this, of course, was not forthcoming. Consequently, they dedicated themselves to a plan which was within the scope of the present operation, one which others could implement and they could monitor. Perhaps unwittingly, they ignored that this was but a half-measure. The busying tasks of establishing a system which they could direct satisfied them that their responsibility had been fulfilled. Unfortunately they had merely built a symbol of good management.

The new winter mail system only provided a structure by which information could be exchanged. This, in itself, did not guarantee better communications. For in January 1907, Moodie wrote to White of his intention to take the mail out of Churchill in early February, even as dog teams conducted the first round trip from Regina to Churchill. It appears that in the previous nine months while the itinerary was laboriously planned, the Norway House Detachment enlarged and the Split Lake Post established, nobody informed Moodie that such preparations would be in place[66].

The problems of communications surfaced repeatedly, a difficulty which characterized the pioneering of northern territory. Moodie's misunderstandings, even in 1908, of what was happening to the 'Rouville', his determination to construct the Baker Lake Detachment years after the Commissioner had shelved the idea, the constant uncertainty of what was happening at Fullerton from September to July, all were the result of tenuous and uncertain communications.

Supplies

Similarly, an effective method of re-supply had to be in place. Once again, the difficult operation conducted by the N.W.M.P. in the Yukon more than vividly illustrated this absolute requirement. If adequate goods were to be procurred and placed at the remote locations, decision-makers had to contend with a long lead time. White was well aware of this: he had lectured the Department of Marine and Fisheries on the point early in 1904[67].

Yet problems plagued the police operation, year after year, almost interminably throughout the next decade. In 1904, there was a drawn out confrontation between the Department of Marine and Fisheries and Job Brothers and Co., the owners of the 'Erik'. By August 30, with only weeks left before ice would clog the Hudson Bay Strait, there was still no agreement on a re-supply contract for that winter[68]. Much of the problem lay outside White's control, the result of internal problems in another department[69]. The next year there was a delay "through unforeseen circumstances" regarding the supply ships of the Department of Marine and Fisheries. This aborted a planned voyage of

exploration and was so extended as to jeopardize the all-important re-supply of the detachment[70].

Finally, in 1906, preparations in Ottawa matched the requirements of the men in the field and the total operation was completed with a minimum of delay. As a consequence, the material for the new post at Churchill arrived in a timely manner. But with the creation of the new detachment, future supplies would only be delivered by ocean-going vessels as far as Churchill. Fullerton, isolated hundreds of miles north, would not be outfitted annually as had been done before. In 1907, the projected use of the 'Rouville' was scrapped and the R.N.W.M.P. turned to the private sector. The Hudson's Bay Company could spare room for only ten tons of additional cargo each season, or approximately one tenth of what the Division normally required. The Revillon Brothers, while more accommodating, charged $45.00 a ton, or three times what the Hudson's Bay Company charged. Both companies stipulated that supplies would not be taken any further north than Churchill[71].

Supplies were so critical that there could be no room for error. To re-stock in the same season due to an order incorrectly filled was impossible. Goods had to come all the way through the Straits of the Bay, be offloaded at Churchill, then loaded back onto whaling boats and sailed or rowed several hundred miles to Fullerton. For example, on August 26, 1908, the Hudson's Bay Company steamer, the 'Pelican' arrived at Churchill with the supplies for the next year. Much to the chagrin of Moodie, there was no coal onboard[72]. Throughout

the next winter this oversight affected every man in 'M' Division. Around the detachment at Churchill all personnel were in some way occupied with cutting or collecting wood[73]. At Fullerton, where there was not only insufficient fuel but also insufficient quantities of food, the problem approached crisis proportions. In the spring of 1909, eight months after the coal had failed to arrive, Moodie mused to White:

> Unless some way can be found of sending supplies to Fullerton this summer, that detachment will have to be closed. I fully expect to see all the men from there at Churchill by first open water this year, as I fear they will be out of rations.[74]

In 1910, an enterprising gentleman submitted a proposal to resupply 'M' Division and with this accomplished, to patrol the Bay. White was enthused. Since 1906 he had wished to position caches of rations between Churchill and Fullerton for emergency use by winter patrols. Now he saw his opportunity and he had several portable buildings constructed. His plan called for the chartered vessel to bring in the much required cargo, then steam the route from Churchill to Fullerton. The portable huts would be erected and the ship could then sail north to Repulse Bay conducting a sea patrol completely under the direction of the police[75]. White's enthusiasm can be measured by the fact that he endorsed the venture despite the fact that it would cost the equivalent of $60.00 a ton to ship the 100 tons of goods[76].

Owned by S.W. Bartlett, the 'Jeannie' set sail with Captain Harold Bartlett in command. It arrived at Churchill, offloaded much of its supplies and then progressed north to erect the winter huts before docking at Fullerton. Disaster struck in September when, patrolling

north of Fullerton, it foundered in a gale at Wager Inlet. All the crew was saved, but the dream of a regular police patrol was lost to the cold icy waters of Hudson Bay.

Supplies seemed always to be scarce and anything unforeseen could threaten disaster. Fortunately, the men aboard the 'Jeannie' were saved, but they had not yet been spared from hardship. The crew reached Churchill but could not be evacuated from the country until the winter climate made the overland route passable. Until then they were looked after and this with the precious food stuffs of the Churchill detachment[77]. They would get out, equipped with the clothes and food of the men who remained at Churchill, but that winter and spring would be memorable for the hardships that 'M' Division endured.

The Natives

Morrison states that the relationship between the police and the natives in the Arctic was one which reflected the prevailing social attitudes of the time. He notes that detachment commanders often made recommendations regarding assistance to the natives, but

> The usual reply from Ottawa was either silence or instructions for the police to do the best they could with their own resources to ameliorate the worst of the suffering among the Indians and Eskimos.[78]

Morrison notes this, but makes no comment. In so doing, he does not acknowledge the very important effect which bureaucratic process had in shaping the evolving relationship. Literally every recommendation from the field supported a more active role in aiding the native, yet White

sought constantly to sever the Force from any immediate or ongoing responsibility for their welfare. To safeguard the interests of bureaucratic efficiency, he turned an unresponsive ear to the very real dilemma of the native condition.

Perhaps White's response was a result of his experience with the Indians of the Yukon. At that time, the N.W.M.P. shouldered the majority of the government's burden, both in the distribution of relief, in the administration of the relief and in the cost of the relief. In return, members of the Force received little personal satisfaction. They quickly became the victims of their own largesse and suffered in the short-term from the precedents created by their efficiency.

In Moodie's first report in 1904, he expressed concern that in the very near future, the natives around Hudson Bay would suffer hardships in the extreme. He knew that traders were abandoning the region as business steadily declined[79]. Moodie pointed out that the natives had relied for too many years upon non-native commerce and that any void would have to be filled by an omnibenevolent government. These sentiments were echoed in Low's separate report[80]. Years later, still trying to win the ear of officialdom, Moodie explained that government intervention would not constitute welfare, but would assure the natives a fair price for their labours. As he reported:

> The natives are not paid wages by the whalers. They get their food and are sent out hunting and receive something for the fur they get. As a rule, there is no fixed price but what they are given is more as a present than a thing that they can claim. If they were paid fair wages and charged a reasonable price for the articles

> given in payment, they would be able to lay in a stock of food and ammunition etc against a rainy day.[81]

Moodie's perspective on the role of government was philosophic and just: be the honest broker; allow the natives the right to profit for the services they provided; and regulate the economy to ensure that they were not exploited. This was Moodie's long term program. In the short term he was more pragmatic, begging for goods to distribute to the indigenous population as they suffered the crisis of transition.

During the winter of 1907, he petitioned for a shipment of primers and gunpowder. He feared for the natives in the Baker Lake region who would "be in a very bad way having no ships or traders to go to"[82]. The humanistic concern grew from being close to the tragedy: the experience of human hardship could easily overpower the doctrine of bureaucratic principle. Moodie was not alone in voicing his concerns. From Sgt. D. McArthur in January 1909, from Cpl M.A. Joyce of Fullerton in June 1910 and even from Captain George Comer of the American schooner 'A.T. Gifford' came the warning of impending destitution. As Comer stated:

> If there is not going to be any one here as a trader next winter, would it not be well for the Police to have sufficient ammunition to supply the natives' wants in trade. . . . There are others who hang around the Barracks but the ones I have mentioned are really needy and have got to be taken care of.[83]

While writing this, Comer, an American, stated that he had already given food to natives who could no longer fend for themselves. He provided the welfare and human assistance which White steadfastly refused[84]. The roles of the entrepreneur and the civil servant seemed to have been reversed.

For White was determined to limit the police commitment. Initially, it could be argued that he was the victim of simplistic reasoning. In a letter to Moodie, written in 1907, he attested to the hope that all would return to a state of normalcy if only the police resisted the temptation to become involved:

> We must be careful to avoid the establishment of Police posts as gathering places for the natives, who would become a charge on the government for subsistence, instead of sustaining themselves by hunting, etc. as they have done in past generations.[85]

This attitude, formulated in the comforts of Ottawa, ignored the impending crisis. But it was 1907 and there were only warnings of potential hardships. White's perspective, while naive, was understandable. He took no action on the recommendations made by Moodie.

But with the arrival of 1909, the situation changed. Moodie was no longer talking about the possibility of future hardships: he was preaching the requirement for action. Destitution had set in and there was no place for theorizing. White's attitude was the product of a bureaucratic system of responsibility and accountability. The circumstances underlying the plight of the natives lay far beyond the realm of his control. To administer aid would not substantially alter these circumstances but would tag the agency with a precedent-setting responsibility which would be difficult and costly to administer. All the while, White would be vulnerable to the charge of acting beyond his terms of reference. White would not endorse the recommendations from the field. The consequences of rational decision-making, however, would literally be fatal.

Moodie had requested powder and ammunition for the coming spring. Hunger, possibly starvation, would be widespread if the natives were not supplied with the means to fend for themselves. White was strongly against such an involvement, still insisting that the R.N.W.M.P. would only bring long term hardship if they became involved in supplying the natives with the tools of their existence. Hoping that he could interest the Hudson's Bay Company in establishing a post north of Churchill, thereby filling the void that the departing Scottish traders had created, he once again turned to Chipman:

> Referring to our conversation respecting the Police in Hudson Bay trading with the natives. We wish to stop this except when unavoidable. . . . If we do not send in supplies and reports come down that the natives are dying because they cannot get food, clothing or the material where-with to hunt, the reproach will fall on the Government and Government Officials.[86]

His words candidly reflected his perception of the relationship between the R.N.W.M.P. and the natives. Ever sensitive to the political vulnerability of the government and government officials, he feared that the plight of the natives could cause embarrassment for the Force. Missing was Moodie's or Comer's humanistic sensitivity[87].

In less than a month, Chipman wrote back, stating that the Hudson's Bay Company would indeed establish a new post at Chesterfield Inlet. He was unsure, however, whether this could be accomplished in the coming season[88]. White gave the matter little further consideration for no further correspondence transpired until six months later, when it was far too late to assist the starving natives. On October 7, Chipman wrote to White:

Sir:

POST AT CHESTERFIELD INLET

> Referring to previous correspondence on the subject, I regret to say that it has been found impracticable to get the necessary supplies and equipment transported along the coast this season ....[89]

He assured White that there would be no difficulty in accomplishing this for the next season[90]. Had starvation threatened hundreds of white settlers stranded in the Canadian Arctic, one speculates that White would have more readily heeded the advice of Moodie and would not have abandoned their fate to the possible establishment of a Hudson's Bay Post. In the spring of 1897, rumours of large-scale starvation amongst American miners in the Yukon circulated. But in this case, the government had clearly indicated that peace and order would be brought to the Yukon region and a plan was immediately instituted. The objective became a priority and there was no question of obstruction due to administrative precedent. Concerns about the established delegation of responsibilities may have simmered in the minds of senior civil servants, but they seldom surfaced as an encumbrance to the accomplishment of the government will. In the eastern Arctic, however, White was allowed to "find" the role of the R.N.W.M.P. under the vague umbrella of an ill-defined government policy.

The problem of destitute natives was not the official concern of the R.N.W.M.P. Once before White had become involved with the issue of relief to the natives and this had caused his Branch great expense and much frustration. In the early years of the Yukon, the Department

of Indian Affairs refused to shoulder the burden of their mandate. Now, White would not involve the Police "except when unavoidable". Bureaucratically, he could rationalize his position and cast a disparaging eye on another department which was responsible for the political and moral blame[91].

Conclusion

One of the chief advantages of bureaucracies is that the spontaneous is rejected. Yet Sifton's decision to involve the N.W.M.P. in the eastern Arctic in 1903 demanded that White respond to the unplanned. White could not fall back on the benefit of precedence - the formalized structure which represented past administrative actions - and consequently, had to follow the paths of others' decisions. The stability of his organization was jeopardized, his authority usurped and the routine method of decision-making undermined.. From the bureaucratic perspective of a 'utility maximizer', the strengths of rationalism had been sacrificed to the demands of irrationalism.

During the next year he attempted to spirit back the semblance of routine. To regain organizational stability, his position as a decision-maker had to be reasserted, yet the government's objectives remained unclear. The material and capital resources for the sustained operation were ill-defined or not allocated. The relationship with the Department of Marine and Fisheries, designed to combine the assets of each organization, strained instead under the tension of incompatability. And White continued to function in a shroud of ignorance, at best merely misinformed[92]. This was the recipe for uncertainty in the

decision-making process, the assurance that a systematic process was impossible for him to influence.

White quickly accepted and encouraged the reduction of police responsibilities agreed to in 1905. It marked the beginning of the return to 'normalcy' which he so adamantly required. He rigorously bore-down on the redefined mandate, re-shaping the operation. But even now he suffered from the effects of uncertainty. The government's objectives remained undefined and his Branch was left to structure its own role.

Analysts would find White's response fitting. He attempted to shape the environment to one which could be controlled more easily. The area of police jurisdiction was rendered miniscule, thereby bringing the logistical requirements of the Division to a more manageable level. The formation of new detachments was discouraged. The role of the N.W.M.P. had been threatened by Sifton's decision in 1903. If the rules, the structure and the activities of the Force could be controlled with a minimum amount of change imposed externally, White would succeed in defending the organization from the forces of administrative irrationalism. The sensible allocation of limited resources demanded that some proof of permanency in the government's eastern Arctic plan be assured before any greater obligation by the N.W.M.P. was made.

He resorted to decision-making which was based on gaining short-term benefits without the incumbrances of long-term commitments.

A communication link between Regina and Churchill could be completed through proven means that were even now in place elsewhere[93]. Indeed, the greatest obligation which White was willing to make, the acquisition of the 'Rouville', was conceded only to satisfy the very essential requirements of re-supplying Churchill and Fullerton while producing a more efficient means of patrolling. By abstaining from long-term commitments, White avoided the provision of electricity and telephone service to Churchill and refused to recognize the need for an interpreter at Fullerton. The possible waste of time and resources was part of his concern. As importantly, a power generator and telephone system would affix the symbols of permanency to a Division which he still saw as an aberration.

Furthermore, White responded to uncertainty by abstaining from an involvement in the unsavoury problems which demanded anything but established procedures. He ignored the gap in the mail system which separated Churchill from Fullerton and he worked diligently to remove the Force from any responsibility for the suffering of the natives. His success in this latter matter, his ability to apportion responsibility to the Hudson's Bay Company and to other departments with little consideration for the result so achieved, marked the extent to which White's actions were shaped by the guiding principles of the 'conserver's' bureaucratic function.

NOTES

[1]Hindsight and thorough research has uncovered the fact that by 1870, fewer than six U.S. whalers worked the waters of the Eastern Arctic. But the newspapers and other sources of the day cultivated the myth that the Americans were still a dominant force. W. Gillies Ross, "Whaling, Inuit and the Arctic Islands," in A Century of Canada's Arctic Islands 1880-1980, ed. Morris Zaslow (Ottawa: The Royal Society of Canada, 1981), p. 46. There is just a hint that the government knew in 1903 that the American influence had died earlier. Low, the Commander of the 'Neptune' which sailed in 1903, indicated that he was instructed to winter with the one American whaler that was known to be in the Bay. A. P. Low, Report on the Dominion Government Expedition to Hudson Bay and the Arctic Islands on Board the DGS Neptune 1903-1904 (Ottawa: Government Printing Bureau, 1906), p. 20.

[2]As an expert on the topic points out, the quality and quantity of available material on whaling in Canadian waters is extremely limited. In different works, one finds errors of dates, ships' names and accounts of catches. See: W. Gillies Ross, "Commercial Whaling and Eskimos in the Eastern Canadian Arctic 1819-1920," in Thule Eskimo Culture: An Anthropological Retrospective, ed. Allen P. McCartney (Ottawa: n.p., 1979), pp. 245-46. Regarding the American surge northward, see: Robert Owen Decker, Whaling Industry of New London (York [Ba.]: Liberty Cap Books, 1973), p. 27.

[3]Decker, p. 28.

[4]For a while, the Scottish whaling industry persevered by adjusting to the changing markets and incorporating technical advances. After 1865, whaling Captains no longer relied solely upon the capture of whales to meet their costs, but turned ever increasingly to the seal fishery to fill the holds of their ships. So thorough was this change that by 1877, seal oil "almost always exceeded the volume of whale oil brought home to Dundee." Gordon Jackson, The British Whaling Trade (London: Adam and Charles Black, 1978), p. 146. By the introduction of steam engines, the Scots could outdistance the competition, but the costs rose commensurately. In earlier years, it was estimated that 40 to 50 tons of whale oil would cover the costs of the average venture; after the incorporation of coal-burning steam engines, a minimum of 70-80 tons of whale oil was required. Technology in itself could not rescue the dying industry. Robert J. Fraser and William F. Rannie, Arctic Adventurer: Grant and the 'Seduisante' (Lincoln [Ontario]: W. F. Rannie Publisher, 1972), p. 33.

[5]By 1871, New Bedford on the eastern seaboard was very aptly termed the "whale-oil center of the United States," yet the whaling ships directed by U.S. entrepreneurs never touched upon Atlantic waters. The fleet usually outfitted from Honolulu, while a large number of supplementary vessels carried the precious cargo from the Pacific to the Eastern centres for processing and distribution. New Bedford retained a position of world eminence throughout the next two decades, its ships hunting in the waters of the west North Atlantic, the Pacific and later, in the Antarctic. Everett S. Allen, Children of the Light: The Rise and Fall of New Bedford Whaling and the Death of the Arctic Fleet (Boston: Little, Brown and Comany, 1973), p. 104. Captain Ellsworth Luce West, Captain's Papers, as told to Eleanor Ransom Mayhew (Barre [Massachusetts]: Barre Publishers, 1965), p. 4. As late as 1894, when many whalers of Scotland and England had long ceased the hunt, some 644 American vessels, employing 17,550 men directly and close to 100,000 indirectly were involved in whaling. Decker, p. 118.

[6]W. Gillies Ross estimates that from 1819 to 1850, over 14,000 whales were killed in the Davis Straits alone and that many more died after being wounded and eluding capture. See: Gillies Ross, "Commercial Whaling," p. 251. Captain George Comer, while talking of whaling in later years, is reported to have said that more whales were captured in the waters around Whale Point than in all the rest of Hudson Bay. Low, p. 32.

[7]Marble Island had been the location of a luckless venture by the Hudson's Bay Company to establish a whale fishery in 1767. There existed both an outer and an inner harbour, the latter measuring approximately one and one quarter mile by one half mile. All but land-locked, it was protected from the arctic winds by high hills on all sides and fresh water was available from a pond located just one half mile from the west edge of the harbour. The outer and the inner harbour were separated by a long narrow channel, the danger of which was enhanced by a large rock which lay midstream and below the waterline at high tide. Ferguson claims that this single rock caused the destruction of at least six vessels. Robert Ferguson, Arctic Harpooner: A Voyage on the Schooner Abbie Bradford 1878-1879 with an Introduction by Leslie Dalrymple Stoir (Philadelphia: University of Philadelphia Press, 1938), p. 48. See also Gillies Ross, "Commercial Whaling," p. 248.

[8]W. Gillies Ross, "Arctic Islands," p. 44.

[9]Between the years 1846 and 1875 the average whaling voyage grossed $47,220; between 1891 and 1904, the value of each cargo had been reduced to approximately $35,000 and this despite the increased prices the products attracted. James W. Tyrrell, Across the Sub-Arctics of Canada, 3rd. ed., rev. and inl. (Toronto: William Briggs, 1908), p. 237. Comer, quoted in Tyrrell, claims that 68 whales were taken between 1891 and 1904 on some nineteen separate voyages. The figures compiled by Gillies Ross are in conflict with this, as he states that only 85 whales were captured in Hudson Bay for the forty year period 1880-1920. Gillies Ross, "Commercial Whaling," p. 266, figure 7.

[10]William Wakeham, Report of the Expedition to Hudson Bay and Cumberland Gulf in the Steamship DIANA (Ottawa: S. E. Dawson, 1898), p. 75. These stations were the sole remains of a once dynamic industry.

Only one Scottish ship voyaged to the waters with the sole intent of whaling during the season of 1897. The trip was a failure and upon its return to Dundee, the company put her and a sister ship, the 'Terra Nova' up for sale. The brig 'Alert' of Peterhead sailed only to supply the whaling stations of Cumberland Gulf. See: Wakeham, p. 74, 24.

[11]In 1897, the American whaling fleet of the eastern Arctic was reduced to three small whaling vessels, none of which was very seaworthy and none of which was the object of much expenditure. By 1903, this number had been reduced to one. The last American whaling station located at Cape Haven, was sold to Walter J. Jackson, an Englishman, in 1903. Fraser, p. 43.

[12]Albert Peter Low was born in Montreal on May 24, 1861 and graduated from McGill University with a degree in Applied Science in 1882. He joined the Geological Survey that same year. His career was auspicious and in the last 8 years of the century, he did extensive work in Labrador. In 1906, after the 'Neptune' expedition, he became the Director of the Geological Survey and in 1907, he was appointed the first Deputy Minister of the Mines Branch, a new government department which included the previous Geological Survey. He retired in 1913 due to a serious illness, yet lived until October 9, 1952. F. J. Alcock, "Albert Peter Low," in Canada's Changing North, ed. and with an introduction by William C. Wonders (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1971), pp. 76-81; Thomson, pp. 293-294. In Low's words, the 'Neptune' was "the largest in the fleet." It was built in 1873 and boasted a bow 8 feet thick and walls on side and stern of almost 18 inches. It was a 465 ton vessel and could carry some 800 tons of cargo and coal. Low, pp. 3-4. See also: W. Gillies Ross, "Canadian Sovereignty in the Arctic: The Neptune Expedition of 1903-1904," Arctic 2(June, 1976): 87-104.

[13]Moodie reported his conversation with the agent representing Noble Brothers at Kekerton:

> "He also expressed pleasure and stated that the firm had long wished that the Canadian Government would look after affairs in that part. The amount of duty, he said, would be nothing to him."

See: Report, Superintendent Moodie to Comptroller White, September 3, 1904, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 281: 716-04/1.

[14]The 'Era' was more than 50 years old and had been designed as a 'coastal packet'. It had been converted for arctic use 30 years earlier, but was now in very bad shape. A crew of twenty served under Captain George Comer. Low, pp. 267-268.

[15]Moodie to White, 30 August 1904, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 280: 707-04.

[16]Low, pp. 48-59.

[17]Report, Moodie to White, 3 September 1904, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 281: 716-04/1.

[18]Ibid.

[19]Ibid.

[20]Memorandum, Deputy Minister of Marine and Fisheries Gourdeau to Minister of Marine and Fisheries, 20 January 1905, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 293: 236-05/1.

[21]Report, Staff Sergeant Haynes to Moodie, Fullerton, 14 August 1905, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 319: 478-06.

[22]Captain George Comer to Fred White, New Bedford, 8 October 1909, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 390: 248-10.

[23]Memorandum, Commissioner to Officer Commanding Regina District, 11 August 1906, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 327: 437-07.

[24]Report, Moodie to Commissioner, Churchill, 31 December 1907, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 354: 55-08.

[25]Ibid. Perry made remarks on the margin of the report and then forwarded it to White.

[26]White to Perry, 14 July 1909, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 365: 66-09.

[27]From James W. Tyrrell, who surveyed the port of Churchill the year before Moodie established his Headquarters there, we obtain a contemporary description of the community.

> "Adjoining the Master's house, and ranged in two irregular, detached rows, near the rocky bank of the Churchill River, were the four or five old frame buildings of the Fort used as storehands and servants' lodges. Two or three hundred yards down the shore was a neat little church and mission house."

The Hudson's Bay Company post was old and dilapidated. The new church, under the Reverend Lofthouse, could seat 300 people and the Minister and his wife had formed a day school. There were only 51 permanent residents, twenty-one of whom were children. Tyrrell, p. 194, 196-7.

[29]Ibid.

[30]The R.N.W.M.P. relied upon the generosity of Comer to survive the winter of 1908-09, when their supplies were in such short supply. See: Moodie to Commissioner, 3 August 1909, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 365: 66-09. See also: W. Gillies Ross, ed., An Arctic Whaling Diary: The Journal of Captain George Comer in Hudson Bay 1903-1905 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1983).

[31]The plan had originated as early as 1879 and was popularized in several books and articles. Some, such as Charles R. Tuttle, saw a Hudson Bay Railway as Canada's part in the grand scheme of Imperial Federation, one which would assist in the realization of Canada's yet untapped greatness. See C. R. Tuttle, Our North Land (Toronto: C.

Blackett Robinson, 1885). By 1904, both the Conservative and Liberal parties agreed with the idea of a railway and by 1908, the route was planned and surveying had started. Construction started in 1910, the same year that thorough surveys were conducted at Churchill and Nelson. Morrison, "The Mounted Police," pp. 239-240; Thomson, p. 216; D. Owen Carrigan, Canadian Party Platforms (N.P.: The Copp Clark Publishing Company, 1968), p. 50.

[32]White to Sifton, 11 August 1903, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 281: 714-04.

[33]Upon the recognition of a 'performance gap' existing between the expectations of one's superior and one's own actions, an official may seek more information and possible new forms of behaviour to bridge this gap. Downs, Inside, pp. 167-168. Taking from the Yukon experience and being aware that he had probably alienated Sifton by his adverse reaction to the eastern Arctic operation, White now accelerated into a headlong plan for police involvement in the eastern Arctic. But Downs also notes that once the official has sought alternatives, he is likely to reduce his search efforts back to their normal 'automatic intensity'". Downs, Inside, p. 171. This may assist in explaining White's reversion to a conservative method of administering the eastern Arctic after 1905.

[34]White to Laurier, 6 July 1904, and Laurier to White, 7 July 1904, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 293: 236-05/2.

[35]White to R. F. Stupart, Superintendant and Director of the Magnetic Observatory, 2 September 1904, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 293: 236-05/1.

[36]Perry to White, 22 August 1904, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 336: 266-07.

[37]Memorandum, Gourdeau to Minister of Marine and Fisheries, 20 January 1905, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 293: 236-05/1.

[38]White to Perry, 16 November 1906, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 330: 95-07. The patrol alluded to by White commenced in the summer of 1908. Inspector Pelletier with a NCO and two Constables left Athabasca Landing on 6 June 1908 and in the next three months, traversed Great Slave Lake to Artillery Lake, eventually proceeding down the Thelon River to Baker Lake. Pelletier's objectives were clearly defined by Perry:

> "1. To assert Canadian jurisdiction over this portion of the country.
> 2. To inquire into the number and condition of the natives.
> 3. To report upon the country and the possibility of this route into the interior from the Hudson's [sic] Bay.
> 4. To ascertain whether any permanent detachments of Police should be stationed there."

Pelletier saw few natives on this patrol and those he did encounter were "good" people and healthy. He recommended against any detachments being formed along this route. See: Correspondence between Perry and

White, 6 April 1908, 11 April 1908, 16 April 1908; Memorandum, Commissioner A. Bowen Perry to Inspector Pelletier, 27 April 1908; and Report, Inspector Pelletier to Commissioner Perry, Regina, 21 March 1909, in Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 364: 18-09.

[39]White to Gourdeau, 11 November 1905, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 330: 95-07.

[40]Gourdeau to White, 27 February 1906, Comtroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 330: 95-07.

[41]White to Gourdeau, 1 March 1906, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 330: 95-07.

[42]G. J. Desbarats, Director of Government Shipyards, Sorel, to White, 28 May 1906, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 330: 95-07.

[43]White to Gourdeau, 25 July 1906, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 330: 95-07.

[44]Captain J. C. Rousseau to White, 5 June 1907, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 330: 95-07.

[45]Morrison, in writing of the Yukon, notes:

> "The government at times (though not always) moved much too slowly to meet changing conditions in the Yukon. Moreover, if the government had inertia it also had momentum, and once its enthusiasm was aroused, it was hard to turn it off."

Morrison, "The Mounted Police," p. 58.

[46]Personal letter, Moodie to White, Fullerton, 9 December 1903, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 281: 716-04.

[47]Moodie to White, Sydney Cape Breton, 20 September 1904, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C. volume 319: 478-06.

[48]Moodie to White, Fullerton, 25 January 1905, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 319: 478-06.

[49]Even Albert Low, who disagreed with Moodie on a number of issues, believed that the R.N.W.M.P. would dot the circumference of Hudson Bay with police posts. Low, p. 3.

[50]Moodie to White, 20 September 1904, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 319: 478-06.

[51]Moodie to Commissioner, 1 July 1908, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 354: 155-08. Marginal note made by Perry, on report, Moodie to White, 31 December 1907, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 354: 155-08.

[52]Moodie to White, 3 April 1909, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 365: 66-09.

[53]These conflicts and the consequent curtailment of responsibility marked a decided change from previous procedures. As Macleod notes:

> "Generally speaking if an officer felt that the performance of a given task was in the public interest, he saw that it was done and worried about authorization later."

Normally a superintendent in the field was entrusted with many powers. Macleod, The N.W.M.P., p. 35, 141.

[54]Moodie to White, January 1907, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 334: 163-07.

[55]Letter entitled "Re Baker Lake Detachment", Commissioner Perry to Comptroller White, 23 March 1909, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 371: 208-09.

[56]Ibid.

[57]Ibid.

[58]Twice in a letter written in early 1907, White cautioned Moodie to restrain his enthusiasm until the future role of the Police could be ascertained. White to Moodie, 15 April 1907, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 334: 163-07.

[59]Chipman to White, Winnipeg, 21 October 1903, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 293: 236-05.

[60]Ibid.

[61]Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 314: 188-06.

[62]And that was the mail that got through. In February 1906, Corporal Rowley of the Fullerton Detachment received some mail bags from an Inuit which Moodie had forwarded in 1903 by native courier for delivery to Churchill. They had never left the boundary of the Bay in two years and were returned to the surprised Corporal by a conscientious but relieved native. Corporal Rowley to Moodie, Fullerton, 3 February 1906, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 319: 478-06.

[63]White to Perry, 9 July 1906, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 327: 43-07.

[64]Split Lake.

[65]Memorandum, Commissioner Perry to Officer Commanding Regina District, 11 August 1906, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 323: 786-06.

[66]Report, Moodie to White, 1 January 1907, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 334: 163-07. Some of the problems of poor communications which continued to plague the operation could not be circumvented. Often the information which Moodie needed, information perhaps to which he was entitled, could not be channelled

to him by the decision-makers in Regina and Ottawa. Throughout the summer of 1907, Moodie had patiently awaited the arrival of the 'Rouville'. Finally, on August 31, unable to wait any longer, he sent a Hudson's Bay Company boat manned by a mixed crew of policemen and natives to Fullerton to evacuate the people from the detachment there. He had been informed earlier that the police boat would be on the Bay by 1907 but it was impossible for White to update him on the many changes which had affected the schedule. The distances which separated the two fields of operation could not be bridged merely by a mail delivery on a regular annual basis.

[67]See Chapter Two, pages 80-81 above.

[68]Memorandum entitled: "Re. Further Charter of S.S. 'ERIK'" - a copy of communications via telegram that transpired between August 15 and August 30, 1904. Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 280: 709-04.

[69]As White wrote Perry:

> "So far I have been unable to make any arrangements for supplies. I do not even know whether the boat will sail from St. John, Halifax or Quebec. It looks as if it were going to be a matter of rush at the last moment."

See: White to Perry, 8 June 1904, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 293: 236-05/2.

[70]Comptroller F. White to Prime Minister Laurier, 19 July 1905, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 293: 236-05/1.

[71]Memorandum, Comptroller White to Prime Minister Laurier, 26 February 1910, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 400: 46-11. The Revillon Brothers was headed by Victor Revillon of Paris. The company centred their operations on fur supply from Canada and posts operating around Hudson Bay, Northern Quebec, Northern Alberta and Saskatchewan. See Zaslow, The Opening, p. 239.

[72]Moodie to Commissioner, no date, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 365: 66-09.

[73]Moodie to Commissioner, 5 February 1909, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 365: 66-09.

[74]Moodie to White, 3 April 1909, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C, volume 365: 66-09.

[75]Memorandum, White to Laurier, 26 February 1910, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 400: 46-11. While White cursed the Department of Marine and Fisheries in 1904 and 1905 for their apparent inability to organize a ship's supplies, the correspondence between White and the shipping agent, J. W. Mann for the 1910 cruise of the 'Jeannie' illustrates that even the Comptroller was not above forgetting the details of forwarding a list of supplies which were needed to be shipped to 'M' Division. See a series of telegrams between White and Mann of North Sydney Nova Scotia between 13 and 15 July 1910, in the Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 400: 46-11.

[76]Memorandum, White to Laurier, 26 February 1910, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 400: 46-11.

[77]Commanding Officer 'M' Division to NCO i/c Split Lake, Churchill, 26 November 1910, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 402: 81-11. At one time in the fall of 1910, there were eleven surveyors, a naturalist and the eight crew of the 'Jeannie' drawing on the supplies of the post at Churchill. See: Superintendant Starnes to Commissioner Perry, 6 October 1910, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 385: 125-10.

[78]Morrison, "The Mounted Police," p. 288. See also Macleod, The N.W.M.P., p. 35.

[79]Personal Letter Moodie to White, Fullerton, 9 December 1903, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C, volume 281:716-04/1.

[80]Low, early in his very comprehensive report, detailed the close bond between whaler and Eskimo:

> "On the whole, the whalers may be taken as beneficial to the Eskimos, and now that the latter have long been dependent upon the whalers for guns, ammunition and other articles of civilization, there is no doubt that many would perish should the whaling stations be closed without other provisions being made for the accustomed supplies."

Low, p. 10.

[81]Report, Moodie to Perry, 31 May 1908, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 390: 248-10.

[82]Moodie to White, 11 February 1907, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 334: 163-07.

[83]Captain George Comer to Major C. Starnes, Cape Fullerton aboard the Schooner 'A. T. Gifford', no date [written in November 1911], Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 424: 204-12.

[84]Comer's concern compelled him to write White when he returned to the United States at the end of the next season. He reported with topical and timely information, and stated most forcibly:

> "The fact that the country now inhabited by the Inuits can never be settled by any other race of people makes it seem important to me that the Government should make extra effort for there [sic] preservation as a people."

See: George Comer to Fred White, East Haddam Conneticut, 28 October 1912, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 431: 562-12.

[85]White to Moodie, 15 April 1907, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 334: 163-07.

[86]White to C. C. Chipman, 3 April 1909, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 371: 208-09. According to K. J. Rea, White's response would be typical of the Federal Government's general response to the natives prior to World War II. He notes that the

government relied upon non-governmental agencies to supply the benefit of health and welfare to the indigenous population. Rea, p. 54.

[87]Perry did not fully share White's approach to the natives in Hudson Bay. In the Spring of 1909, after Moodie requested assistance for the natives and while it was under consideration by White, Perry supported sending goods to aid the population. While he generally did not agree that the R.N.W.M.P. should supply goods to the indigenous population, he was realistic and flexible enough to realize that something had to be done or death would result. As he stated to White:

> "As the police have established themselves in this part of the country it would be very difficult to withdraw and leave the natives to their own resources, especially if the whalers also abandon that part of the Bay."

He was willing to concede as perhaps others were not that by 1909, Fullerton was functioning for little useful purpose. It had become primarily a centre for assistance to the natives. If this was the case, he reasoned that they should accept that any plan to redistribute the Police force would influence the economy of the area. See: Perry to White, 23 March 1909, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 371: 208-09.

[88]Chipman to White, Winnipeg, 28 April 1909, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 371: 208-09.

[89]Chipman to White, 7 October 1909, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 371: 208-09.

[90]Ibid.

[91]This attitude however influenced the decisions related to even the Force's legitimate duties. In July 1909 Cpl. Joyce, stationed at Fullerton, petitioned Moodie at Churchill for the services of an interpreter. Year after year Moodie had requested this for Fullerton and year after year a decision in Ottawa had been delayed. As Joyce so simply stated:

> "If such a man was stationed here I think it would be a very short time until the police would be looked upon as the chief authority, as at present the natives think the whalers can do about as they please, and that the police have very little to say about it."

The laws of the Canadian government could not be communicated to the people of the region. For want of the ability to communicate, the ability to fulfill a fundamental and unquestioned role was jeopardized. In frustration, Moodie inscribed in the margin of Joyce's report: "Already reported more than once". He then forwarded it to the Commissioner. Joyce to Moodie, Fullerton, 1 July 1909, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 365: 66-09.

[92]As the Spring of 1904 stretched on, White contacted the Department of Marine and Fisheries in an effort to avoid the chaos that had surrounded the sailing of the 'Neptune' the year earlier. In April, he spelt out his concerns to Gourdeau:

> "At present I have no information beyond what I have seen in the newspapers, which of course is not official, and we can not expect our men to volunteer for two or three years service in that northern region unless we can give them some idea as to the nature

of the duties they will be called upon to perform and, in a general way, where they are likely to be located, and when a relief vessel will visit them."

White to F. Gourdeau, 25 April 1904, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 293: 236-05/2.

[93]In the Yukon.

CHAPTER IV

THE WESTERN ARCTIC: 1903-1911

Introduction

The accomplishments of the western Arctic operation paralleled those of the East. Detachments were incorrectly located and the men who manned them openly questioned the relevancy of the duties they performed.

Unlike the eastern Arctic, however, White controlled every aspect of the western operation even in the formative stage. Here there was no confrontation with the Department of Marine and Fisheries, nor did the government impose preconceived objectives and strategies. This operation was guided by White and the shape it assumed directly reflected his influence. To maintain this power he controlled the distribution of information and with it, the delegation of authority. The manner in which he responded to new information about the whaling industry was all-important. Repeatedly, he rejected any initiatives, miring the Police presence to the constraints of past precedents. He had been well advised prior to Constantine's journey north in 1903. Later, with the Superintendent's report on his desk, he possessed all the information he required to establish a meaningful role for his

Arctic contingent. But to follow Constantine's recommendation, to withdraw the McPherson Detachment and acquire an Arctic patrol vessel to survey the waters east of Herschel, would usurp White's authority in two ways.

First, he would abandon not only his preconceived plan for expansion, but also the advantages of relying upon tried and proven methods of police operation. To replace these methods with the risks in operating an Arctic patrol boat, while exacerbating the logistical problems of supporting the operation, would threaten the stability associated with routine.

Second, such a course of action would demand a large commitment of resources. White would be accountable for the costs of procuring and maintaining such a vessel but much of the responsibility for the operation would rest with the appointed commander located in the Arctic. Such a delegation of authority might lead to difficulties similar to those which he suffered during the Yukon years, when he was forever responding to the demands of an operation he could neither control nor fully comprehend. It was unlikely that White would willingly endorse recommendations which so seriously degraded his authority. As in the eastern Arctic, the rallying call for initiative may well have been the whalers, but ultimately, the all-important influence would be White's insistence on administering the operation in a manner which he could shape. As it was in the East, whaling was on the decline, foreshadowing the end of the ostensible purpose for the police presence in the West even before it was established.

Whaling in Canada's western Arctic was short-lived. In 1848, the bark 'Superior', operating from Honolulu, first penetrated the Arctic Ocean from the North Pacific. Three years later, two old New Bedford whaling ships sailed northward from their new base, the port of San Francisco. Ever-improving modes of overland transportation linked this city with the consuming eastern states, assuring its predominance over the distant Honolulu[1]. Ships would penetrate the Arctic waters yearly at the time of ice break-up and whale until the returning ice forced them south. Fleeing the destructive power of nature, they would stop at San Francisco to offload and reprovision for several months of whaling in the Pacific before returning north once again[2].

This established routine changed after the 'William Baylies' docked in 1886. The ship had remained in the north for two years, wintering in the ice east of Alaska. Her holds contained some 13,000 pounds of baleen and 750 pounds of oil[3]. It took little time for competing vessels to adjust their operation. Early in the season, whaling ships squeezed through the ice at Point Barrow and sailed directly to Herschel Island where crews offloaded cargo for the upcoming winter. Then they hunted whales in the present-day Beaufort Sea before racing to their winter quarters at Herschel ahead of the threatening ice. Variations of this method continued into the next century[4].

But increased efficiency and the popularity of the whaling ground swiftly depleted the number of whales in the newly-found hunting grounds. Whaling captains sought new areas, yet untapped. Their

vessels ventured east beyond Herschel. In 1900, the 'Balaena' which hunted the waters east of Franklin Bay docked with 48,000 pounds of whale bone, and a new migration of whaling vessels ensued[5]. Herschel was abandoned, its facilities too remote to be of use[6].

But these were the gestures of an industry that world-wide was suffering a protracted demise. In 1895, the 14 vessels of the western Arctic fleet accounted for only 5 bowheads[7], while one ship in three seasons killed only 5 whales[8]. As in the eastern Arctic, new whaling vessels were not acquired to replace the old; smaller less costly ships were used to offset the reduced return; crew members with little or no experience were hired; and increasingly, trade became all-important in the vain hope of securing the slightest margin of return. Into this environment of economic malaise came the N.W.M.P., belately asserting the authority of the Canadian government.

Western Arctic Expansion

During 1904 great plans were made for the future establishment of a hegemonic police presence in the western Arctic. Both the Commissioner and the Comptroller recognized the need for a boat at the mouth of the Mackenzie and they investigated various plans for securing the services of a vessel for the 1905 season[9].

Meanwhile Fitzgerald, with a small handful of men continued to represent the Canadian government from his small post at Fort McPherson. During 1903, he had made two patrols to Herschel. In 1904, frustrated by the lack of work to do at McPherson[10], he journeyed north

to Herschel to winter there with Constable Sutherland during the 1904-05 season[11]. In July 1905, Inspector Howard and four subordinates arrived at McPherson aboard the steamship 'Wrigley' to relieve Fitzgerald and his three companions. In less than a week, Inspector Howard set out on his first patrol to Herschel[12]. But Fitzgerald could not be stayed from his Arctic appointment and in less than a year, was back to command the Herschel Island detachment while Howard remained at the Headquarters of 'N' Division at Fort McPherson[13].

Howard's command was to last but two years and his replacement, Inspector A.M. Jarvis, was directed by Perry to relocate the Headquarters of 'N' Division to Herschel, "visiting Fort McPherson from time to time as found convenient"[14]. Interestingly, his duties were little changed from those of his predecessor twice removed: he was to report on the whaling activity while stopping the transfer of intoxicants from whaler to natives. Added to these instructions were Perry's notes: "It is also your duty to protect the Natives from abuse by the Whaling Crews"[15]. This was more direct and broader in scope than similar instructions relayed to Moodie.

During the summer of 1907, Jarvis became the first R.N.W.M.P. official to travel east of the mouth of the Mackenzie along the Arctic coast. To do so, he 'hitched' a ride on the American ship 'Beluga' commanded by Captain George W. Porter. As the 'Beluga' searched for whales, Jarvis reached as far east as 126 degrees 30 minutes West and later, as far north as 72 degrees 25 minutes North[16]. Inspector G.L. Jennings, who arrived at Herschel in July 1909 to replace Jarvis,

conducted a similar shipboard patrol, once again collecting information on the number and state of the local inhabitants while searching out any ships that were trading in this little-known region. Jennings, however, was unable to imitate the success of Jarvis and only penetrated 140 miles east of Herschel. He sighted no vessels. At the village of Kittigazuit, he discovered that "the hills surrounding the village [were] literally covered with old graves": in the fifteen years previous, disease had decimated the population, reducing it from four hundred to fifty[17].

But for the disastrous winter of 1910-11 - when Fitzgerald and his party died of starvation and exposure while conducting the Dawson patrol and Sergeant Selig at Herschel died of an uncertain internal complaint[18] - the first decade in the western Arctic was characterized by routine and inactivity. White could claim that:

> . . . north of Edmonton, posts have been established as far as the mouth of the Mackenzie River, a distance of about 2,000 miles, with a view to securing to Canadian traders and Canadian Revenue the trade now carried on by San Francisco whaling and trading ships.[19]

But trade was declining. With the dwindling native population, the reduced number of whales and the less than prosperous returns, Canadian businessmen were not eager to venture the capital necessary to conduct such a risky business. Fitzgerald had earlier complained of no police work at McPherson and as the years progressed, the situation worsened[20]. Even at Herschel, the workload decreased, as evidenced by this report of August 1909:

> Customs. None since 1907 . . .
> Police Duties. Outside of the patrol work and the general protection of the natives, the police work here is nil.[21]

From the winter of 1906-7 to the summer of 1911, only one vessel wintered at Herschel on each of three years and for two years, not a single vessel anchored there. There is no better description of what the men endured than the haunting words of Sergeant Fitzgerald as he penned yet another report to the Commissioner in 1909, the year before he died:

> When there are no ships wintering at Herschel Island I think that it is one of the most lonesome places in the north. There is no place one can go, except to visit a few hungry natives, nobody will leave the island except [if] it is a case of necessity, and there is no white man to visit closer than 180 miles.[22]

Year after year, the men of 'N' Division patrolled the region, collected information, tended to their survival and collected the few dollars of duty that were owed to the government[23].

Characteristics of Western Arctic Expansion

The western Arctic operation in these early years represented a classic example of the difficulties of decision-making which arose with the delegation of responsibility and authority. The technical experts - the R.N.W.M.P. in the field - forwarded the many recommendations which, if implemented, would have assisted them in the fulfillment of their duties. These reports, after being read by the Commissioner, arrived at the desk of the Comptroller who was responsible for the overall direction of the Force and accountable to the government for that direction. Most often White abstained either from implementing the recommendations or from guiding the government to a more relevant policy.

Detachments

Just as Moodie had done, so did Constantine, then Fitzgerald, then Howard report to the Commissioner with recommendations for new detachments. Unknowingly in concert, both Constantine and Fitzgerald independently urged that McPherson be abandoned, while Fitzgerald strongly recommended that a detachment be located at Herschel[24]. It was not until Inspector Howard made similar recommendations in a detailed report, that Perry and White directed that a detachment be formed at Herschel in 1907[25]. But Jarvis was barely established at Herschel before he reiterated the earlier demand of Howard, that a new detachment at Baillie Island well to the east of Herschel be established[26]. After spending some four years deliberating on the extension of service to Herschel, neither White nor Perry were eager to endorse the creation of yet another new detachment[27]. Indeed, within a very few years the whaling and trading activities declined to such an extent that even Inspector Jennings concurred with his superiors that the establishment of a detachment at Baillie Island would be an extravagant and unnecessary waste[28].

The reticence shown earlier by Perry and White to the establishment of a detachment at Herschel stemmed primarily from their plan to either purchase or charter an American whaling vessel. This would serve as a patrol boat and as a revenue cutter in the western Arctic and would make a Herschel Island detachment redundant. White never ardently pursued the acquisition of a vessel and in February 1905, cancelled the plan citing excessive expense. Perry was upset

with the decision. Despite White's promises for a vessel in the future, none would be acquired[29].

It was at the initiative of Jarvis, and later Jennings, that patrol work along the coast was accomplished despite the absence of a police vessel. Jarvis' patrol during the summer of 1907 onboard the 'Beluga' and the 1909 voyage by Jennings, followed by the trip during 1910 aboard the tender 'Herman', provided the detachments with the mobility which they otherwise lacked. As a result of the first patrol Jarvis concurred with Howard regarding the need for a detachment at Baillie Island. But White was quick to counter this request. He wrote to Perry:

> I happen to know that the route laid down by Capt. Bernier for the S.S. 'Arctic' for the coming season, which will probably receive the authority of the Government, includes the waters and islands North and East of the mouth of the Mackenzie River. If governmental approval is given to this plan, the work suggested by Inspector Jarvis will be accomplished by another Department.[30]

Bernier's plan did not receive government approval and Jarvis' suggestions were not reconsidered. White had been eager to reduce and entrench the responsibility of the Force in the eastern Arctic. Similarly, he hoped to minimize the risks related to decision-making in the western operation. There would be neither the detachments nor the patrol boat recommended by the field commanders.

Supplies

The problem of transporting supplies to 'N' Division was exacerbated by White's insistence on relying upon the Hudson's Bay Company and their steamship service along the Mackenzie River. The

difficulty lay in the less than two hundred mile stretch separating Fort McPherson from Herschel. Not unlike the circumstances of Fullerton and Fort Churchill, all supplies for a year had to be unloaded at Fort McPherson and trekked by the police along the hazardous and exposed distance to Herschel[31]. The disadvantages were twofold.

Firstly, all might be lost along this perilous route and if this happened, there would be insufficient supplies for the detachment to survive[32]. Secondly, even if the supplies did arrive intact, heavy and bulky items, life-sustaining items such as coal, could not be transported. Therefore the police at Herschel purchased whatever the whalers would sell them. However, as Jarvis pointed out in a later report:

> The whalers never carry more coal than they require, being, in fact always short. It is only through their kindness to us that we are able to secure a few tons each year.[33]

Howard recommended that the R.N.W.M.P. imitate the successful means by which the missionaries solved this problem: resort to the cheaper and safer method of bringing supplies to Herschel by the sea[34].

Inexplicably, White would not budge from the decision to resupply along the Mackenize River. In 1904, when he incorrectly thought that there was a detachment at Herschel, he contemplated a resupply by sea. Fortunately for the policemen at McPherson, the Pacific Steam Whaling Company informed White that they would not be sending a tender to Herschel that season. Consequently, White was forced to rely on the Mackenzie River system[35]. That was the last time

that he considered using the ocean route to resupply the Division. The problem became most significant after 1907, with the Divisional Headquarters established at Herschel. A totally unacceptable logistical routing existed. Successors to Howard requested that the method of supply be reviewed. Jennings even went so far as to draw up a schedule in 1910 of the vessels which planned to return to the area the next year[36].

What White failed to recognize was that the problems of supplies, correctly located detachments, and the requirement to freely patrol where the itinerant whaling and trading vessels went, were intertwined with the requirements for a police vessel. It was Howard who first pointed out that Herschel and McPherson were not on the Mackenzie River and that "no control of that river [could] be exercised from" these locations[37]. Without the detachment at Baillie Island, everything that happened east of the river was outside the effective jurisdiction of the Police. But the vessel which, once purchased, would ensure the supply of a Baillie Island Detachment, would resolve this inadequacy while also serving to resupply Herschel[38].

Indeed Jennings, even after denying in 1910 the requirement for a detachment at Baillie Island, agreed with Howard and Jarvis about the need for a vessel. By having a boat of exact specifications[39], he could guarantee that such "a vessel could easily go up the McKenzie [sic] to Fort Resolution and also patrol the coast to Baillie Isle, and further if weather and ice conditions were favourable"[40]. Jennings

went to great length to prove that such an acquisition would save the Force money. White, however, remained unmoved.

The story of supplying Herschel differs little from that of supplying Fullerton: supplies were uncertain, coal was procured at great expense from any willing source, the most basic medical supplies were delayed years before arriving and primitive lamps had to be borrowed from visiting whalers[41].

Initially, Constantine and Perry supported White's preference for the Mackenzie Valley supply route, but this support waned. White, by refusing to purchase the necessary river boats which they felt the Police should own to link the South with the North, denied them the means by which an effective supply system could be established. As early as 1901, Constantine foresaw the dual requirement of supply and patrol boats to fulfill the future police duties in the Northwest[42]. In 1903 and again in 1905, Constantine repeated his request[43]. Commissioner Perry heartily endorsed Constantine's recommendations, over the years suggesting that a small fleet be procurred which would link the waterways stretching from the Peace River region to the Arctic Ocean[44]. But White could not be swayed. In 1902 he cited expenses and priorities:

> We could not ask in one year for sufficient money to purchase the several boats suggested in your letter . . . . It is about settled that Police supervision is to be extended to the mouth of the Mackenzie and it occurs to me that probably our best plan would be to provide in the first place a boat for the Mackenzie River ....[45]

Later, White merely ignored the issue. Perry replied to White's letter regarding future police duties at the mouth of the Mackenzie by even more bluntly demanding the resources to fulfill the tasks. White did not answer the correspondence. Similarly, he never followed up on his promise for a Mackenzie River police boat.

On two separate occasions the Department of Indian Affairs suggested that the R.N.W.M.P. join with them in acquiring a vessel which could be used to serve both agencies in the Northwest. Twice White denied them[46]. Instead White oversaw, indeed insisted upon, a cumbersome, inefficient and unwieldy support structure which failed to satisfy even the most essential requirements for the continued existence of 'N' Division.

Communications

A reliable system of communications, the major impediment to an efficient eastern Arctic operation, was soon in place in the west. Fitzgerald in 1904 complained of a lack of official direction for the 1904-05 season[47], but within a short while there was a regular delivery of three mails each year which linked Fort McPherson with Ottawa and Regina[48]. The distance which separated McPherson from Herschel, while arduous and risky for hauling supplies, was not the barrier for mail service that the long route from Churchill to Fullerton was.

The Natives

White's response to the hardships of the western Arctic natives differed little from his reaction to the plight of the natives of the

eastern Arctic. No detachment commander repeated Moodie's request for large-scale government involvement to save the natives, but they constantly urged that emergency goods be made available to the men at the small post at Herschel. The gravest circumstances arose when the tenders did not make it through the ice off the Alaskan coast. This happened in the summer of 1906. Howard described the situation:

> The Huskies [Inuit] worked for the ships all last winter and spring and relied on the food that they were to receive on [the] arrival of [a] tender in return to keep them over this winter.[49]

Fortunately, Sergeant Fitzgerald was able to distribute supplies which the Police had inherited when the Reverend Whittaker left the island. Through this means, he staved off starvation.

By the winter of 1908-09, a surplus of supplies no longer existed. Neither a whaling vessel nor a tender arrived at Herschel during the summer of 1908 and Fitzgerald faced trying to keep the natives alive with what little he had. He fed each of the 47 natives who remained on the island one full meal once a week[50]. They ate their dogs and they ate their seal skin garments, but by the conclusion of the long hungry winter, not one human being had died of starvation[51].

Not surprisingly, Fitzgerald recommended that measures be taken to ensure that this situation did not occur again:

> If it is the intention of the Government to help the natives on the coast, I beg to suggest that a supply of food be put at the Island, in charge of the Officer Commanding, but not to be issued to them unless they have a bad year, when there are no ships able to get in . . . . All these natives have depended, to a certain amount, on the ships for a number of years. They can get but very little food from the H.B.Co. or the traders.[52]

Lest he be misunderstood, he reiterated that this would not be a permanent policy of general welfare:

> If the Government has some supplies at the Island, I think that the natives would pay for most everything they got. There are a few old people, one blind woman and a couple of cripples that the Government should help.[53]

Ironically, the R.N.W.M.P. were unwitting partners in an economic system which relied upon the labour of the natives without ensuring fair payment. When the natives provided a service, the Mounties gave them chits. But these were only redeemable at the Hudson's Bay Company Post at Fort McPherson, where they seldom went. When a chit was not cashed, the Force was not charged. Consequently, the Police were sometimes a welfare burden on the natives. As Fitzgerald stated:

> When we buy dog food from them now, we are taking food from them, and they cannot replace it with other food.[54]

White, however, did not endorse the Sergeant's suggestions that money be used in all transactions and that emergency supplies be stored for occasional assistance to despondent natives.

White's Role

Initially, White responded to the western operation with more enthusiasm than he did to the eastern operation. Soon, however, he strove to maintain the status quo and perhaps to even reduce the size of the operation. He received little direction from the government, but neither was he quick to volunteer information or recommendations that would have assisted in policy formation. He was allowed to do

just what he was doing and in turn, he wrote glowing annual reports which did little but bleat about the past accomplishments of the Force.

He must have been nervous of demands made by other Departments, demands which had he accepted them, would only have been met by sacrificing the R.N.W.M.P. budgetary estimates. When the operation was first mounted, he was disappointed by the lack of interest of other Departments[55]. Yet later, these same Departments were quick to call upon the Mounties to provide the services which lay well outside the mandate of the Force. In 1908, the Superintendent of the Forestry Branch of the Department of the Interior, having read newspaper reports of fires in the Mackenzie River region, inquired into the availability of police to assist in the reduction of man-made fires:

> May I ask whether that part of the country is patrolled by the Mounted Police, or if there is a sufficiently strong force to make it possible for them to undertake the prevention of fires in addition to their other duties.[56]

White was cool and patronizing in his reply:

> You will observe that the subject matter relates entirely to your Branch of the Department of the Interior, and the Indian Department. You ask whether the country referred to is patrolled by the Mounted Police, and if there is a sufficiently strong force to undertake the prevention of fires. In reply to this query I would say that only an occasional patrol of Police passes through the District, and it would be quite impossible for them to undertake the prevention of bush fires covering so large an area of territory within which we have no Police posts.[57]

In late 1909, a similar line of inquiry was initiated by R.N. Venning, the Superintendent of Fisheries, in which Venning asked whether the Police were available in the western Arctic to conduct fisheries duties[58]. During the next month, through correspondence between

Venning, White, G.J. Desbarats, the Deputy Minister of Marine and Fisheries, and the Justice Department, enough uncertainties regarding jurisdictional concerns and the technicalities of implementing Canadian law were raised to render Venning's suggestions unrealistic[59]. White's plan of 1903 was carried out in reduced form throughout the next decade. The operation, limited by the lack of a fisheries vessel or a patrol boat, was merely sustained. The oft-exerted pressures of the Inspectors in the field, of the Commissioner in Regina, and of fellow senior bureaucrats in Ottawa, did little to change White's perspective. He actively sought the maintenance of the status quo, thereby assuring himself a passive role in the creation of long-term government policy.

In so doing, he effectively re-shaped the Commissioner's judgement. Initially, there was every indication that Perry was more imaginative, more dynamic and more sincere than White in his hopes to achieve a large and relevant role for 'N' Division. It was he who actively encouraged the acquisition of a policeboat until at least 1905; it was he who continued to nudge White regarding an active police presence in the Arctic[60]; and apparently it was he who exerted sufficient pressure to ensure the establishment of a permanent detachment at Herschel Island. But eventually, Perry was lulled into the same "wait-and-see" attitude of White. Each new Inspector was instructed to gather information and each one made copious notes which were read by Perry and passed on to Ottawa, where they were filed.

Change, when it took place, took the same form as it did in the eastern Arctic. Downs has described this as "Change in

self-defense" and characterized it as the response of 'conserver officials' to pressure from external sources[61].

> The only changes they [conservers] strongly favour are those that reduce either their effort and inconvenience or the probability that any additional future changes will threaten their security.[62]

Both White and Perry could act and act immediately when disaster befell members of the Force or when political favour could be gained. It was not until after the disastrous winter of 1910 that many of the previously-relayed concerns regarding the importance of supplies and proper shelter were heeded. Fitzgerald had on several occasions emphasized the risk associated with the McPherson to Herschel route. Now he and his companions were dead, the victims of exposure and starvation as they attempted to complete the Dawson patrol. Perry reacted decisively, if belatedly[63]. He issued the authority to erect and stock four rest houses between Herschel and McPherson, and was adamant about getting supplies cached along the Peel River for the future use of the Dawson Patrol. His forthright directions would safeguard against a repeat of this unfortunate occurrence. His professional responsibilities would be fulfilled:

> Inspector Beyts has had long experience in winter travelling and I rely upon him to take every precaution for the safety of the lives of the men under his command when carrying out their arduous and dangerous duties. An efficient guide is essential on all winter patrols. The outfits should be the best obtainable. The men [are to be] supplied with suitable Arctic clothing at public expense[64].

Perry could not be stayed. For five years the Force had rented buildings owned by the Pacific Steam Whaling Company on Herschel Island; now Perry directed that they be purchased outright[65]. And for

the first time, a doctor was dispatched to 'N' Division, arriving at McPherson on September 19, 1911[66]. Just the winter before, Sergeant Selig had died of an ailment from which, had it been treated, he would probably have recovered. Disasters seemed the catalyst of initiative.

Similarly, White was ever-sensitive to the image of the Force. In a telling and rather candid remark to Perry in 1905, he betrayed to what degree he was so motivated:

> If we succeed in opening an all-Canadian route to the Yukon, we shall get credit for it. I know that some think I am fond of seeking for more work to do. It is this keeping ahead of settlement, and playing the pioneers, which has done so much for the reputation of the RNWMP.[65]

Again, five years later, he was on the lookout for duties which would afford the Force a high profile in the eyes of influential people. Mr. Frank Oliver, Minister of the Interior, was contemplating a trip from Edmonton to Dawson via the Mackenzie, Porcupine and Yukon Rivers. White understood that Oliver planned on using the Hudson's Bay Company to get him through, but White wrote Perry to forewarn him that he expected the Police to provide the service from Fort McPherson to Fort Yukon[68].

There were many people within the Force - Moodie, Howard, Jarvis, and even perhaps Perry - who would have disputed White's remarks regarding his lust to find more work for the Force. But one could hardly doubt his sincerity when he addressed concerns regarding the reputation of the Force. Reputations were obtained through the perceptions of outsiders and symbolic gains could be achieved which enhanced the image of the Force with a minimum of internal

administrative inconvenience. With every success so gained White sustained his own perception of a well-administered organization.

Conclusion

White approached the western Arctic operation with the stability of the Force chiefly in mind. During the initial years of the operation, the government hesitated to follow through with the initiative which had sparked the information-gathering expeditions. By the mid-decade, they appeared satisfied with the original advances gained by the R.N.W.M.P. White had successfully absorbed the impact of this government initiative with a minimal effect on the purpose, the structure, the rules or the activities of the Force. As a 'utility maximizer' he rationally channeled the influence of change by a relatively inexpensive allocation of resources. In the years which followed it was important that he control any influences which could upset the administratively rational process which he had directed. The repeated calls for a patrol boat, the request to establish an infrastructure designed to provide succor for the natives, the demands for a re-supply system which was efficient and reliable, all promised elements of administrative uncertainty which in the future might undermine his successes. White chose to deny the recommendations, for to do otherwise, would have sanctioned the threat of irritants to the overall good-functioning of the Force.

He refused to make the decisions which might allow uncertainty or the risk associated with change to encroach. The consequences - improperly positioned detachments, starving natives, the risk that the

Division's supplies might be destroyed - must be judged irrational when viewed from the very real perspective of the policemen positioned in the North. But for White, the rationality of inertia had triumphed.

NOTES

[1]In 1851, 375,000 barrels of whale oil were shipped from Hawaii destined for United States; by 1871, this quantity was reduced to 20,000 barrels. Everett S. Allen, Children of the Light: The Rise and Fall of New Bedford Whaling and the Death of the Arctic Fleet (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1973), pp. 180-182.

[2]West, p. 26.

[3]Ibid, p. 25.

[4]Crew and supplies would leave San Fransisco on ships destined for Port Clarence, Alaska. There they would rendezvous with whaling ships which had come from the Arctic and each vessels' respective cargos would be transferred. The whaling ships would then reverse course and either winter at Herschel after whaling the remainder of the season, or offload the cargo at Herschel for other crews and return to San Fransisco at the completion of the hunt for that season. For this reason, men were hired by 1895 for periods of three to five years, with a crew averaging some forty-two men in number. Arthur James Allen, A Whaler and Trader in the Arctic: 1895-1944, with an introduction and epilogue by Rusty Heurlin (Anchorage: Alaska Northwest Publishing Company, 1978), pp. 9-15.

[5]The whalebone taken by the 'Balaena' was valued at $150,000. The vessel had taken 27 whales. Yet during that same season, the 'Narwhal' had bagged only two, the 'Fearless' two and the 'Beluga' and 'Bowhead' none. San Francisco Chronicle, 9 October 1900, in Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 314: 177-06.

[6]Not one whaling vessel remained at Herschel Island during the winter of 1899-1900. Edmonton Bulletin, 12 October 1900, in Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 134: 177-06. The 'Narwhal' wintered some 250 miles northeast of Herschel Island, off Baillie Island, in the company of two other ships. Allen, A Whaler and Trader, p. 96, 102.

[7]Morris Zaslow, The Opening, p. 258; West, p. 258.

[8]Allen, A Whaler and Trader, pp. 15-57. Other problems plagued the Arctic operators of the Pacific Steam Whaling Company and the H. Liebes Company, both of San Francisco. The discovery of gold in the Yukon and Alaska and the subsequent publication of easily gained riches did little to enhance the morale of whaling shipmates marooned on a

tiny pinpoint of land isolated in the Arctic. Desertions from the icebound ships were few, but the threat of men escaping to Alaska, lured by the promise of instant wealth, loomed heavily in the minds of the Seamasters.

[9]In November 1904, A Bowen-Perry once again travelled to San Francisco. This time he looked into the feasibility of chartering a fully-manned vessel to patrol the Mackenzie Bay regions and the ocean waters east. White intended to "place a Police Officer on the ship with instructions to get all that is possible out of it during the season and report results for the consideration and future action of the government". Before Perry's departure, White cautioned him not to commit himself "to any definite arrangement". White to Perry, 14 November 1904, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 314: 177-06. Regarding Perry's commitment to acquiring a boat, and White's acknowledgement of the possibility to plan for one, see: Perry to White, 14 July 1904 and ciphered telegram, White to Perry, 18 July 1904, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C, volume 235: 296-02.

[10]Report, Sgt. Fitzgerald to Officer Commanding 'G' Division, Fort McPherson, 1 October 1903, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 235: 296-02.

[11]The Reverend Whittaker of the Church of England travelled to Peel River that winter, and rented his small hut and a store-house at Herschel to the R.N.W.M.P. for a $5 monthly charge. Report, Sgt. F. J. Fitzgerald to Officer Commanding 'G' Division, 20 August 1904, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 235: 296-02.

[12]During the period 17 July 1905 - 31 January 1906, detachment members conducted five patrols, three to Red River and two to Herschel Island to wile away the time. See: Report and Diary of Inspector Howard, 17 July 1905 - 31 January 1906, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 309: 112-06.

[13]So named and created in early 1905. In writing to Perry, White suggested:

> "Don't you think it would be well to create a new Division - say 'N'- for all territory west and north of Athabasca Landing, in the same manner as we created a new Division -'M' - for Hudson Bay; . . ."

White to Perry, 14 February 1905, Comptroller's Papers, Record group 18, P.A.C., volume 3029.

[14]Memorandum, A. Bowen-Perry to Inspector A. M. Jarvis, 7 May 1907, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 353: 149-08.

[15]Ibid.

[16]See: Jarvis to Perry, Herschel Island, 4 August 1907 and Harvis to Perry, on Board the S.S. 'Beluga', 24 August 1907, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 353: 149-08.

[17]Reports G. L. Jennings to Perry, 1 August 1909, 11 August 1909 and 10 September 1909, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 383: 55-10.

[18]Cpl Somers, in his report for 1 December 1910 - 30 June 1911, cites the cause of Sgt. Selig's death on the evening of 28-29 January 1911 as "some internal complaint, like bladder trouble". But Dick North in The Lost Patrol (Anchorage: Alaska Northwest Publishing Company, 1978), p. 111., claims that the fatal disease was a throat ailment. See: Report, Cpl. Somers to Officer Commanding in charge of 'N' Division, 7 July 1911, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 411: 309-11.

[19]Memorandum entitled 'Estimates 1904-05: NW Territories', White to Laurier, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 268: 171-04.

[20]Jennings reported in 1910:

> "Police Duties: Little or none to be done here. Patrols and general protection of the natives constitutes all."

Inspection Report, Fort McPherson, Jennings to Perry, 15 February 1910, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 383: 55-10.

[21]Inspection Report, Herschel Island Detachment, 7 August 1909, Jennings to Perry, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 383: 55-10.

[22]Report, 1 December 1908 - 5 May 1909, Fitzgerald to Perry, Herschel Island, 16 May 1909, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 372: 236-09.

[23]From 1 July 1909 to 30 June 1910, 'N' Division collected a total of $713.25 custom's revenue, $649.07 of which was gathered at the detachment at Herschel. During this same period, the police patrolled 5715 miles, 2860 of which were on the water. Twelve miners were known to be working the area bounded by the Peel River, the Porcupine River and the Alaskan boundary. See: 'The Mackenzie River District Report', Jennings to Commander 'N' Division, Fort McPherson, 9 July 1910, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 383: 55-10. The Headquarters of 'N' Division had been transferred from Herschel to Athabasca Landing, thereby facilitating communications with Regina and Ottawa.

[24]Fitzgerald felt vulnerable while located so far from Herschel, uncertain of events as they transpired there and powerless in circumstances beyond his control. He felt that "a Police detachment is useless at Fort McPherson, [as] the Indians in that district are harmless, [and] there is no inducement for them to break the law ...." Report, Sgt. Fitzgerald to Officer Commanding 'G' Division, Fort McPherson, 1 October 1903, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 235: 296-02.

[25]In February 1906, Howard asked that the Headquarters of 'N' Division be located at Fort Simpson, with detachments at Smith's Landing, Resolution, Providence, Good Hope and McPherson. Significantly, he recognized the importance of Fort McPherson as a

center of communications from where the Dawson Patrol could be supplied and a link could be maintained with the yet-to-be established Herschel Island Detachment. Report, Howard to Perry, Fort McPherson, 14 February 1906, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 309: 112-06. Six months later, Howard emphasized what to him must well have been the obvious: the need for a strong detachment at Herschel. Howard to Perry, Herschel Island, 26 August 1906, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 309: 112-06.

[26]Regarding Herschel, see Ibid. Regarding Jarvis, see Report, Jarvis to Perry, Fort McPherson, 28 January 1908, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 353: 149-08.

[27]White to Perry, 13 April 1908, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 353: 149-08.

[28]From a report written by Jennings upon his return to Regina after having left Herschel on 8 August 1910 aboard the "Herman' which was destined for San Francisco after it travelled first east to Baillie Island. Report Jennings to Perry, Regina, 8 October 1910, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 383: 55-10.

[29]See various correspondence between Perry and White between 8 and 27 February 1905, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 314: 177-06. On 27 February 1905, White wrote to Perry:

> "Do not despair, we shall get one [a vessel] yet, but I would rather lose a year than to be drawn into a second edition of divided responsibility as in the case of the 'Arctic'. Ibid.

[30]White to Perry, 13 April 1908, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C, volume 353: 149-08.

[31]Before arriving at Fort McPherson, the supply goods had already travelled a long distance. They were usually purchased in eastern Canada and shipped by rail first to Calgary and then to Edmonton. They then were loaded upon wagons and transported the next one hundred miles to Athabasca Landing. Supplies were off-loaded and placed upon the steamer 'Athabasca' a flat-bottomed sternwheeler of 140 tons which transported the goods a further 265 miles before arriving at Grand Rapids. The next eighty-five miles of rapids necessitated the goods to be placed on barges, where they could be safely poled to the waiting steamer, the 'Graham'. Two hundred miles of riverway separated the supplies from the next barrier, a land portage of fourteen miles at Fort Smith. Only after this difficulty had been surpassed could the goods be loaded aboard the steamer 'Wrigley' which completed the long and costly route to Fort McPherson. So time-consuming was the shipment of materials that the Hudson's Bay Company only assured customers of one run by water each year for any landfalls north of Great Slave Lake. See: Edmonton Bulletin 6 August 1897, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 140: 445-97.

[32]Report, Howard to Perry, Fort McPherson, 16 July 1907, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 353: 149-08. In the very first year of operating in the Mackenzie River mouth the police experienced the hazards of an unexpected storm in this region. They had borrowed a Mission boat from the Reverend Whittaker for a trip

from Herschel to McPherson, but were trapped by a sudden storm which demolished the small boat. White to Perry, 31 October 1904, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 452: 6-14.

[33]Jarvis to Perry, Herschel Island, 20 November 1907, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 353: 149-08.

[34]Howard to Perry, 16 July 1907, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 353: 149-08.

[35]Correspondence Perry to White and White to Perry, 17 and 18 February 1904, Comptroller's Papers, Records Group 18, P.A.C., volume 235: 296-02; H. J. Knowles, Pacific Steam Whaling Company to Perry, San Francisco, 11 May 1904, Ibid.

[36]Report entitled: "Herschell [sic] Island, Report of Inspector G. L. Jennings re [illegible] of" in Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 410: 241-11.

[37]Howard to Perry, 16 July 1907, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 351: 149-08.

[38]Ibid.

[39]50-60 feet long, 14-15 feet wide, draught of four feet when empty, and a net tonnage of 25. See: "Herschell [sic] Island, Report of Inspector G. L. Jennings re. [illegible] of" in Comptroller's Papers, Records Group 18, P.A.C., volume 410: 241-11.

[40]Ibid.

[41]By August 1908, Sgt. Fitzgerald was quite candid regarding the sad state of affairs:

> "For two years I have sent a list of stores needed at this detachment, a very few arrived this summer, the others I have heard no word of. For nearly three years I have had to beg and borrow every lamp and wick that I have on the detachment, also brooms."

See: Report, Staff Sgt. Fitzgerald to Perry, Herschel Island, 1 August 1908, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 372: 236-09.

[42]Constantine to Commissioner Perry, 8 April 1901, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 335: 204-07.

[43]Superintendent Constantine to Mrs. Constantine, Chippewayan, 16 June 1903, in Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 235: 296-02; and Constantine to Perry, Edmonton, 28 November 1905, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 3029. In the former, relayed through Perry to White, Constantine stated:

> "It does not speak well for the Government that traders and the missionaries have them [the steam launches] for their work, and the Police and other Government Departments have to do their work by tracking and poling up the rivers - meaning a great loss of time, hardship and privation to the men".

[44]Perry to White, 3 December 1902, 22 December 1902, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 335: 204-07; marginal notes by Perry in relaying report to White, Constantine to Pery, 28 November 1905, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 3029; and Perry to White, 7 January 1911, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 397: 4-11.

[45]White to Perry, 18 December 1902, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 335: 204-07. Ironically, Constantine went into great detail in proving that the Force would in the long term save considerable expense by procurring the vessels for their own use and save the high charges demanded by the Hudson's Bay Company and the Missionary boats. Constantine estimated that the initial expenditure for three steamers which would work the river system from present-day Fort McMurray to Fort McPherson would be $8,000. See: Superintendent Constantine to Mrs. Constantine, 16 June 1903, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 235: 296-02.

[46]White to Perry, 18 December 1902, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 335: 204-07; various items of correspondence between the Secretary of Department of Indian Affairs and Fred White and return, dated 1 through 5 March 1907, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 335: 204-07.

[47]Report, Fitzgerald to Officer Commanding 'G' Division, 7 September 1904, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 235: 296-02.

[48]One arrived in July aboard a Hudson's Bay Company Steamer, another during the winter from the Yukon and another in February, which had journeyed from Edmonton. Jarvis to Perry, Fort McPherson, no date (probably 12 February 1908), Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 353: 149-08. Mail service along the Mackenzie was initiated in 1901. Zaslow, The Opening, p. 237.

[49]Howard to Perry, Fort McPherson, 18 January 1907, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 353: 149-08.

[50]He estimated that if he fed them each one meal a day, they would be out of supplies in two weeks. Fitzgerald to Perry, Herschel Island, 6 May 1909, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 372: 236-09.

[51]Ibid.

[52]Staff Sergeant Fitzgerald to Perry, Fort McPherson, 10 February 1909, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 372: 236-09.

[53]Ibid.

[54]Fitzgerald to Perry, Herschel Island, 4 December 1909, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 372: 236-09.

[55]In correspondence to Perry, he stated:

> "I have been much disappointed by the apathy of the other Departments. Nothing has been done in connection with the proposed Fishery Service Patrol in McKenzie [sic] Bay, and, with the exception of the Customs, none of the Departments appear to realize that there is anything in the far north that is worth developing".

White to Perry, 19 May 1903, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 235: 296-02.

[56]R. H. Campbell to Fred White, 8 October 1908, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 353: 149-08.

[57]White to R. H. Campbell, 14 October 1908, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 353: 149-08. White's rather defensive tone was caused by two reasons. Campbell, in his letter of 8 October, presumed to instruct White that it was "a serious mistake to reduce the Mounted Police Force, especially in that northern country", and he suggested that they were the ideal force to handle "the protection of timber and the various other requirements of such a new country". This 'advice' - advice which was contrary to White's long term plan - came literally days after he received a report from Inspector Jarvis which similarly suggested regular patrols of a small force along the Valley to deter such forest fires. Report, Inspector Jarvis to Commissioner Perry, 13 September 1908, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 353: 149-08. Also, while White could claim in his letter to Campbell that no detachments existed in the area, it must be remembered that Inspector Howard had earlier recommended the establishment of police posts in this very region. White had every reason to be defensive: facts and circumstances were building to threaten his plan for reduced police commitments in the western Arctic.

[58]In a clear display of how little the government action in the Arctic was the result of concerted and unified policy, Venning wrote:

> "The Inspector of Fisheries for the Yukon District reports to the Department that a very considerable number of United States Whaling Vessels winter at Herschell [sic] Island, North of the main Coast of the Yukon Territory, and that these Vessels carry on Whaling operations to a very considerable extent in Canadian Territorial waters . . . . I should be much obliged if you would be good enough to inform me whether your Department maintains any police posts at or near Herschell [sic] Island, and if so whether you could arrange for a supervision of the operations carried on by United States Whaling Vessels in the Territorial Waters there".

R. N. Venning to F. White, 18 December 1909, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 384: 69-10. One wonders, in retrospect, how the information of the Yukon Inspector could have been so obsolete and how the Department Head in Ottawa could be so uninformed about the western whaling operations. It suggests that there was little information amongst senior levels of the Administration regarding the government presence there.

[59]White to Venning, 20 December 1909, and G. J. Desbaras to White, 19 January 1910, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 384: 69-10.

[60]In late 1905, Perry forwarded to White newspaper clippings regarding whaling vessels trapped in the ice east of Alaska, and recalled the disorder of 1897, when a similar occurrence had transpired in American waters. Perry to White, 4 November 1905, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 314: 177-06.

[61]Downs, Inside, p. 200.

[62]Ibid, p. 97.

[63]The gravity of this disastrous winter can be understood when it is realized that with the deaths of four men on the Dawson patrol and that of Sergeant Selig, 'N' Division's northern complement was reduced by more than one half. Three of the eight men survived: Corporal Somers and Constable Blake at Fort McPherson and Constable Wissenden at Herschel. See North, p. 111.

[64]Memorandum, Perry to Officer Commanding in Charge Athabasca Landing, 9 May 1911, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 447: 401-13.

[65]Ibid. In 1906, when plans were being prepared to move the headquarters of 'N' Division from McPherson to Herschel, Perry and White had differed as to whether these buildings should be rented or purchased, and if purchased, at what price. See correspondence between Perry and White from 6-15 October 1906, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 309: 112-06. It is telling that Perry, even then, questioned the relevancy of a future police role:

> "Of course, if we can rent the buildings for a term of years, it probably would be better. Should whaling operations in the Beaufort Sea terminate at any time, there would be no further necessity for a Detachment at Herschel Island".

Perry to White, 15 October 1906, Ibid. This reasoning, while extremely rational, begs two questions. Why was there a delay of three and a half years in establishing a detachment at Herschel after the post at McPherson had been erected, and why did Perry decide to purchase the building in 1911, when all indications pointed towards the imminent termination of whaling operations in the Beaufort Sea?

[66]C. H. Wilson, Acting Assistant Surgeon R.N.W.M.P. to Officer Commanding 'N' Division, Fort McPherson, 21 January 1912, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 425: 258-12.

[67]Letter entitled 'Re Peace Yukon Trail', White to Perry, 13 March 1905, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 3029.

[68]White to Perry, 6 May 1910, Comptroller's Papers, Record Group 18, P.A.C., volume 392: 359-10.

CONCLUSION

The government moved quickly in the Yukon to protect the nation's sovereign rights and to enforce the Dominion's laws. To do so, it turned to the N.W.M.P. Yet the isolation of the Yukon and the unprecedented requirement for swift and effective decision-making shifted power from Regina and Ottawa to Dawson City. Consequently, while the prestige and credibility of the N.W.M.P. increased immeasurably, the formalized means of obtaining rational results were usurped. Politicians and the public alike heaped merit upon the Force, dragging Comptroller Fred White into the glitter of success despite his many personal protests against the tasks being conducted. Later, White could not escape, nor did he necessarily wish to escape, the accolades which wedded the police to events in the Yukon. When Sifton insisted on Mounted Police involvement in the eastern Arctic, he did so because of the Force's record in coping with unforeseen duties in the harsh Yukon environment. When other departments requested the services of the police, they did so because of the growing folklore born of the Klondike. White cherished, indeed cultivated this handsome reputation, but desired none of the instability which this form of pioneer work brought to the N.W.M.P.

The initiative which launched the expedition of 1903 was political. By 1905, however, the driving force was shifting silently, almost imperceptibly, from the political to the administrative. There was no national crisis as there had been in the Yukon. There was no expanding prairie population to direct a dynamic and all-encompassing political strategy. What was now required was the expertise of a systems' manager to oversee the police operations while tendering advise to the government. What was required was a return to the traditional role of the Comptroller's offices.

The manner in which White performed this function in the ensuing years measures the degree to which he was successful in shaping his professional and decision-making environment. His reports to the government, while informative, were not the stuff from which national strategy could emerge. Seldom was there mention of the plight of the natives, the requirement for an ocean-going supply and reconnaisance vessel, or the need for new detachments. To do so might be to jeopardize the intrusion of the political decision-makers into an increasingly stabilized administrative structure. He supplied information to the government as he was duty-bound, but invariably it reinforced the level of expertise which the R.N.W.M.P. brought to its duties, while emphasizing the singular function that White provided. He pre-empted the requirement for political input[1]. White's reports most often juxtaposed information about whaling, mining and trading with the reputation-enhancing accomplishments of the northern detachments. With little analysis and few recommendations, his reports described the present and future duties with the confidence obtained

from past successes. He catered to the favourable attention of the government, sustaining the reputation gained in the Yukon while protecting the R.N.W.M.P. from similar risk-taking operations.

In the absence of the political initiative, no national northern policy emerged. Consequently, White could legitimately claim to be at a disadvantage in supporting the recommendations which regularly arrived from the field commanders. Most suggestions from the North were ignored or turned down. The control he exercised in the processing of information was all-important. Detachment commanders called for changes in the location of the detachments, in the procedures used to supply and support them, and in the tasks to be accomplished by them.

Left to the decision-maker who compares objectives to national policies, the choice is clear: relocate detachments, reorganize supply lines or redefine and assume new responsibilities. This happened to the N.W.M.P. during the crucial Yukon years. But left to the decision-maker who is responsible for organizational management, the opposite choice is equally clear: minimize the risk, entrench procedures, embellish past successes and solidify external reliance upon the organization's present service. White strove for and accomplished this during the Arctic operations from 1903 to 1911. The result: an irrational product, rationally obtained.

Indeed the only initiatives which White implemented during these years were those which addressed circumstances which, if left

unattended, would have invited political intervention into his decision-making environment. He secured a method of supplying 'M' Division with a police-owned or controlled boat on Hudson Bay; he approved the placement of emergency huts between Churchill and Fullerton, and between McPherson and Herschel; he hired doctors for the two northern Divisions; and he oversaw the caching of supplies along the Peel River. Significantly, detachment commanders had long requested these services, but it was not until there was publicity about the disastrous winter of 1910 that White was forced to act. Administrative measures were undertaken to forestall imposed external change.

By 1911, the northern police presence was entrenched. In the East, the 'M' Division Headquarters remained without electric lighting during the long winter darkness, cut off from the small community of Churchill several miles away for want of a telephone link. Fullerton Detachment would remain open periodically for the next several years while a new detachment at York Factory would provide an increased sense of purpose. The political initiative - the opening of the southwest corner of Hudson Bay as a transportation terminus - would provide the R.N.W.M.P. with a raison d'etre which the administrative initiative in the previous eight years had failed to do. In the West, the new men at Herschel moved into recently purchased buildings on the island. They and their colleagues at Fort McPherson could not travel along the coast, nor mount a river patrol along the Mackenzie. Like their predecessors, they relied upon hearsay to account for the whereabouts

of travellers and traders. Their function was to survive and to communicate their survival to the outside world.

In the eight years which had elapsed, the whalers were unquestionably gone and the sovereignty issue was dormant. The idealist Moodie had been replaced; the enthusiastic Fitzgerald was dead; Clifford Sifton was gone from his powerful position of authority.

Comptroller Fred White, the linchpin of the northern police operations, survived. Decorated for his excellence in service to the government, he was the Commissioner of Canada's North. The will and power of administrative authority had endured the test of time.

NOTES

[1]The government recognized White's knowledge in northern matters while symbolizing their reliance upon his expertise by appointing him Commissioner of the reshaped North-West Territories in 1905.

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